Climate of Fear and Food Insecurity in Africa

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War was thought to be an end of history. End of history, not only in the form of liberal international system as postulated by Francis Fukuyama, but also an end of history from holistic perspective where sustainable development would be the order of the day. What *perestroika* and *glasnost* brought to Africa amount to misery, poverty, maldevelopment and a lacuna in the area of economic opportunities. To most states in the continent, clouds of war, conflicts, banditry, kidnapping and politics of zero-sum-game pervade the atmosphere. The end result of this comes directly to the down-trodden people who are the majority and stay in the countryside. A few states did not taste the bitter pills of instability, but this does not mean that they enjoy food security. The imposed neoliberal international economic relations subjected Africa to the level of "beggar-thy-west" policy where humanitarian aid continue to feed the continent. This was in the form of producing what Africans hardly consume, but consume what they do not produce. Instability that these attributes generate are lingering in the continent in the form of climate of fear. This commentary focuses on the impact of instability on food security and how the continent is coping with the same. Relying on secondary sources of data and embedded liberal theory, with some flavours of social constructivism, the paper concludes that electoral system that are indigenous to the continent's environment will promote sustainable food security and by extension, food sovereignty.

Wole Soyinka (2005) in his *climate of fear: the quest for dignity in a dehumanized world* examined how "Army of God" polluted the globe

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with religious fundamentalism; the effects that is causing political instability between *us* and *them,* another form of Afrophobia/religiophobia/Islamophobia as captured by Amusan and Mchunu (2018). Human productivity and performance in whatever venture is naturally limited by the atmosphere of fear, danger, and instability. Instability creates tendency of uncertainty, insecurity, and anarchy, which in turn, disrupt productive activities of states (Kah 2017; Onwusirib *et. al.,* 2015; Pate 2014). The African state in its current form is laden with instability caused by war, conflicts, insurgency, banditry, kidnapping, and activities of gunmen (Christakis 2013; Mlambo & Dlamini 2019). The unending crisis in some African countries - Central African Republic (CAR), Congo, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, South Sudan, among others - buttress the fact that Africa is a potential source of climate of fear (Ngoh 2013; Gegout, 2018). Some of the daily news making the internet rounds of deadly attacks in some African states, especially, Libya, Nigeria and South Sudan are unspeakable and destructive of human development (Kah 2017; Onwusirib *et. al.,* 2015). The killing of rice farmers in Borno State, Northern part of Nigeria by Boko-Haram armed members not only threatens food security of the country, it subjects farmers into fear, which in turn, inflict on them psychological trauma (Amusan & Ejoke, 2017). This has implications for food insecurity in terms of quantity and quality of food required for nourishment.

Africa is supposed to be stable and safe for it to be free from problem of hunger and mal-nutrition. But its abysmal performance in the attainment of the SDGs two (No hunger, food security and sustainable nutrition) is partly attributed to overwhelming cases of instability that characterises the continent's polity (Imaseun 2015; Kah 2017). Thus, to achieve this feat (SDG 2), Africa needs to be stable to boost agricultural food production. However, the current situation where insurgents and bandits hold sway defeats the chances of meeting the SDG 2. The insurgents' attacks on markets, livestock holding does not only reduced income from sales of livestock, but prevents

attempts at future agricultural food production (Kah 2017). Many large-scale farmers have resorted to switching their farming job for other safe ones, for fear of being killed or rendered bankrupt by violent herders and bandits.

In a bid to address the climate of fear, measures have been designed and implemented by African leaders and governments at regional, sub-regional, and national levels to address instability-induced food insecurity problems. At the national level, there are several intra-state measures specifically established to tackle instability problem. For instance, in Nigeria, there is the Joint Task Force Codenamed Operation Restore Order/Hope (JTF-ORO) (Akubor & Okolo 2019; Amusan 2014), in addition, there are regional based community security forces (Amotekun, Eastern Security Network-ESN, Civilian Joint Task Force-CJTF among others) (Akubor & Okolo 2019) specially formed to tackle insecurity. These security forces are established to complement the conventional security forces in Nigeria. Similarly, other conflict-prone states in Africa, like Cameroun (Multipurpose Intervention Group of the National Gendarmerie-GPIGN), Chad (Chadian Nomadic National Guard), Libya (Libyan Arab Armed Forces) among others aim at atmosphere of serenity for sustainable development. Also, at the regional and sub-regional levels, the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS), and others security measures were taken to address Africa's insecurity.

Despite these measures, Africa is still increasingly unsafe for investment in food chain value. The displacement of farmers and irregular migration to escape from conflicting zones in part of Africa is the bane of the continent's high score (30-50, that is, alarmingly too high) in hunger and undernourishment perception index (FAO *et al.,* 2017). The increasing rate of hunger and mal-nutrition is due to the rise in conflict-affected countries, which in turn, is the leading cause of famine and malnutrition. The latest FAO data (2020) shows

that Africa hosts 256 million hungry people due to rising cases of food insecurity, and may not be able achieve the SDGs two (no hunger) in 2030. Conflict, which sometimes creates an atmosphere of fear contributes to unfavourable statistics on food security in Africa (FAO 2020).

The continent's food security project is affected by instability; the idea of killing in the name of God or forceful conversion of people from their faith by religious fundamentalists are not only threatening, they sometimes caused long term perpetual desperation. This tends to scare famers away from farming. Majority of African farmers are now potential refugees in neighbouring African states due to incessant attacks by Islamic insurgents (Mlambo & Dlamini 2019). This is in contrary to what the Holy Qur'an (Sura 2, Al-Baqarah 256) dictates that there is no compulsion in religion. The fear of being kidnapped while conveying farm produce to markets, grossly affects consumers' access to, and utilization of food. Onwusiribe *et al.,* (2015) report that the incessant crisis of kidnapping in Northern Nigeria halts supply of food to the Southern part. Besides, it has negative effect on exportation, as many of the cash crops have either been set ablaze or stolen by ravaging bandits and insurgents. This has undernourishment implication with untold health challenges in the midst of unemployment and disguised employment that pervades the continent (Imaseun 2015; FAO 2020; Global Hunger Index 2020). These scenario ginger this paper as an intervention aimed at advancing new knowledge on how Africa can navigate its insecurity problem to boost food security.

Many studies (Dubagat 2013; Hemen 2013; Kah 2017; Ngoh 2013) investigated the organic linkages between instability and food insecurity, this paper examines further how the twin issues impact on psychological disruptive aspect. This paper unlike other studies, argues that an attempt to proffer solutions to allay Africa's climate of fear is instrumental to boosting of food security, as it is envisaged that an inquiry into how induced food insecurity will stimulate evidence-based findings and policy directions that could significantly address Africa's

food insecurity challenges. It is in the light of the foregoing that the paper interrogates the implications of political topsy-turvy on food security in the continent. The next section examines the challenges of insecurity and an agent of food insecurity as discussed below.

Insecurity, Instability, and Food Insecurity: A Conceptual Review
It has been established and well documented that a conflictual environment is detrimental to productive activities (Cards, 2019; FAO 2015). It will be deceptive to expect improvement in human conditions in an insecure environment of fear and anxiety which in the long run scare people from engaging in their normal routinized activities including agricultural food activity. Conflict takes heavy toll on food security (Onwusiribe et al., 2015; Willett 2001). Rural farmers are the prime object of both internal displacement and seeking for refuge in neighbouring states as the case of South Sudan in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, DRC and CAR; the same is applicable in Nigeria as sedentary farmers have to relocate to Benin Republic due to the herders' incursion in the Ibarapa area of Oyo state in the country (Ajayi 2021; Gegout 2018; Okunlola 2016; Vickers 2013;). Insecurity and instability are the feeling of danger, uncertainty, risk, and fear that tend to hinder the progressive reasoning and performance of people and country. Africa's major security problem is provoked by conflict or violence caused by fundamentalists and bandits with direct negative impacts on food security and food sovereighty of a nation (Epule *et al* 2012; UN 2011).

For instance, forceful encroachment by Boko-Haram insurgents into farm holdings to kill and loot farm produce is enough to discourage farmers from farming during planting season. Evidence, from the foregoing shows that insecurity and instability are social problems caused by conflict, war, insurgency, and activities of bandits, fundamentalists, and ethnic militias. The cause of insecurity has been blamed on factors such as governance failure, greed of warlords, religion-fanaticism, the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms,

hunger and poverty (Amusan 2015; Collier, 2000; FAO 2020; Idike & Agu, 2014; Malmbo & Dlamini 2019).

On food insecurity, it means lack of food in the right quantity and quality at all times for human consumption. Food security across the world has been established as a critical element of state security, as its absence can trigger the disruption of state peace and security (Amusan 2015; Clover 2013). It is an individual access (physical, social, and economic) to satisfactory food that meet their dietary needs to live a healthy life (USAID 2015). Amusan and Agunyai (2021) defined it, as ability of all humans to eat food at all times in good quantity, quality, and adequate nutrients for a healthy growth and development. It is a situation of food sufficiency with no hunger or fear of starvation and absence of hidden hunger (Kah 2017; Wawa 2018/2019). Africa remains the most largely affected continent by hunger and malnutrition (FAO 2020). Sub-Saharan Africa is worse hit by hunger, as it was confirmed in a report (Kah 2017) that five of the six countries ravaged by hunger were in the Sub-Saharan. It is also on record that the large number of malnourished people in Africa are far below global hygienic, sanitation and nutrient standard. FAO (2017) reports that the numbers of undernourished people in SSA rose from 220 to 224 million, representing 25% of 815 million people undernourished globally in 2016. From this report, it is obvious that a quarter of the world's undernourished people live in Sub-Saharan Africa, making it the region with the highest cases of malnourished people in the world.

Food insecurity, sometimes provokes conflict, a source of atmosphere of fear that discourages engagement in agricultural food production (Awodola & Oboshi 2015). It was specifically revealed that since the outbreak of Boko-Haram conflict, Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, has lost its teeming marketing status, which makes it hub of business centre linking Nigeria, Chad and Cameroun (Awodola & Oboshi 2015). The incessant attacks by the religious fundamentalist coupled with the challenges of climate change on the Lake Chad are

the twin negative factors that perpetuate food insecurity with emphasis on fishing (once flourished Baga fish market has turned to a ghost town) and grain production in the North-East geo political area of Nigeria (Amusan 2013). Thus, it would be very difficult to cultivate land for planting of crops, under the perpetual fear that such cultivation will soon be forcefully looted by armed bandits. This accounts for the greatest problem confronting African farmers that is rarely investigated. It is highly devastating and traumatising to invest in agricultural food production, only to realise later that the entire farm produce is harvested to feed Boko-Haram insurgents and other bandits in the forest; hence aggravate atmosphere of helplessness and ravaging poverty (Muhammad 2015).

Implications of Climate of Fear for Food Insecurity in Africa

Fear is usually a psychological problem caused by a frightening experience, which in most cases is due to conflict (Amusan & Ejoke 2020; Obafemi & Galadima 2013). Conflict creates tendency of danger and risk, which in turn, inflict on victims' fear (Mbombo 2015). In the literature, fear as the bane of food insecurity is an aspect, that is rarely investigated. Unlike other factors that exacerbate food insecurity, fear is the real determinant of farmers productivity (Muhammad 2015). Evidence has shown that despite conflict and instability in some African states, some farmers still summon courage for agricultural food production (Kah 2017). This goes to show that it is the climate of fear and not the conflict that scares farmers from food production. However, it has also been argued that it is very difficult to see fearless people in the face of intense conflict (Muhammad 2015).

Climate of fear, which is displayed in form of avoiding any productive activity for fear of being kidnapped for ransom or killed. On several occasions, farmers would be forced to supply food to the final consumers or disruption in the total food chain due to the atmosphere of insecurity. In Nigeria for example, no region is safe, there is the perpetual fear of ravaging insecurity across the land. The

same is applicable to Kenya, Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Mozambique DRC, CAR, Mali and Chad to mention a few states that are contending with instability. The movement of people and food across various regions through the road has been difficult in recent times due to incessant case of kidnapping, bandits, and unknown gunmen. This has implication for food crisis and high price of food (Awodola & Oboshi 2015; Kah 2017; Onwusiribe et al 2015). Kah (2017), specifically notes that most pedestrian bridges in the Northern part of Nigeria have been bombed, vehicles conveying food supply are ambushed, harvested crops destroyed, and driver killed. This created further atmosphere of fear that prevents future food production.

One other implication of climate fear is panic buying of available food at a very high cost. Conflicting countries where famine is predominant are faced with the challenge of panic buying at exorbitant prices caused by hike in transport cost and paucity of raw food in the market (FAO 2017; Kah 2017; Nforngwa 2016). This is in addition to several amount of money spent on major highways to security forces who openly demand for money from drivers. All of these are added to the price of food, making it very difficult for people to access available food in the market (Awodola & Oboshi 2015; FAO 2020).

Coupled with the challenges of climate change and incapacitated of many African states to come with precision weather forecast, also questions of when, where and how to plant is another shortcoming in the age of el-Niña and el-Niño where draught and flooding continue to militate against food sovereignty in Africa. Many farmers lost their plant due to lack of rainfall, the major source of water for sedentary farmers. Irrigation that is common among large scale farmers has its own challenges as the food these farmers produce can hardly be found in the African market. They sell to multinational humanitarian organisations, turn their products to animal feeds and others for alternative fuel, bio-fuel (Brown, Hawkins & Doran-Peterson 2017). In Nigeria farmers have become prey in the hands of Fulani herders

who unlawfully encroached on farms in the southern part of the country with their cattle and eat up all crops, and sometimes kill the farmers who oppose them. This ugly circumstance does not only create fear, but threatens food production (Akubor & Okolo 2019). It leads to shortage of food not only in the market but in refugee camps across the country (Kah 2017). It was reported that because of the activities of Boko-Haram, Islamic State for West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) among others have created the atmosphere of fear that hinder food availability, accessibility and affordability.

The utilization aspect of food security is also not exempted from the problem of climate of fear. Food nutrition and nourishment are components of food security threatened by conflict and instability. This fear has made many farmers adopt inorganic farming practices to boost food quantity without adequate nutrients; a scenario that compromise human health (2017). Amusan (2017) specifically notes that, even though the Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), which is aimed at modifying plants and animals for quantity food availability breed hidden hunger. This is a ploy to promoter multinational pharmaceutical companies as the case of Bayer dominated by Bill Gates (Bunarek 2018).

From the foregoing analysis, it can be deduced that climate of fear affects all the components of food security. Consequently, aggravating tendency of food insecurity. The fear to produce food in large quantity affect accessibility to and availability of food. Similarly, fear which hinders free flow of food supply to consumers is a threat to food security. And climate of fear that pushes farmers to substitute organic food for the inorganic one, is a potential source of undernourishment. All of these contribute to food insecurity in Africa.

Measures to Address Climate of Fear and Food Insecurity as a Matter of Conclusion

Peaceful atmosphere is a critical determinant of human development, because humans tend to be highly productive when their life is safe and secured. Peace is fundamental to the attainment of SDGs (especially Goal 2). To achieve peace and security, factors causing conflicts and instability need attention. The issue of governance failure that has been blamed for the cause of incessant conflict in Africa, can be corrected though the voting out of underperforming governments in subsequent elections by the citizens (Ilias 2015). This needs to be addressed taken into consideration the challenges of ethnicity, religious bigotry and challenges of populism that affect elections outcome in many states in the continent. Power of incumbency is another issue that needs to be addressed through political socialisation and political culture for a sustainable development. Besides, targeted government support for farmers to return to active food production is needed through security support in the countryside. There is also a need to create an enabling environment through fund availability from Agric banks with single digit interest meant primarily for farming with emphasis on food production. The feeling of compensation and protection from the government can boost the morale of farmers to return to agricultural food production. Dialogue with key members of anti-state organisations, especially the ones calling for secession through identifying their grouse against the state and immediately attend to their complaints will go a long way in healing and appeasing their minds against conflict.

There is a need for community policing, especially in rural areas to protect farmers from activities of bandits. This will enhance the effective control of forest reserves against invaders and terrorists. Furthermore, strong political will by African leaders will make a huge difference in tackling conflict and insurgency in some African states. This should also be replicated in assisting farmers with adequate facilities for food production.

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To sustain this feat, Africa needs leaders with strong political will to dispel conflict and allay fears in the land in form of good governance promotion and inclusive government that foster a sense of belonging on Africans. If all Africans are exposed to idea that the continent's resources belong to all for the good of all and not for a few, the tendency of hostility and acrimony against the state will be reduced. The reduction in acrimony and hostility promotes togetherness and unity, which in turn, promote security and peace. Thus, with peace and security in the land, everyone, including farmers will be productively engaged. Peace, effective productivity and adequate supports from government will go a long way in enhancing Africa's chances of achieving food security.

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Dissection of Hazardous Climate and Farmer-herder Conflicts in Nigeria

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Abstract

This study analyses the impacts of hazardous climate on Nigeria's farmer-herder conflicts. Using variables - temperature, droughts, and rainfall – this paper dissects hazardous climate on the conflicts in terms of duration, incidents, and deaths. Relying on data from Nigerian Security Tracker, Nigeria Watch, World Bank's Climate Portal, Climate.org, and the Federal Ministry of Environment, from 2014 to 2019, this study analyses the temporal and spatial dimensions of the conflicts using regression - a statistical technique used to examine the correlations between two or more variables having cause-effect relations which also have predictive abilities. This study found evidence that temperature, rainfall, and droughts are climatic factors that influence the farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria. In addition, the study found some seasonal and spatial patterns with North Central region of the country being the hard-hit.

***Keywords**: Hazardous climate, farmer-herder conflicts, droughts.*

Introduction

The past few decades have seen scholars making frantic attempts to establish a potential link between climate vulnerabilities/hazards and political violence in Africa. Despite the considerable amount of time, efforts, and resources, there is still no consensus regarding the estimated

effects of climate hazards, variability, and vulnerabilities on conflicts (von Uexkull, Croicu, Fjelde, & Buhaug, 2016; Buhaug, Benjaminsen, Sjaastad, & Magnus, 2015). Literature in this area has largely suffered from the seeming lack of generalization or replication (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Blattman and Miguel, 2010).

Nonetheless, recent studies suggest that there is evidence of climate-violence link (Adigun, 2019, Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel, 2013; Hsiang and Burke, 2014). This claim has not, however, gone uncontested by scholars who contended that there are no relationships between them (Madu & Nwankwo 2020; Bejaminsen 2016). These scholars reject the notion that conflicts in the Sahel region of Africa are linked to climate change. They argued such linkage is too simplistic. One way to look at the lack of scholars' consensus in this area may be due to the different scopes and methodologies adopted. Also, many scholars focus on different forms of violence or contentions – from small to large - as units of analyses which has contributed to these mixed results (Nett & Rüttinger, 2016). But there seems to be consensus in the literature that even if a link is found between climate change and conflicts, such relations will be substantially weak (Buhaug, 2016) as a result of the fact that there are several other factors – political and socio-economic – that have more explanatory capacities than climate change (Detges, 2017; von Uexkull et al., 2016).

Due to the lack of consensus on the climate-conflict link in Africa, some scholars have shifted their attention to attempting to find a link between climate vulnerability and conflicts. While some authors argue that climate change-induced droughts, desertification, and hazards can lead to the loss of livelihoods which in turn leads to higher risks of conflicts, some others maintain that the opposite is the case. They contend that droughts reduce the chances of conflicts rather than increase it because organized violence requires huge resources (including food supply).

In their reasoned opinions, droughts prohibit conflict, because with decreasing resources less fighting is possible (Butler & Gates, 2012).

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However, there has been little attention from both sides of the divide about *empirically* establishing how the intensity of climate vulnerability changes the incidents and durations of low-intensity conflicts. Since military operations and standing armies could be too expensive, cheap forms of political violence might still be conceivable. An example of this is the farmers/pastoral conflicts in Nigeria. Thus, when looking at political violence, including all arrangements of civil conflict can distort the effect of droughts on more specific phenomena. This consideration would explain why many studies are unable to find the expected positive relationship. Moreover, it offers an objection to the argument that scarce resources lead to less conflict. Consequently, in this paper, we ask: Is there positive or negative relationship between climate-induced hazards and rural violence?

To answer this question, we will be analyzing the current data using standard research methods. This paper attempts to fill a research gap – finding evidence of the intensity of climate-induced hazards and variability causing rural violence in Africa. There appears to be less emphasis in literature in this aspect largely due to scholars either overlooking it or because it is one area that has been conspicuously *empirically* under-researched in the context of farmers/herdsmen relations between 2014 and 2019.

This paper is organized as follow: the next section provides reviews of previous studies on the climate-conflict connections, their shortcomings, and contributions concerning this current study. The paper proceeds to examine climate vulnerability in Nigeria concerning the West African context. After that, we proceeded to explain our data sources, methods and analytical models used in this paper. Next, we presented the results, empirical analysis, and discussions of our findings. Finally, the summary and conclusions from the paper were presented and suggestions for future research.

Related Literature

Scholars have examined the link between drought and conflict. Olsson (2016), in a study of Darfur conflicts, suggests there is evidence of climate change in the protracted war. Olsson's model shows that climate change can lead to resource disputes, market collapse, and weak trade among groups which may increase the risks of conflicts. The study argues that dwindling natural resources in vulnerable environments might cause conflict over these over-contrasting means. Like many studies before this (Kevane and Gray 2008) which found the changing weather conditions to be predictive factors and evidence of conflicts, it did not sufficiently explain the outbreak of violence. Maystadt, De Luca, Sekeris, and Ulimwengu (2014) explores the possible links between regional and monthly weather variation and conflict in Somalia. The study finds a cogent relationship linking droughts, measured by temperature anomalies, to the protracted unrest/conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Maystadt *et al.,* (2014) notes that the presence of lootable resources provides the right climate for conflicts as witnessed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Sudan.

In their study, Adams, Ide, Barnett and Detges (2018) observed most studies on the link between climate and conflict tend to focus solely on areas where violence already occurred. This, they argue, is like working from answers to questions and that can lead to bias results.

von Uexkull (2014), Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012), established that there is inverse relationship between rainfall and risks of rural conflicts in Africa. von Uexkull (2014) notes that Agricultural communities depend on rain and often feel marginalized in the period of poor rainfall and will likely be triggered into violence in their absence of external support.

Walch (2017), contends that climate change in the past years has led to a situation where insurgent groups take advantage of the frustrations of local populations caused by drought or poor rainfall as part of recruitment drives. When resources get depleted as a result of

increased droughts, insurgent groups may tempt the local population their much-needed resources in exchange for their support. There is ample evidence, however, to reject this claim. As Bejaminsen (2016) stated, this causal explanation as too simplistic and points out that historical tensions are at the root of the problem.

In a similar vein, Madu & Nwankwo (2020) analyse the spatial dimension of the farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria. They observed that, while climate change vulnerabilities may cause conflicts, the regions (in Nigeria) prone vulnerable to climate changes records lesser farmer-herder conflicts. They contend that while climatic hazards could influence herders' migration pattern, there is no evidence of droughts causing farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria.

In their study on climate change vulnerabilities in the Sahel region of Africa, Joiner, Kennedo, and Sampson (2012) examines the impacts of hazardous climate, population vulnerability, and poor governance as triggers of political violence in the region. They observed that climate change vulnerabilities vary across countries which makes it difficult to generalize the impacts of climate-induced hazards on conflicts in the region (ibid: 20).

On the impacts of climate change on conflicts, Joiner, Kennedo, and Sampson (2012)'s study concludes that factors like ethnic polarization, religious diversity, and extractive industries expose governments' vulnerability – through lack of accountability and responsiveness - in West Africa which creates room for conflicts. Poor governance, they observed, increases the likelihoods of conflicts which causes some ethno-religious groups to feel excluded or marginalized and adapt to climate change. As a result of these, rural communities are prone climate-related hazards with weak adaptive capacities from the state (Ibid: 31).

Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) explored the link between climatic vulnerabilities and civil war in sub-Sahara Africa. Examining rainfall and temperature as variables, they observed a weak (insignificant) positive relationship between weather volatilities and

civil war in Africa. While, like us, Couttenier and Soubeyran set out to establish a strong positive correlation between climate-induced hazards and conflicts, we resisted the temptations to use cross-country data which may not always tell the relationships due to peculiar local conditions. Also, the study examines large scale civil wars which depends on the heavy mobilization of resources and more decisive political, ethnic, and socio-economic factors than climate change.

Most of these studies, like Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014), suffer from the tendency to rely on annual data which are largely aggregated and inadequate to capture in-year variabilities. Also, many based their studies on national data with little or no efforts to observe the subnational variabilities and dynamics because all conflicts have local dimensions (Aas, Buhaug, Falch, and Gates, 2011, Fayomi 2009). Also, most empirical studies attempting to establish direct causal relationships between climate variability and conflict leading to diverse results depend upon methodological issues like design, variables adopted, case studies, or units of analysis (Ide, 2017). Two studies by Gleditsch (2012), Nordås and Gleditsch (2007) analyzed pieces of research on how climate affects conflict events and present different evidence on the climate-conflict relationship. The tendency for scholars' sampling bias led Adams *et al.,* (2018) to conclude that the fact that some studies may have concentrated on a few cases which may have led to biases in the claims made. Also, the link between climate vulnerability and conflicts could be dependent on several other environmentally sensitive variables which include ethno-religious polarization, resource contention, and governance vulnerability (Schleussner, Donges, Donner, and Schellnhuber, 2016).

The farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria happen mostly in the rural areas which are largely under-reported in the media. Another challenge observed in our search in literature is that most scholars focus on large scale violence like civil war or insurgencies.

This study, on the other hand, firmly establish a model linking drought severity to the incidence of farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria between 2014 and 2019. This approach provides a more rigorous

statistical analysis of data in contrast with much of the current literature. This study focuses on a case-specific context as it largely avoids the issue that the process that links climate change and conflict is statistically obscured due to divergent effects that might affect cross-country studies. Restricting the analysis to a single case can help account more easily for the common historical social and political factors that have shaped society. As such, as far as we know, studies that offer a quantitative analysis of the link between the intensity of climate-induced hazards and farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria are scanty.

Nigeria: Climate Vulnerability in the West African Conflict Model
To adequately situate our study, we need to understand Nigeria in West African contexts. West Africa's geography has shaped Nigeria's cultural demographics and political economy. Due to dense forests, the region is an ideal location for the formation of distinct ethno-religious groups across the landscape. Most West African countries are multi-ethnic and religiously diverse. Nigeria alone is home to over 250 distinct ethnic groups. Also, an important political dynamic of West African counties is a distinct North-South divide between Muslim and Christian religious groups. For about a millennium, the Islamic religion spread from North Africa to West Africa but halted by the dense tropical forest. At about this same period, the Europeans had contact with coastal populations and spread Christianity towards the North but were resisted by Islamists (Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education, 2009). This religious divide is evident across West African countries and Nigeria in particular. These religious and ethnic diversities have created tensions, acrimonies, and competitions among national groups over control resources. These tensions have led to civil wars, ethno-religious conflicts, and electoral violence such as recurrent coups in West Africa over the past three decades (Moran 2011; Siollun 2009, 2013).

Nigeria possesses an abundant deposit of minerals and other natural resources. The country is rich in oil and natural gas deposits, with the government primarily depending on the exploitation of oil for government revenue (de Oliveira 2007, Siollun 2009).

The mining industry in Nigeria accounts for a small portion of global trade in minerals like many of its counterparts in West Africa. However, her rich, untapped mineral deposits continue to be a source of worry for many. Illegal mining of minerals has accounted for many violent deaths in some parts of Nigeria with the most recent case being Zamfara, North-West Nigeria. Oil extraction requires huge logistics, capital requirements, and efficient handling at every stage. Despite these, some armed groups have found ways to get involved in illegal mining through the use of cheap and locally-made implements to finance illicit operations. These illegal extraction activities has contributed in no small ways to the "resource curse" and people's vulnerability to climate hazards.

The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007 estimated that West African countries were vulnerable to climate changes. The projections of changes in rainfall, droughts, and climate-induced hazards in the region may vary but will continue to be a source of concern about the abilities of countries to adapt or cope with more extreme seasonal droughts in the north and overflooding in the south. There have been some severities in droughts in the region's history and the last two decades have taken a substantial toll on the livelihoods and food security of hundreds of thousands of people (Jackson School of Geosciences, 2009).

As the severity of droughts increases in some regions and decreases in other places, people's vulnerabilities to climate-induced hazards as a result of their reliance on climate-dependent socio-economic activities such as agriculture, herding, and fishing. Most Nigerian rural dwellers engage in subsistence farming who depend on rain-fed agricultural practices during planting seasons and harvest decisions. The volatile weather makes farmers vulnerable to failed crops, loss of income, hunger, and huge debts. Also, a significant number of rural

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populations are herders. Like the farmers, herders depend on stable weather to keep the soils healthy enough for their animals (cattle) to graze. The herders, mainly pastoralists, are particularly vulnerable to drought because herders tend to reside in relatively dry areas or deserts. There have been stringent attempts by the Nigerian government to limit the mobility of pastoralists, coupled with the drying of the Sahel region, have been identified as a source of conflict in Nigeria (Adigun 2019). Despite successive government's best efforts, Nigeria's agriculture is still largely primitive or subsistence in the rural areas with certain activities synonymous with particular ethnic groups, such as the herdsmen (who are largely ethnic Fulani). Due to disputes related to herders trespassing people's lands, there has been an increase in the clashes between the Fulani herdsmen and local farmers over the years (Adigun 2019), because of the seemingly irreconcilable differences with both groups.

The farmer-herder violence has largely escalated due to the use of guns which possess far more lethal impacts than machetes, knives, broken bottles etc. since 2014 according to Nigeria Watch and Nigerian Security Tracker databases. Most notable examples of violence between the two groups are the 2018 New Year Day attacks by herdsmen on a community in Benue state, North-Central Nigeria and later attacks on Mambilla Plateau, a Fulani community in Taraba state by local militias killing 20 persons and stealing of over 300 cows in the process.

Nigeria faces other vulnerability including sea-level rise and deforestation due to its intemperate climate. The sea level is rising as ocean temperatures increase, and large urban coastal populations will be particularly vulnerable to these changes. The Nigerian government have been trying to cope with this challenge of protecting livelihoods as saltwater intrusion changes the composition of agricultural land and destroys fisheries but with little results. With over 25 per cent of Nigeria's population concentrated in coastal cities vulnerable to sea level rise, and the IPCC estimates that more than millions of people who inhabit the coast of the Niger-Delta and Lagos will be hugely affected.

As a result of the link between violence and the stiff competition over resources, there are concerns that rural violence could increase due to fueled by droughts which about 11 states in the Sahelian part of Nigeria (mainly in the Northern part) are currently highly vulnerable (Federal Ministry of Environment, 2018). In the instance of farmer-pastoral conflicts, it is not difficult to imagine the scenario where changes in farming patterns and climate-induced herder migrations could lead to stiffer competitions of access to land, water, and grazing routes thereby giving rise to violence (Federal Ministry of Environment 2018 and Adigun 2019) at a time when there has been a complete breakdown of the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolutions between both parties. Even though this is highly speculative, the empirical aspect of this study will shed more light on the impacts of droughts on conflict risks in Nigeria.

Data Sources and Methods
This study relied on databases, online reports, and authoritative publications. For climate data, this study used the following variables: rainfall, temperature, droughts (as independent variables) with incidents and durations (measured in days) as (dependent variables) for this study.

For climate data – temperature, rainfall, droughts – we relied on data from the Climate-Data.org (https://en.climate-data.org/) which gives both national and subnational (including monthly and yearly) data and the World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal (https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/) which provides a rich data source for temperature, rainfall, droughts, precipitation, and other climatic variables from 1901-2016). The database also contains projections for variables for different countries for the next twenty years (2020-2040).

For state-specific database on droughts, we relied on recent calculations of scholars in the field. We used the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) and complemented with maps from Nigeria's

Federal Ministry of Environment's National Drought Plan (2018) (https://knowledge.unccd.int/sites/default/files/country_profile_documents/1%2520FINAL_NDP_Nigeria.pdf). In the absence of reliable nationwide SPI calculations, we created, 1 or 0, which were assigned based on whether the state is prone to drought or not. These values were determined from the geographical map of Nigeria.

For conflict data, we relied on two databases - Nigerian Security Tracker (NST) and Nigeria Watch (NW). The NST (https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483) is a project of the Council on Foreign Relations' Africa program, which documents and maps violence in Nigeria that is motivated by political, economic, or social grievances. The database has lists of different forms of violence that can occur – including sectarian, political, religious, or gang violence in Nigeria extracted from online news platforms. The NST database records details of every incident from their locations, weapons used, actors involved, sources of information etc.

The Nigeria Watch (NW) is a research project that monitors lethal violence, conflicts, and human security in Nigeria founded in 2006. The NW (http://www.nigeriawatch.org/index.php?html=10) is hosted by the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA-Nigeria) on the campus of the nation's premier University of Ibadan. The project records the durations, deaths, locations, etc. of lethal violence on its website based on both traditional and online media sources.

The authors choose both databases because they have proven to be reliable sources of data since its commencement in 2006 for Nigeria Watch and 2011 for Nigerian Security Tracker. Also, they have a rich history of non-partisanship and credibility which are two essential requirements for a study of this nature. The databases also depend on several sources to generate the data in addition to their field staff. The coding schemes adopted by both databases firmly tally with the design of this study.

The databases overt reliance on newspaper reports suffer from obvious limitations. First, even by Nigerian Security Tracker's admittance, the media can be inherently overt and covert partisan, especially in election periods. There is the tendency to either over (or under) report particular incidents or events and not others or to portray these events in ways that can be prejudicial for various economic or political motives. Therefore, newspaper reports about a sensitive issue like the farmer-herder conflicts may not be fully accurate (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule, 2004). Also, information about security issues in Nigeria may be grossly exaggerated by political actors during elections or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for electoral, donor or other purposes. To address these limitations, we triangulate our data sources to avoid relying exclusively on one source of information. Also, we chose a timeframe that covers two election cycles (2015 and 2019) in Nigeria. To further ensure the quality of our data, we took extra steps to independently verify the sources provided to determine the veracity or otherwise of the reports. In doing so, we discovered some of the incidents reported have either been found to be untrue, improperly coded, or news have been deleted from the websites in what constitutes about 5 per cent of what would have constituted part of our data.

These limitations, notwithstanding, we made efforts to compare our data with some other databases to ensure regularity and standardization. The authors extracted information regarding location, incidents, dates, and duration from these sources which are analytically relevant to our study. It was our responsibilities to code, analyse and interpret the data so generated from these sources using Microsoft Excel 2016.

For analysis, we deployed the use of regression (and correlation) analysis – a statistical procedure used "to determine the correlations between two or more variables having cause-effect relations" (Uyanik and Guler, 2013) which also have predictive abilities.

We used the 12 months of the year as units of our temporal analysis and the 36 states and Federal Capital Territory (making 37) as units of our geographical analysis. We grouped these states into clusters or hotspots depending on their vulnerabilities to climate change or intensity of incidents of conflicts. Clustering is used to "identify subgroups or profiles of individuals within the larger population who share similar patterns on a set of variables" (Bolin, Edwards, Finch, & Cassady, 2014). The technique is used widely in criminology, epidemiology, social, and physical sciences (ibid). We came up with three clusters based on the degree of concentration of conflicts and severity of climatic hazards.

Results and Discussions

Based on data from the Nigerian Security Tracker (NST), there were a total of 6274 cases of violence from January 2014 to December 2019 out of which 309 relate to the farmer-herder conflicts leading to 3087 deaths which represent about 5 per cent of violent conflicts in Nigeria. The patterns of these conflicts show a duration of few hours to about 273 days as the case of 2018 as records from the Nigeria Watch (NW) database shows. Also, in the period under review, data from NST and NW show that 2015 witnessed the lowest with 10 cases and 227 deaths, while the conflicts reached the peak in 2018 with 122 incidents and 962 fatalities. The NW database shows that the farmer-herder conflicts spanned 534 days in the years under review. Also, the databases shows that an overwhelming number of the incidents of farmer-herder conflicts took place in the rural areas – outside state capitals and urban centres – which are the hubs of farming activities in Nigeria. Table 1 below shows the summary of farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria from 2014 to 2019.

Table 1: Farmer-Herder Conflicts, Incidents, and Deaths (January 2014 – December 2019)

Month	2014		2015		2016		2017		2018		2019	
	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths	Incidents	Deaths
Jan	1	33	0	0	2	40	7	29	24	194	6	16
Feb	6	72	2	19	4	334	4	42	17	68	2	4
Mar	9	182	2	96	4	25	11	41	23	179	3	19
April	6	131	0	0	9	91	3	35	21	273	4	40
May	2	4	2	35	3	27	8	79	11	85	6	33
June	5	82	1	8	8	68	2	3	11	74	1	7
July	1	11	1	40	7	23	3	55	3	14	2	3
Aug	0	0	0	0	6	43	0	0	6	35	2	3
Sept	2	14	0	0	3	4	0	0	4	15	3	8
Oct	2	34	1	7	5	69	3	41	2	25	1	1
Nov	0	0	1	22	3	40	3	57	0	0	4	22
Dec	0	0	0	0	3	12	6	19	0	0	2	20
Sum	34	563	10	227	57	776	50	401	122	962	36	176

Source: Authors' Compilations from Nigerian Security Tracker database

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The data further revealed that Adamawa, Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba States account for 236 cases and 2816 deaths in the period under review while states like Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Lagos, Osun, Sokoto, and Yobe recorded no incident of farmer-herder conflicts in the period.

In this study, we investigate these numbers using temporal and geographical analyses with variables relating to climate hazards and vulnerability to interpret their patterns. The next section will be devoted to this.

Climate Hazards and Farmer-herder Conflicts: Temporal and Geographical Analyses

The timeframe nationwide regarding the farmer-herder conflicts shows a rapid and steady increase in cases and lethality since 2016 according to both Nigeria Watch and Nigerian Security Tracker databases. The database shows the farmer-herder conflicts have produced 34 cases (with 563 deaths), 10 cases (with 227 deaths), 57 cases (776 deaths), 50 cases (401 deaths), 122 cases (962 deaths), and 36 cases (176 deaths) in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 respectively. The Nigeria Watch database reports the conflicts lasts over two days or have possibilities of retaliatory attacks. However, the yearly breakdowns of the farmer-herder conflicts do not immediately reveal their relationship with climatic hazards, vulnerabilities, and sensitivities since 2014.

The monthly breakdown of the conflicts durations and incidents may provide some important clues to the relationship between the conflicts and climate variations. Taking a cursory look at the table below, we can see that the conflicts tend to be more intense at the beginning of the year than any other part. As Figure 1 shows, there exists a similar pattern between the incidents of farmer-herder conflicts, deaths, and their durations.

Table 2: Durations of Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Nigeria (January 2014 – December 2019)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Month	Durations (in days)					
January	4	0	6	6	62	10
February	1	2	3	3	28	10
March	4	1	4	12	28	13
April	0	8	9	2	60	16
May	1	0	3	6	28	12
June	2	4	1	2	22	8
July	2	3	3	2	9 3	
August	2	6	0	4	10	3
September	0	3	1	3	11	3
October	1	1	0	12	6	8
November	4	4	1	14	3	4
December	1	2	1	12	6	5
Total	**22**	**34**	**32**	**78**	**273**	**95**

Source: Authors' Compilations from Nigeria Watch database

Table 2 shows that the first four months of the year – which records the least amount of rainfall and often the hottest in many states (according to Climate-Data.org) – tend to have the most prolonged conflicts. With averages of 15, 8, 10, and 15 days of farmer-herder conflicts in January, February, March, and April respectively, the data shows that these months may not only be climatically volatile, but the spark of conflicts may be longer than every other month in the year.

The months of May to August -which cover the farming seasons - took the nest highest average in durations of the farmer-herder conflicts with averages of 9, 7, 4, and 4 days respectively.

Figure 1: Incidents, Deaths, and Durations of Farmer-Herder Conflicts in Nigeria (2014-2019)

Source: Authors' Compilations from Nigeria Watch and Nigerian Security Tracker databases

The data also shows the last four months of the year – September, October, November, and December – equally record high durations. So far, our temporal analysis has not shown any evidence of the relationship between climatic variations and farmer-herder conflicts. But, with the average of the January to April summing up to 48 as against 24 for May-August and 19 for September to December, we shall, therefore, be running further tests to examine this relationship. Table 3 shows the average monthly rainfall, temperature, incidents, and deaths in the period under review.

Table 3: Average Monthly Rainfall, Temperature, Incidents, and Duration (2014-2019)

Month	Temperature	Rainfall	Incidents	Durations
Jan	25.32	1.82	6.67	14.67
Feb	27.85	5.26	5.83	7.83
Mar	30.41	39.26	8.67	10.33
Apr	30.63	59.29	7.17	15.83
May	29.68	112.02	5.33	8.33
Jun	28.31	165.91	4.67	6.5
Jul	26.7	148.69	2.83	3.67
Aug	25.77	235.39	2.33	4.17
Sep	26.49	217.26	2	3.5
Oct	27.68	108.45	2.33	4.67
Nov	27.26	10.13	1.83	5
Dec	25.01	2.08	1.83	4.5

Source: Authors' Calculations and Compilations from World Bank Climate and Climate-Data.org databases.

When the data was subject to regression analysis, we saw a strong positive correlation (0.6562) between temperature and the incidents of farmer-herder conflicts and another significant relation (0.4593) with the durations of the conflicts. The data equally shows negative correlations between rainfall, incidents, and durations of the conflicts. The negative correlations between rainfall and incidents (-0.3916) and durations (-0.4862) simply mean lower rainfall (especially at the begging of the year) tend to increase the incidents and durations of the farmer-herder conflicts. These results are summarized in the table at the Appendix.

These results seem to confirm the findings of von Uexkull (2014) and Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012) which found that low rainfall tends

to increase the risks of conflicts in rural Africa. However, the p-values depicting the relationships between incidents, durations, and rainfall are 0.2081 and 0.1089 respectively which are greater than 0.05. This shows that our data may not be statistically significant for us to conclude on the relationship. The p-value for the regression between the incidents of farmer-herder conflicts and temperature shows greater significance at 0.0205 which is less than 0.05. with this, we can conclude with over 95 per cent confidence that there is a significant positive relationship between temperature variation and the rising incidents of the farmer-herder conflicts.

Excessive temperature arising from climate volatility can lead to severe crop damage or poor output. And, with little or no hope of support or subsidies from the government, herders' incursions into farmlands – especially during the dry seasons or periods of low rainfalls can trigger violence between the farming and herder communities in large scales. As observed by von Uexkull (2014), seasons of poor harvests or severe crop damage in farming communities will likely be triggered into violence in these delicate periods of climate vulnerabilities.

In our temporal analysis, unlike the study by Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) which explored the relationship between climatic volatility and civil war in sub-Sahara Africa, we found a positive relationship between temperature and the increasing incidents and duration of the conflicts on the one hand. And, like Couttenier and Soubeyran, we found a relatively weak positive relationship between rainfall and the incidents of farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria. Also, like Couttenier and Soubeyran, our data shows the p-values depicting the relationships between incidents, durations, and rainfall are 0.2081 and 0.1089 respectively which are greater than 0.05. This agrees may not be statistically significant to make a firm connection between rainfall, incidents, and durations of the farmer-herder conflicts. Unlike Couttenier and Soubeyran, what our study did not do is to fall into the temptations of using cross-country data which may not always

tell the relationships due to peculiar local conditions. With our study focusing strictly on a single case – Nigeria's farmer-herder conflicts – our temporal analysis found evidence that the conflicts could be linked to climate vulnerability. We also did not rely on too many aggregated data in this study.

The geographical analysis of the patters of the farmer-herder conflicts shows the clusters and hotspots of the conflicts since 2014. Our exploratory analysis reveals that Adamawa, Benue, Kaduna, Kogi, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba states account for 236 (77 per cent) of the incidents of farmer-herder conflicts leading to 2816 (or 71 per cent) deaths in the period under review. The locations of these states, except for Adamawa, shows they are in the "Middle Belt" area of Nigeria where religious identities get complicated with ethnicity (Dayil 2015, Egwu 2011). Most of these states have a history of ethno-religious conflicts (Dayil 2015, Egwu 2011) and are surrounded mostly by states prone to climatic hazards such as desertification, droughts, and ecological disasters. This seems to explain why the conflicts have often been tagged "Fulani herdsmen killings" "invasion", "attacks" etc. in the media (Adigun 2019) which appears to complicate the problems.

While many people seem to have made the conflicts an ethno-religious issue in the Middle Belt, many aspects of criminal activities have been tagged as committed by "Fulani herdsmen" in other places like kidnapping, assassination, robbery, or rape. In 2018, after series of attacks in Benue communities, some Tiv residents in Oke Ako area of Ikole in Ekiti state killed a herdsman reportedly as a retaliation to the mass burial of some 73 persons reportedly killed by herdsmen in Benue state. It took the intervention of the state Governor, Ayo Fayose, to broker a peace meeting in what would have led to bloodletting in the state.

Taking a look at the map (in Figure 2), we noticed that 11 states in the northernmost part (the Sahelian region) of Nigeria - Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Yobe, Zamfara,

Sokoto and Kebbi are some of the most vulnerable states to droughts. Odoh & Chilaka (2012) reports that about 35% of fertile lands about five decades ago have now been seen off by the forces of droughts, desertification, and other climatic hazards posing serious threats to the livelihoods of 15 million farmers and pastoralists (Odoh & Chilaka, 2012). More frightening is the fact that these states, according to some estimates, could become mere dunes in the next two decades (ibid). According to recent World Bank estimates, droughts in the north may get more severe in the next few years which may threaten livelihoods production for both farmers and herders (https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/).

Figure 2: Nigeria's Drought Vulnerability

Source: Federal Ministry of Environment, National Drought Plan, 2018

The coastal states of Delta, Akwa Ibom, Rivers, Lagos, Bayelsa, Anambra, and Abia States are less prone to droughts or desert encroachment largely due to proximity to water and fertile lands. Even at that, Delta state has recorded more incidents of farmer-herder conflicts than Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, and Yobe States put together even though these states face some of the worst incidents of droughts and desert encroachments. The "Middle Belt" states' record of droughts ranges from mild to moderate droughts.

To establish the relationship between droughts (and other variables) and farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria, we shall be running a regression analysis.

When we ran a regression analysis between the drought indices for the seven hotspots (Group A) states – Adamawa, Benue, Kaduna, Kogi, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba, the results showed some interesting results as shown in the table in the Appendix.

From the table in the Appendix, we can see that our data points to evidence that there is a relationship between drought – as measured by Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) – durations and incidents of the farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria. The positive correlations between SPI and the incidents as given by 0.152034 are not too strong to make an emphatic claim to the effect that drought severity may account for the increasing incidents of the conflicts. But, it certainly points to the fact that there is a shred of evidence that some climatic hazards may actually fuel the conflicts. Also, the relationship between drought and the durations of the conflicts is given by 0.34553. These two results point to the fact that relationship exists between the two.

When the dummy variables for droughts vulnerability were, there were no states in the seven hotspots states that could be classified as "Very Vulnerable" to drought, so the "0s" were recorded all through. Even though most of them are classified as states as "Less Vulnerable" to droughts, they still recorded a positive relationship (0.514896547 and 0.271101234) with duration and incidents respectively.

In the 20 Group B states which are medium hotspots and low droughts. There was a negative correlation (-0.092080105 and -0.027007306) between states that are vulnerable to droughts and duration and incidents respectively. The weak negative correlations in these states – most of them in the South-South and South-East of the country shows that droughts may not be too much of a factor causing or triggering the conflicts in those parts of the country. The fact that the coefficients are closer to 0 suggests there may be no relationship between the conflicts and droughts in those areas. These results seem to be in line with Butler & Gates (2012) who note that high droughts discourage fighting.

In the 10 states in Group C which recorded the least of incidents of farmer-herder conflicts yet are the most vulnerable to droughts and desertification in the country. Most of these states are in the Sahelian region of the country. The coefficients shows there are positive relationships (0.216644561 and 0.259259259) between duration and incidents of the conflicts. The data here points to the fact that there may be evidence of likely conflicts in regions prone to droughts between farmers and herders.

These results seem to be in line with the study carried out by Maystadt, De Luca, Sekeris, and Ulimwengu (2014) which explores the possible links between regional and monthly weather variation and conflict in Somalia. Their work concludes that there is a strong link between droughts, measured by temperature anomalies, and the protracted unrest/conflicts in the Horn of Africa. And, as Adams, Ide, Barnett and Detges (2018) observed that most studies in this area tend to focus squarely on areas where violence already occurred. Our study as shown by these results, however, rely on data from areas *historically* vulnerable to conflicts – ethno-religious, electoral, or communal riots – to be able to arrive at its conclusion.

In studying the spatial dimensions of farmer–herder conflict in Nigeria, Madu & Nwankwo (2020) argue that since the regions prone to eco-violence in Nigeria actually recorded the least incident of

farmer-herder conflicts, there is no basis for the assertion that the conflicts take droughts could instigate the farmer-herder violence. Unlike, Madu & Nwankwo (2020), our study found evidence that droughts can not only induce herder movement in search for greener pastures, their movement also poses, or increases the chances of clashes with farmers due to ever depleting land issues and resources. This is because the states with the highest incidents and durations of farmer-herder conflicts and those with the highest drought vulnerabilities have higher risks of conflicts as our data show.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper situated and examined the impacts of climate hazards on the incidents and durations of the farmer-herder conflicts in Nigerian from 2014 to 2019. Relying on data from several conflicts and climate databases, we found evidence that temperature, rainfall, and droughts as climatic factors that influence the farmer-herder conflicts since 2014.

Based on the temporal analysis, we found the durations and incidents of the conflicts tends to be higher during the dry and hot seasons with little or no rainfall (December to around April). These periods are very delicate, especially after poor harvests, severe crops damage, or unusually low rainfall. The geographical analysis reveals that the conflicts have hotspots in areas less vulnerable to droughts. In areas with no droughts, our data shows there is no relationship between droughts and the farmer-herder conflicts. Our data show that, in areas highly vulnerable to droughts, there is evidence (albeit weak) that climate hazards could trigger the conflicts.

The variables – temperature, rainfall, drought – were rigorously dissected in this paper using a statistical procedure known as regression technique to establish their relationships with the incidents and durations of the farmer-herder conflicts from 2014 to 2019 in Nigeria. Several recent studies by von Uexkull (2014), Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012), Butler & Gates (2012), Madu & Nwankwo (2020), Adigun

(2019), Maystadt, De Luca, Sekeris, and Ulimwengu (2014), Butler & Gates (2012), Olsson (2016), Joiner, Kennedo, and Sampson (2012) and Couttenier and Soubeyran (2014) have been done in the area of climate-conflict link but there has been few which successfully established the connections. Most of these studies found either weak, insignificant, or no relationship between them. This study provides evidence of the link between the hazardous climate and the farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria. Due to the conflicts' implications on food security, government-funded ranches and irrigation systems should be constructed across the country. Future studies can examine the impacts of climate vulnerability on the ethno-religious polarization of conflicts in Africa.

APPENDIX
RESULTS
1. Temporal Analysis

	Temperature	Rainfall	Incidents	Duration	
Temperature	1				
Rainfall	-0.09	1			
Incidents	0.656	-0.392		1	
Duration	0.459	-0.486	0.848	1	
					N=12

2. Geo-spatial Analysis
All States

	Very Vulnerable	Not Vulnerable	Less Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Duration	Incidents	
Very Vulnerable	1						
Not Vulnerable	-0.297775	1					
Less Vulnerable	-0.442325868	-0.4097756	1				
Vulnerable	-0.249423298	-0.231068515	-0.343237617	1			
Duration	-0.30596674	-0.154539328	0.34099462	0.080070399	1		
Incidents	-0.241170378	-0.154179089	0.250658749	0.1231056	0.931259	1	N=37

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Group A: High Hotspots and Medium Droughts

	Less Vulnerable	Vulnerable	Incident	Durations	
Less Vulnerable	1				
Vulnerable	-1	1			
Incident	0.271101234	-0.271101234	1		
Durations	0.514896547	-0.514896547	0.903655684	1	N=7

Group A: High Hotspots and Medium Droughts (With SPI)

	Incidents	SPI	Duration	
Incidents	1			
SPI	0.152	1		
Duration	0.904	0.346	1	
				N=7

Group B: Medium Hotspots and Low Droughts

	Duration	Incidents	Very Vulnerable	Not Vulnerable	Less Vulnerable	Vulnerable	
Duration	1						
Incidents	0.920739159	1					
Very Vulnerable	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	1				
Not Vulnerable	-0.023406057	-0.038589903	#DIV/0!	1			
Less Vulnerable	0.078181221	0.054014613	#DIV/0!	-0.816496581	1		
Vulnerable	-0.092080105	-0.027007306	#DIV/0!	-0.272165527	-0.33333	1	
							N=20

Group C: Low Hotspots and High Droughts

	Duration	Incidents	Very Vulnerable	Not Vulnerable	Less Vulnerable	Vulnerable	
Duration	1						
Incidents	0.216644561	1					
Very Vulnerable	0.216644561	0.259259259	1				
Not Vulnerable	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	1			
Less Vulnerable	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	1		
Vulnerable	-0.216644561	-0.259259259	-1q	#DIV/0!	#DIV/0!	1	
							N=10

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Boko Haram, Herdmen and Niger Delta Militancy: Exploring the Dynamics of Nigeria's Security Challenges

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Abstract
The reality in Nigeria today is the danger posed by centrifugal social forces that has resulted in high rate of insecurity. The failure of past governments in their efforts to address holistically, the security challenges confronting the country has given rise to the growth of insecurity and their attendant challenges. The mayhem unleashed by the Boko Haram Islamic sect on citizens of the country, particularly in the Northeast geo-political zone had led to loss of lives, properties and the displacement of over 200,000 people in that part of Nigeria. Kidnapping, rape, armed robbery, destruction of oil facilities by Niger Delta militants alongside the attacks carried out by perceived Fulani Herdsmen on some communities in the North, Middle Belt and South of the country are also major security challenges facing the country. As a result of the dynamics of these centrifugal social forces, Nigeria has been listed among the terrorist countries of the world. Government responses to these challenges have been a mixture of carrot-and-stick approach that has not put an end to the menace. Rather, the rate of insurgency and in fact, general insecurity in the country is becoming alarming with each passing day. This paper contributes to the growing literature on this issue but, in addition, argues that there should be re-conceptualization of government failed approach in favour of a holistic and ideology driven approach. Relying strongly on secondary source for its validated and authenticated study data, the paper adopted the relative deprivation theory and argues that feeling of mass deprivation has resulted in aggressive and violent behavior by a large proportion of Nigerian youths. The resultant organized violent behaviour has found outlets in terrorism, banditry, militancy among others. Concluding that insecurity has been the bane of stability, growth and development in Nigeria, the paper recommended among others, that

government should improve human, economic and security governance through well taught out policies and implementable programmes.

Introduction

Toward the dusk of the last millennium, unfolding events on the global stage indicate that the 21st century would be characterized by twin issues of security and terrorism. The September 11[th 2001], Al-Queda terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre [WTC] in New York-USA, the global economic meltdown and the collapse of the Asian Tigers constitute the preamble to the problems of global insecurity as a result of armed conflicts, militancy banditry and terrorism the nations of the world are now passing through.

Violent agitation by social and ethnic groupings is not new in Nigeria. Scholars such as Onigu (2016), Subruan (2009) and Richard (2011) have all examined the bases of insecurity as a result of terror attacks in Nigeria. The level of insecurity as a result of terrorism, militancy and farmers/herders clashes, in the northern and southern parts of Nigeria has created unprecedented security challenges. These challenges according to Ewetan and Urhie (2014) ranges from kidnapping, through suicide attacks to bombing, ritual killings, politically motivated killings, ethnic clashes, armed banditry and in recent times herdsmen attacks on farmers and communities. According to Imhonopi and Urim (2012), both the Federal and the State Governments in Nigeria have used force-for-force as well as carrot and stick approach to deal with the challenges but insecurity seems to be on the rise despite these concerted efforts. This development Egwu (2011) has observed may not be unconnected with the rise in the level of hatred among ethnic groups, religious intolerance by sectarian religious groups, political rivalry and a growing youth population that are increasingly disconnected with governance in the country. A report

by the Open Society (2012), noted that the primordial tendencies of various ethnics groups towards violence, the perennial eruption of various ethnic militias such as the Niger Delta militias and the inclinations of religious fundamentalists like Boko Haram group to violence have all collectively aggravated the scale and widen the scope of insecurity in Nigeria. The resultant destruction of infrastructure as fall-outs of those violent attacks has taken the country many years' backward as well as retarded industrial growth and socio-economic development across the country.

This paper, within the context of Boko Haram, Insurgency, Herdsmen Attacks, and Niger Delta Militancy explores the dynamics of the security challenges confronting Nigeria. The first level of analysis examines insecurity in Nigeria from the analytical tripod of intolerant religious bigotry and terrorism under the guise of religious fundamentalism championed by the Boko Haram insurgents. The second analytical tripod examines insecurity induced by climate shift which has resulted in increasing spates of Herdsmen/farmers clashes across Nigeria due to diminishing natural resources. The third analytical tripod examines insecurity rising from resource control agitators under the guise of environmental activism, spear headed by various Militia in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The activities of the various actors represented in the above groups have not only aggravated the level and scale of insecurity in Nigeria but also widened its scope, to the point that insecurity now threatens the very fabric of national integration as well as created an ecology of fear, disquiet and anxiety across the country.

Conceptual Framework
The framework for conceptual analysis in this paper is anchored on the concepts of security, terrorism and insecurity.

The Concept of Security

Mc Grew (2008) asserts that the security of any nation is anchored on two fundamental planks namely, (i) the maintenance as well as the protection of the citizenry, and the nation's economic interest against external aggressions (ii) promotions of an international order that safeguards national core values, interest and social order. It is in this regard that Omede (2012) sees security as a dynamic condition involving the ability of a nation to counter threats to its core values and interest. Garuba (2016) on the other hand sees security as the capacity of the State to secure its territory against external attacks through a network of security agencies as well as protecting the democratic structures and the people by the military and police/ paramilitary agencies from internal upheavals arising from unemployment, hunger and other socio-economic injustices. Nwagboso (2012), notes that historically, security has been about protecting people and that without this pre-occupation, security makes no sense at all. Arguing along this line, Gaskin (2016) posits that the primary duty of any government is to keep its citizen safe by guaranteeing their security. He argues further that the *raison d'être* for the legitimacy and existence of any government is its ability to provide adequate security and protect the society from anarchy. Dike (2010) and Omede (2012) stretched this argument and narrowed it to Nigeria by emphasing that security in Nigeria should be holistic and incorporate the citizens as primary beneficiaries of every security apparatus and deliverables the government can put on the table. Drawing from the forgoing, security in this paper is conceptualized as the effort by governments at all levels to strengthen its protective capacity to contain internal and external aggression, control crime and criminality, eliminate corruption, enhance genuine development, preserve and ensure the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad, as well as the protect the country's sovereignty.

The Concept of Terrorism

Even though the Oxford Advanced learner's Dictionary (2010), defines terrorism as the use of violent action to achieve political aims or to force government to act, terrorism as a concept is not easily defined. In spite of the volumes of scholarly work, there is no generally accepted definition of the concept. According to Martin (2006), nearly all the definitions explained terrorism emotively or polemically to "arouse emotions rather than exercise intelligence".

Terrorism is a dimension of insecurity. The US Commission on War on Terror (2012) conceptualized the act of terrorism as a premeditated use of violence by sub-national groups to secure political or self-interest objectives through intimidation of people, attacks on states, territories by bombing, hijacking and suicide attacks among others. For Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamuose (2013), terrorism is seen as a premeditated or politically motivated act of violence carried out against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. The US Commission on War on Terror (2012) identified two types of terrorism viz: the domestic and the transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism involves activities of local terrorist within the territory of a host country and their targets are fellow citizens, their property, institutions and policies. Activities of Boko Haram terrorist in Nigeria, Tamil Tigers in Srilanka are examples of domestic terrorism. Activities of transnational terrorism on the other hand cut across national boundaries and their victims' and targets are institutions and supporters of such institutions (Sander and Ender, 2018). The Al-Queda sponsored US attack of 9/11/2001 is a classic example of activities of transnational terrorism.

Similarly, terrorism is not easily classified. Writers and scholars have come up with different classification based on their subjective perspectives. Pumphrey (2012) classified terrorism within the context of Revolutionary terrorism; Friendly Fire terrorism, False Flag terrorism, and State Sponsored terrorism among others. According to Galtung (1996) the form of terrorism determines the choice of the

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target and victims but diplomats, civilian, key state officials including heads of government, airlines and key economic infrastructure top the list of targets and victims. Laqueur (2017) predicted that the terrorist of the post-cold war would be less ideological, more likely to harbor ethnic grievance and harder to distinguish from other criminals. This prediction seems to be unfolding in Nigeria today.

Causes of terrorism have been identified by Martin (2006) to include psychological motivation, culture and religion. He argues that psychological motivation is intertwined with poverty and economic disadvantage that fueled terrorism. In this vein, Pumphrey (2012), notes that statistics show that 15 percent of the world's population consumes 85 percent of global resources and that third world countries are at the receiving end of this inequality. According to Galtung (1996) culture and religion are the two causative factors of terrorism. He argued that the tenets of certain cultures and religion encourage violence, as religious fundamentalists believe that the end justifies the means in achieving religious survival. For Eme and Jide (2012) colonialism and nationalism with associated struggle for self-determination are factors that trigger terrorism across the globe. They pointed out that there exist a co-relational relationship between groups perceived to be engaged in terrorist activities and their struggle for self-determination. Drawing from the foregoing analysis, this paper submits that poverty, economic deprivations, social and political injustice are the potential trigger for terrorism.

The Reality of Terrorism in Nigeria
Francis (2006) notes that, prior to the Fourth Republic, terrorism was a perception rather than reality in Nigeria. It was almost impossible to conceive of Nigeria as host to terrorist activities a few years back let alone the high level of terrorism being witnessed today. He argued that knowledge of terrorism was restricted to newspaper stories and headlines announcing terrorist attacks in countries like Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Israel, Afghanistan, Sudan and Iran among others. The feeling

of being secure pervaded Nigeria. Nigeria then did not experience any terrorist attack like those that rocked Kenya and Tanzania in which the Al Queda bombed the US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 killing 258 people and injuring more than 5,000. The narrative has changed since 2010, when the country witnessed relentless terrorist activities especially in the northern part of the country. Specifically, some of the terrorist activities in Nigeria since 2010 include the October 1st bombing of the Police Force Headquarters in Abuja in 2011, Christmas day bombing at St Theresa Catholic church Madalla in Suleja, on December 25th2011, Easter day bombing in Kaduna 2012, bombing of United Nations building Abuja 2011, August 26th, Kano bombing and bombings in Maiduguri 2012. FBI (2021) report indicates that most attacks take place in northern and northeast Nigeria. There has been an increase in insurgent attacks in Borno State. However, there have been a significant number of attacks elsewhere. Public places where crowd gather have been targeted, including places of worship, markets, shopping malls, hotels, bars, restaurants, football viewing centres, displacement camps, transport terminals, government buildings, security and education institutions (schools, further education colleges and universities are all regular targets), and international organization. Attacks have taken place around religious and public holidays in public and crowded places including places of worship and during election periods.

In its March (2021) Report, the FBI documented some of the most recent terrorist attacks perpetuated mostly by the Boko Haram, but also the ISWAP and JASDJ to include:

- October 2016 – Boko Haram coordinated attacks on IDP camps, market, places of worship and security force installations in Borno and Adamawa states.
- February 16, 2018 – Detonation of devices by 3 Boko Haram suicide bombers at a fish market in Konduga, Borno state. 19 people were killed and about 70 others injured.

- March 1, 2018 – Boko Haram terrorists, armed with light weapons, anti-aircraft weapons and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) conducted a well attack against a military base in Rann, Borno state. 9 members of the Nigerian security forces and 3 UN consultants were killed. Several others were injured and some abducted.
- October 31,2018 – Boko Haram conducted a raid on Dalori IDP camp and surrounding communities near Maiduguri where at least 8 people were killed and several women abducted.
- November 18, 2018 – ISWAP conducted an attack against a military base in Metele and a significant number of soldiers were killed.
- February 16, 2019 – JASDJ conducted a complex attack on a mosque in southern Maiduguri killing up to 20 people.
- February 23, 2019 – ISWAP conducted an indirect fire attack against Maiduguri, focused on the West of the City in the area around the airport and military cantonment.
- June 17, 2019 – Three Boko Haram suicide bombers detonated their devices outside a hall in Konduga, Borno state where football fans were watching a match on television. At least 30 people were killed and 40 injured.
- February 9, 2020 – Boko Haram insurgents are reported to have killed at least 30 people and abducted women and children while sleeping in their vehicles during an overnight stop in Auno town, on a major highway near Maiduguri.
- June 9, 2020 – Boko Haram insurgents are reported to have killed about 81 civilians in Felo village, Gubio LGA.
- June 13, 2020 – Insurgents attack Munguno town, killing at least 38 civilians and targeting the humanitarian hub located in the town.
- July 2, 2020 – Shots were fired at an UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) flight in Damasak, Borno state.

Attacks have increased in frequency and casualty since 2014 and includes the capture and control of local government areas around Bama and Malam Faturi, establishment of their base in the Sambisa Forest, attack on a hotel in Mubi, Adamawa state in 2014, abduction of female students of Chibok, Dapchi, and Damaturu Government Secondary Schools between 2014 and 2018 among other strikes. All these forceful termination of lives, destruction of property, abduction of young girls and turning them into sex slaves, abduction and killing of aid workers and expatriates among others clearly indicates that terrorism has firmed its tap root in Nigeria.

The Concept of Insecurity
Insecurity is the antithesis of security. Terrorism and insecurity are the twin menace that has continued to threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria. Achumba *et al.,* (2013) argue that insecurity exist where there is inability or lack of capacity to take defensive action against forces that portend harm or danger to an individual or group, thereby rendering them vulnerable. For Beland (2015), insecurity exist when there is a state of fear or anxiety from a lack of protection. Beland contends that physical insecurity is more visible and pervasive than economic and social insecurity. According to Egwu (2009), the pattern of insecurity in Nigeria has been regionalized. For instance, Militia groups operate in the south, religious insurgency run havoc in the north, kidnapping has free reign in the east and south, ritual killings in the east and west, political and non-political assassinations across the nation. Recently, the regional pattern of insecurity in the country has given rise to regional security formation and vigilante groups across the country in a bid to address the high rate of insecurity. Drawing from the foregoing analysis, in this paper, insecurity is defined as a chronic threat to human life, territories, state, religious beliefs, property and institutions.

Identified Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria

Analyst and scholars have examined different sources of insecurity. Beland (2015), Egwu (2009), Achumba *et al.,* (2013) had earlier identified emotional response to external threat, as well as threat from within and threat to beliefs especially religion as sources of insecurity. Achumba *et al.,* (2013) more recently and within the context of Nigeria's experience identified two major sources of insecurity in Nigeria, namely insecurity resulting from remote factors and those resulting from proximate factors. One of the remote causes of insecurity identified by Achumba *et al.,* (2013) is the cumulative effect of bad governance as a result of corruption which over the years have weakened the institutional framework in the country and rendered them ineffective. In addition, Igbuzor (2011) noted that due to weakened institutions, democratic accountability is lacking. This he argues is manifested in the inability of government to provide basic public goods to Nigerians. As a result of government failure, frustration and discontents on the part of the citizenry find expression in violence at the slightest provocation. Increase in crime, criminality and resultant insecurity in Nigeria according to Hazen and Horner (2007) is a response by the people to the perception that Nigeria has the resources but entrenched corruption has created a state of poverty in the midst of plenty.

Another identified remote cause of insecurity in Nigeria is the perception of marginalization by the minority ethnic groups. Egwu (2000) contends that the lifestyles exhibited by the political class is out of tandem with the grinding poverty to which less connected citizens are subjected. In addition, he argues that there are disparities in the location of economic infrastructure, employment opportunities and other safety nets skewed in favour of the dominant ethnic groups and this state of inequality, unfairness and injustice has bred discontents. Some ethnic groups in response have been forced to take their destiny into their hands, as it is being played out in the Niger Delta region. Ibrahim and Igbuzor (2002) and Salawu (2010) also

identify the prevalence of the ethnic and religious crisis as a remote source of insecurity in Nigeria. For Hazen and Horner (2007), these crises continued to brew and throw up violence due to the existence of imbalance in the social relations between one ethnic or religious group and another. Adagba *et al.,* (2012) in their contribution noted that the root cause of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria is located within the context of distribution of scarce resources, power, expansion of religious territories and political offices. The development of suspicion and fear between who gets what, when and how has created a tendency towards violent confrontations to even scores resulting in large-scale killings among ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria.

Another remote but critical source of insecurity in Nigeria identified by Adagba *et al.,* (2012) is the social disconnect between the majority of citizens of the country, their leaders and the government in power. The authors argues that whether the government in power is military or democratically elected civilian, there exist a gulf between them and the people. The gulf has widened with every successive administration as their failures to address the socio-economic needs of the citizens have bred a culture of mistrust and resentment. Consequently, centrifugal forces have no difficulty co-opting them to vent their anger on the perceived enemies of the people. This demonstration of anger was put in full display when hoodlums hijacked the "End Sars" protest, destroying the much needed and vital national and private infrastructure and assets.

Nwagboso (2012), observed that one of the fallouts from the civil war in Nigeria is the gradual and eventual breakdown of moral and socio-cultural value system. He argues that this breakdown of socio-cultural and communal value system resulted in exploitation of the weak by the strong. The emerging zero- sum and corrupt value system in Nigeria is anchored on the principle that might-is-right or the end-justify-the means. All these tendencies have contributed to the prevailing insecurity in the country. On the other hand, Achumba *et al.,* (2013) noted that proximate causes include the existence of porous

borders that enhance unimpeded inflow of heavy weaponry and hired killers from the North Africa war zone to infiltrate Nigeria and used as mercenaries. Rural urban drifts due to absence of economic opportunities and environmental degradations that pollute land and water that are the main sources of livelihood of rural people due to oil spillage and the lack of CSR by the oil companies are factors that cumulatively provoke social, unrest within their host communities, while the terrorism that result creates insecurity across Nigeria.

Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework that underpins this paper is the Relative deprivation theory. Developed in the 1940s, the concept of relative deprivation itself has a longer history in the social sciences. Tocqueville and Marx in the 19th century used the idea of relative deprivation in their respective analysis of the French revolution and the problem associated with the rise of capitalism and personal property. However, sociologist Samuel Stouffer (1900-1960) is credited with developing relative deprivation theory after WW II. Subsequently, scholars like Gurr (1970), Wilson (1973) and Morrison (1978) also made their own variable contributions.

Relative deprivation refers to the idea that feeling of deprivation and discontents are related to a desired point of reference (reference groups). Feeling of relative deprivation arises when desires becomes legitimate expectations and those desires are blocked by society. Generally considered to be the central variable in the explanation of social movements, relative deprivation theory is used to explain the quest for social change that inspires social movements. The theory enables us to understand why men rebel and just as frustration produce aggressive behaviour on the part of the individual, so too does relative deprivation predicts collective violence by groups especially those members of the society who feel more frustrated and disgruntled by social and economic conditions. According to Krahn and Harrison (1992) relative deprivation theory is used to explain the root causes of social movements and revolutions in the field of sociology.

Proponents of the Theory

Some of the major proponents of relative deprivation theory are Aristotle, Karl Marx, Bertrand de' Tocqueville, Samuel Stouffer, Simme Flynn, Quinn McMemar, Renois Likert, Linda Brown and Townsend Patrict.

Basic Thrusts of the Theory

Among the basic thrusts of the theory that:(i) relative deprivation predicts collective action by groups especially those members of the society who feels more frustrated and disgruntled by social and economic conditions.

(ii)   Relative deprivation is a conscious feeling of negative discrepancy between legitimate expectation and present actualities (Wilson 1973).

(iii) Relative deprivation also leads to political violence. According to Okanya (1999), political violence is the exercise of physical force by individuals or groups so as to inflict injury or cause damage to person or property with the intention of influencing the political process.

(iv)   The higher the extent of discrepancy that men see between what they seek and what seem to be attainable, the greater their anger and consequent disposition to aggression.

(v)   Individuals and groups who lack some goods, services and comforts are more likely to organize themselves collectively to improve and defend their conditions (Morrison 1978).

(vi)   Men who feels that they have many ways to attain their goals are less likely to become angry when one way is blocked than those who have few alternatives.

Major Strengths and Weakness

Relative deprivation theory provides researchers and policy makers adequate paradigm in the effort to resolve a large volume of social problems. For instance, the theory enhances our understanding of why

men rebel. This is because just as frustration produces aggressive behaviour on the part of the individual so too does relative deprivation predict collective violence by groups especially those members of society who feels more frustrated and disgruntled by social and economic conditions. The theory also helps us to have a better understanding of why there are frequent problems associated with ethnic groups, regions or provinces that are fighting to address their relatively deprived situations especially in federations where resources and revenue are not well distributed. Unfortunately, relative deprivation theory has come under strong attack for contradicting its central idea which suggest that individuals or groups feel deprived when their current circumstances are negative compared to the situation of others. Critics have observed that whereas absolute deprivation clearly leads to feeling of discontent and ultimately efforts to effect social change, feelings of relative deprivation may or may not definitely lead to the creation of social movements and collective identity (Morrison 1971).

Application of Theory to the Study
Proponents of relative deprivation theory sees it as the main cause of conflict, insecurity and violence in the society. Gurr (1970) for instance defines relative deprivation as perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their capabilities. According to this theory, the wider the extent of discrepancy that men see between what they seek and what seems to be attainable, the greater their anger and consequent disposition to aggression. The theory further propose that individuals and groups who lack some goods, services and comfort are more likely to organize themselves collectively to improve their conditions (Morrison 1978).

Relative deprivation theory unravels, albeit paradoxically, the widening material gulf between the state and the masses in Nigeria. This antagonistic divide is attributed, primary, to exploitation and structural violence that manifests in the form of unjust policies,

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inequitable distribution of resources, unequal access to power, poverty etc in the country. The class analysis framework of Marx and Engels (1977) when employed to support the relative deprivation theory, can best explain the endemic struggle at play between the exploiters (the national elites) on the one hand and the exploited (mass of the citizens of Nigeria) on the other hand.

Nigeria manifests in abundance the shortcomings of capitalism Despite that that she generates billions of dollars annually from the sale of crude oil and other resources, such earnings have been largely mismanaged owing to the elites inadequate capacity for economic, resource and sovereign governance. This has, in turn, exposed the masses of the country to exploitation at various degrees. Major fallout of Nigeria's degenerating structural condition are rising insecurity and underdevelopment as symptomatized by dwindling economic and social conditions as well as the general state of anomie and tension at the political realm.

Thus, amid the weakening structural conditions, conscious feeling of negative discrepancy between legitimate expectation and present activities as well as a growing army of people who lack some goods, services and comfort, groups have increasingly began to organize themselves collectively to improve and defend their conditions in Nigeria. Utume(2005) has rightly observed a strong correlation between suffering, deprivation or frustration on the one hand and crime on the other and has argued that criminals carry out their acts in reaction to socioeconomic deprivation imposed on them or their people by the elite.Thus,the escalating security challenge as epitomized by the tripartite conditions of terrorism, banditry and militancy clearly reflects the structural state of affairs of the Nigerian state today.

The Dynamics of Nigeria's Security Challenges
As highlighted earlier, this paper seeks to explore the dynamics of Nigeria's security challenges from the following perspectives:

1. Insecurity as a result of Religious Intolerance and the rise of Boko Haram insurgency

Agi (2018) notes that the issue of religion evokes heated debates and creates division and insecurity than any other in Nigeria. This he observed and explains why many religious sects and socio-political groups exploit the fault line to unleash terror and create insecurity in Nigeria. Prior to 1966, Coleman (2016) notes that incidents of religious extremism and violence in Nigeria were uncoordinated and haphazard in their occurrence and no direction from outside strategists. Those that occurred at all were short-lived, collapsing at the appearance of the military or police forces. He noted further that the narrative changed between 1966-1979 with the emergence of provocative Islamic religious teachings with external influence from Libya and Yemen resulting in organized killings. These were in turn followed by violent responses from government. The situation degenerated between 1986-1996 when sectarian rivalry became prominent and religious intolerance of other groups became the order of the day. Within this period, Agi (2018), notes that violence and insecurity resulting from religious intolerance became regionalized. Northern Nigeria became the epic-center for religious violence and gangsterism. A prominent feature of the insecurity during this period was the bloody nature of the religious and ethnic violence. Starting with the Maitatsine religious uprising in Kano, Maiduguriand Kaduna in 1992. Yola in 1994, the Palm Sunday riot and Kafanchan riot in 1995, culminating in the Jama' atul Tajid quit notice to non-indigenes in Kano in 1995 and Muslim vs. Christian clash in Kaduna in 1996. All these scenarios prepared the ground for the rise of Boko Haram at the beginning of the 21st century.

Boko Haram is perceived by many as a radical militant Islamic sect that seeks to impose strict Sharia laws and its radical interpretation of Islamic injunctions in the northern states of Nigeria as well as other parts of the country (Olugbode, 2010). "Boko" is an Hausa word for western or non-Islamic education, while "Haram" is an Arabic word that literally means 'forbidden'. The sect has its origin in Islamic

fundamentalism and was formed by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno state in 2002. According to Ikenga and Efebeh (2013), Boko Haram moved to Kanamma in Yobe state in 2004 and set up its base called Afghanistan. The official recognized name of Boko Haram is "Jama' atul Alhul Sunna Liddo' Wati Wal Jihad" meaning "people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and jihad" (Ikenga and Efebeh, 2013). The group also promotes an Islamic doctrine that prohibits Muslims to participate in any form of political or social activities. The killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the sect by security agencies transformed Boko Haram into a violent terrorist insurgent group that has ravaged the north-east geo-political zone of Nigeria leading to wanton destruction and death of thousands and displacement of the entire population of the region. At the peak of the insurgency, Boko Haram was in control of over eleven (11) local government's areas in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States and paralyzed economic and social activities of the Northeast geopolitical zone. Tekhon (2015) notes that the most audacious attacks on churches, military barracks and police headquarters were launched in 2011. More sophisticated attacks were carried out on religious buildings, Foreign missions and the UN Headquarters in Abuja seen as symbols of western culture. Table 1 below shows the summary of violent attacks and activities carried out by Boko Haram from 2009-2014.

Table 1: Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria

Year of Attacks	States Targeted	Victims		
		Deaths	Injured	Displaced
2009	Yobe, Borno, Bauchi and Kano	Over 800 persons	Over 1000 persons	Unquantified number of persons
2010	Borno, Abuja,and Plateau	Over 330 persons	Unknown	700 prison inmates freed
2011	Borno, Kaduna, Yobe, Niger, Bauchi, Abuja, Kastina and Plateau Bombed UN building in Abuja	Over 425 persons	Over 300 persons	Unquantified number of persons in (11) LGA's
2012	Adamawa, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Plateau, Yobe, Abuja, Sokoto and katsina	Over 1047 persons	Over 2045 persons in 9 states	Entire villages in Northeast region
2013	Borno, Adamawa, Kano, Plateau, Gombe, Yobe and Bauchi	Over 732 persons	Several hundreds in Gombe, Bauchi and Yola	Several hundreds across the Northeast region
2014	Borno, Adamawa and Yobe	Over 200 persons	Several hundreds	Kidnapped 270 girls from a girls secondary school in chibok
	Total	**3534**	**3345**	**Over 200,000 displaced in the Northeast states**

Source: Human Rights Watch (2017).

According to Nwagboso (2012), Boko Haram now constitute a serious security challenge in Nigeria with its linkage to Al-Queda and even recently the ISIS. The activities of the sect according to Tunde (2017), had received motivation and financial boost from its association with external transnational terrorist groups and the acceptance of its creed

by its adherents. The sophisticated guerrilla tactics deployed by the Boko Haram insurgents during its attacks, Onigu (2016) notes has emboldened the group and made it possible for them to carry out their activities unhindered in the north east geo-political region of Nigeria. It is in the light of this that this paper posits that the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents threatens the fabric of the Nigeria state and also, exposes the incapability of the country and its political class to respond positively to the insecurity created by the sect which has made the country unattractive for Foreign Direct Investment(FDI).

2. Insecurity in Nigeria Induced by Farmers-Herders Conflicts over land Resource Shortage as a Result of Climate Change

Until the return of democracy in 1999, Fulani pastoral herdsmen have lived peacefully with their host communities wherever they settled across Nigeria. In some communities like Agatu in Benue State where the host population is largely Muslims, they have even intermarried. Many scholars have written on the causes of insecurity created by herdsmen attacks on farmers and host communities where they had, hitherto, lived in peaceful co-existence. Some writers, social commentators and even socio-political analysts have alluded to a conspiracy theory or Islamisation agenda, while others see the herdsmen attacks as an extension of Boko Haram insurgency. This paper is a departure from those narratives and objectively situates the root cause of the herdsmen attacks on the disputes over limited land resources as a result of changing global climate condition. According to the New York based Human Rights Watch (2017) report, 40 percent of all inter and intra state conflicts in Nigeria since 1990 were natural resources related conflicts. The report estimated that communal violence involving contested land disputes had resulted in the death of over 10,000 Nigerians in less than a decade. The perennial farmer-herder's conflict in Nigeria follows a similar pattern across the Sahel where as a result of over thirty years of drought induced by climate change has resulted in feed and water shortages due to desertification (HRW 2017). This situation, the report notes pushed nomadic

pastoralists, mostly ethnic Fulani's to move southward outside their normal grazing routes. At the same time, climate change weather-related factors have also pushed farmers in the South to cultivate more land each year on hitherto known grazing routes, leaving herdsmen with fewer places to water and graze their cattle. The resulting contest according to Aaron (2017) is responsible for the persistent and deadly clashes between Fulani Herdsmen and Farmers who had coexisted for years in peace. Experts had warned that there were grounds to believe that climate change impacts could lead to herdsmen-farmer conflicts and poor government response to the resulting violence could lead to insecurity in the country (Homer-Dixon, 2017). Poor government responses at the early stages of herders attacks created gaps that were capitalized on by criminals, mostly from Nigeria's neighbours to the north to infiltrate the conflict. Having been unchecked for long, and having become more lethal as a result of massive infiltration by criminals, the modus operandi of herdsmen attacks transformed dangerously. Thus, beginning from 2017 but certainly at its peak today, criminality at different dimensions-banditry, armed robbery, cattle rustling, kidnapping, abduction, even terrorism all crystalized under the identity "Fulani Herdsmen" to continue to wretch havoc all over the country but particularly in the Northwest and North central geopolitical zones. With deadly instrument of violence at their disposal today, the criminals "Fulani Herdsmen" have on daily basis since 2019 invaded schools and abducted school children, attacked and over run police and military settlements and check points, attacked and kidnapped travellers over run villages and set them on fire, rusted cattle, abducted traditional rulers, politicians and expatriates. Table 2 presents a summary of the dimension and spread of attacks perpetuated by Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria since 2012 as reported by the Human Rights Watch (2017).

Table 2: Fulani Herdsmen Attacks in Nigeria (2012-2013)

Dates of Attacks	States Targeted	Location of Attacks	Victims		
			Death	Injured	Displacement
June 2012	Plateau	Chakaruma village	2 persons	20 persons	Whole village displaced
July 2012	Plateau	Maseh, Tse and Shong villages	192 persons	450 persons	3 villages razed down
August 2012	Benue	Ojankele and Ijegwu communities	12 persons	300 persons	1000 persons
September 2012	Edo	Ubiaja village	1 person	50 persons	——-
October 2012	Plateau and Benue	Dallyam, Ranghol, Lotton villages in Plateau , Yogbo village in Benue	34 persons	150 persons	Several persons
Novermber 2012 December 2012	Plateau Plateau and FCT Abuja	Barkin-Ladi Bachit village in Plateau, Gwarko village in Abuja	13 persons 6 persons	Several persons Several persons	——- ——-
January 2013	Plateau and Nassarawa	Du village in Jos, Agbu, Ekye and Agwasu villages in Nassarawa	570 persons	150 persons	Whole communities razed down
January 2013	Plateau and Benue	Wadatan, Gerba village in Jos, Amla village in Benue	450 persons	120 persons	20 houses razed down
Febuary 2013	Nassarawa	Iga and Rutu communities	10 persons	15 persons	100 persons
March 2013	Plateau, Benue and Kaduna	Kadarko, Uvir communities, Anguwah and Mafan in Kaduna	32 persons	60 persons	500 persons
April 2013	Benue, Delta and Plateau	Yogbo village in Benue, Ogume community in Delta, Riyom LGA in Plateau	28 persons	120 persons	1000 persons Farmlands destroyed
May 2013	Benue and Plateau	Okpachanyi, Akongh villages in Benue, Zangang villages in Plateau	75 persons	60 persons	450 persons
	Total	**34 villages across Nigeria**	**1425 persons**	**1495 persons**	**2550 persons**
		Total	**5470 victims across Nigeria**		

3. Insecurity in Nigeria Due to Resource Control Agitations

Nwagboso (2012) traced the origin of the Niger Delta crisis to early 1990's when tension heightened between international oil companies operating in the region and some group of leaders representing the Niger Delta ethnic groupings. The ethnic groups complained about exploitation by the oil companies drilling oil in their Ogoni region and not paying commensurate compensation. This situation according to

Osungade (2016) persisted until the emergence of the Fourth Republic in 1999. Ken Saro-Wiwa an Ogoni environmental right activist became the arrow head of the agitation which started on the platform of environmental activism. He was later joined by nine other Ogoni leaders after the Kaiama Declaration. Unrest in the region continued and became a threat to oil companies whose royalties were the major source of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings. The persistent violence in the region led to the extra-judicial killing of the Ogoni leaders including Ken Saro-Wiwa by the General Abacha military regime. This act was met with international condemnation followed by sanctions placed on Nigeria. The root cause of the Niger Delta agitation and conflict as noted earlier was primarily environmental degradation due to pollution of the Ogoni land and water space as a result of oil spillage which consequently led to poverty, unemployment and absence of basic amenities (Nwagboso, 2012). The poor response from the government in addressing the conflict and its root cause resulted in the emergence of a variety of ethnic militias and the militarization of the entire region. These militant groups include:

(i)   The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)
(ii) Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC)
(iii) Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)
(iv) The Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari
(v)   The Niger Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Ateke Tom.

These militant groups carried out deadly attacks on oil and gas facilities, as well as other criminal activities such as hostage taking, kidnapping, bombing, raping piracy of diverse forms, extortion, oil bunkering, pipeline vandalization and assassination. Thus, the foundation was laid for the wave of insecurity in the region and subsequent spread across Nigeria with the October 1st bombing of Eagle square in Abuja in 2010. Some of the major attacks carried out by Niger Delta militants in Nigeria are presented in table 3.

Table 3: Major Niger Delta Attacks (2003-2010)

Dates of Attack	Militant Group	Target attacked	Victims	
			Deaths	Injured
16th, March. 2003	MOSOP militants	Shell petroleum Development oil Facilities in WarriNigerian Naval Facilities on Escravos river	7	20
July 2006	MEND militants	Naval officers escorting Chevron oil tanker on Chomoni creeks in Warri	4	3
14th, April.2007	NDV	Mini-OkoroElelenwoPolice station	Unrecorded number of policemen killed	Several policemen and civilians
1st , January. 2008	NDVF	Two police stationsFive star hostel in port Harcourt	Not recorded	Not recorded
1st, October. 2010	MEND	Eagles square Abuja	Not recorded	Not recorded

Source: Human Rights Watch (2017) Report.

As the violence became widespread forcing oil companies to suspend operations, government responded by establishing some institutions to address the environmental and poverty issues. The Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC), the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta (MND) were established as remedies. These gestures of the government failed to calm the tension in the region as the conflicts and insecurity in the Niger Delta persisted. The Federal Government under President Musa Yar' Adua used a mixture of the carrot-and-stick response by proposing an amnesty program and unconditional pardon to the militants in the region. The militants were given a period of time to surrender their arms in return for training and rehabilitation (Nwogu, 2014). The Amnesty Program reduced the rate of militant attacks on oil facilities in the Niger Delta, but the spillover effect into neighbouring South-east geo-political zone gave birth to other dynamics of security challenges in Nigeria.

4. Insecurity in Nigeria as Result of Armed Banditry, Kidnapping and Assassination

According to Adagba *et al.,* (2012) the incessant kidnapping with its associated activities such as pre-meditated assassination and armed robbery that is the hallmark of the militant modus-operandi in the Niger Delta, spilled over into the South-East zone especially in Abia, Imo and Ebonyi states. These states according to Achumba *et al.,* (2013) witnessed the highest acts of abductions where prominent indigenes became easy targets. Nwogu (2014) notes that this phenomenon became widespread and took on a whole new economic attraction after 2007 general elections in which youths that were armed by politicians as political thugs diverted their guns, skills and energies into kidnapping and paid assassinations as a means of economic survival. As the level of kidnapping, armed robbery and assassination of prominent Nigerian citizens spread across the country, insecurity of lives and property also spread unabated. The kidnappers were so emboldened in their brigandage that they attempted to kidnap a sitting executive governor of Abia state in 2008 (Nwogu, 2014). Thus, between 2007 and 2010 many prominent citizens especially in Abia, Imo and Ebonyi states were kidnapped for ransom. The prevailing insecurity in the South-East geo-political zone forced the relocation of many businesses and the consequent negative impact on economy of the region like Boko Haram did to the economy of the North-East region. To address the level of prevailing insecurity in the south-east region, the Federal Government deployed soldiers at the invitation of the South-east governors. The soldiers launched intensive attacks on the kidnapper's hide-outs especially those in the notorious armed robbery and kidnapper's dens in Ukwa West Local Government Area of Abia State (Francis, 2006). These military actions according to Francis minimized the reported cases of the menace.

At the root of Nigeria's security challenges is the issue of economic deprivation and unemployment especially among the youthful population. According to Langer and Ukiwo (2011), 60 percent of Nigeria's population and three-quarters of its unemployed are youths

under thirty years. Lander and Ukiwo argue that both internal and external evidences tend to suggest that alienated young people who lack resources and economic opportunity are more likely to be easily recruited by centrifugal forces as the foot soldiers to fight their cause against the Nigerian state. In Borno and other North-east states, Boko Haram was able to attract these categories of jobless young men who initially enrolled in the school established by the sect leaders. According to Tekhon (2012), the school became a primary recruiting ground, producing a ready mass of armed gangs. The school also produced two groups using the Boko Haram front to unleash terror. The first group consisting of the poor and jobless youths had deep social and economic grievances against Nigeria. The second group had clear radical religious vision which is directed against the foundation of the political-religious and economic interest of the Nigerian state (Tekhon, 2012). According to Aaron (2011), leaders of the Niger Delta militias also attracted disaffected youths from Warri, Port Harcourt, Yenegoa and their sub-urban areas as recruits. Aderujo (2012) notes that the presence of high number of unemployed youths on the streets across Nigeria deepens the recruitment pool for political violence and insecurity in Nigeria as politicians' bankroll, mobilize and manipulate them for their political survival. Thus, idle young men and women provided the muscle and stoked the fire of conflict and insecurity in the country.

Aaron (2011), has rightly observed that in the South, many farmers now cultivate on hitherto known grazing routes long agreed upon with Fulani Herders. This encroachment into the grazing routes have led to violence as the farmers regard the dung offered by the Fulani herdsmen for grazing and watering rights less valuable. Case studies across Nigeria shows that as social fabrics decay and old understanding became irrelevant and jettisoned, groups tend to rely more on divisive identity politics to sort the haves from the have not's (Aaron, 2011).

Another emerging trend in the dynamics of Nigeria's security challenges is the emergence of the notion of "indigeneity" which

connotes "original inhabitant of a place". According to information from Human Rights Watch (2017), the issue of indigeneity has been used across Nigeria to limit access to natural resources and public goods and has contributed significantly to the insecurity and violence being played out in Jos, Plateau state. The Jos crisis that has transformed into a sectarian violence started in 1999 the root cause being anchored on the prism of the indegeneity to deny Hausa settlers the right to land and political offices. The Human Rights Watch Report (2017) notes that:

> *"Jos lies on the bother between Nigeria's Muslim majority North and Christian South. Access to land resources is often determined by whether on is a native or indigene………….. Jos is historically a Christian city…………."*

The crisis has snow balled and pitched the Hausa Muslims against the "indigenous" Christian population in which over 10,000 Christians were killed between 2007 and 2010 (Nwogu, 2014). In the 2010 crisis, it was reported that 500 Christians lost their lives and property worth millions of naira were destroyed. Whatever the argument over the remote causes of the frequent sectarian crises in Jos, the emerging trend now is that the crisis is transforming into one of the most disturbing internal security threats to Nigeria's corporate existence. Manipulation of categories like indigeneity according to the Human Rights Watch (2017) is not only a symptom but also a cause of the breakdown in moral narrative around land, identity and history.

According to Africa Report No. 168 put together by the International Crisis Group (2010) negative relationship between Nigerians and government fuels an atmosphere of insecurity in the country. The report shows that Nigerians view the credibility and relevance of their leaders, governments and public institutions with reservations and low perceptions. This according to the Africa Report No. 168 (2010) promotes and enhances expression of violence at the slightest provocation. Both in the Niger Delta and the North-east

regions, official government infrastructure were targets during violent confrontations, imposing huge cost on the whole country. The militants and Boko Haram insurgents on the other hand explained and justified their actions by citing government failure as well as voiced their disgust with government.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Insecurity in Nigeria has been a major challenge to successive administrations especially with the return of democratic governance in the country. Activities of the terrorists groups like Boko Haram, the Niger Delta militants, kidnappers, armed bandits and Fulani herdsmen have led to loss of many lives and property and also the displacement of over 200,000 persons in the North-east region and other parts of Nigeria. Some of these activities that create insecurity in the country include bombing, suicide bomb attacks, burning of churches and police stations among others. Government at various levels have responded within the ambit of their constitutional powers like in Benue State where the open grazing law enacted prohibits open grazing and wandering of cattle into farmlands. At the Federal level, a mixture of carrot-and-stick approach was applied giving birth to federal institutions and agencies established to address the environmental and poverty issues in the Niger Delta. On the security challenges posed by Boko Haram government responded by establishing the North-east Development initiatives to rebuild the infrastructure in the North-east region and its economy as well as resettle the displaced population in the IDPs back to their ancestral communities. Inspite of all the efforts aimed at addressing the dynamics of the Nigeria's security challenges, the level of insecurity in Nigeria in the light of prevailing trend remains alarming. Due to the fall-out of the endsars protest that cut across Nigeria, policemen have abandoned their duty posts either on the highway or within towns, thereby enhancing attacks by hoodlums and social miscreants on the citizens. In the light of all these therefore, the paper recommends as follows:

1. Government should declare a state of emergency on security and articulate poverty reduction policies that will strengthen efforts aimed at addressing the various security challenges confronting Nigeria.
2. Nigerian security agencies should be equipped with modern state of the art security devices as well as heavy weaponry and power packed Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) sophisticated enough to fight modern day terrorism.
3. Ranches and grazing grounds with clearly demarcated boundaries should be legally established in all states of Nigeria for herdsmen to graze and water their stock in order to significantly reduce the incessant farmer- herder clashes.
4. Government at every level should create more jobs and also create enabling conditions for the private sector participation in the economy so that large number of youth population that would ordinarily have taken to crime will be properly engaged in employment.
5. Finally, the Federal Government of Nigeria should seek help from military strong and technologically advanced countries aimed at supporting her to defeat terrorism and banditry.

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The Nexus between Peace, Human Rights and Development in the Promotion of People's Human Rights in Zimbabwe

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Abstract
This paper seeks to clearly explain some crucial links between peace, human rights and development. The central argument is that there has been a recent discovery of the strong link between peace, human rights and development which has to be exploited for effective human development to be realised. The major findings were that there is a strong dialectical nexus between peace, human rights and development. The central conclusions were that the article constructed a theory of 'positive peace, participation and human rights', which takes into account peace, human rights and development in order to promote the quality of human rights. Furthermore, the article argues that the absence of effective institutions to promote and respect human rights may lead to a conflict trap and resultantly an upsurge of physical violence. The findings were that there is need to take into account the linkages between peace and human rights which are crucial in the improvement of the quality of human rights for the people. The policy implications deriving from this research were that there is dire need to integrate the three pillars of peace, development and human rights to reduce conflict and promote stability in societies. Peace and human rights are key phrases used.

The role of peace in promoting development cannot be doubted. It can be observed that generally, on a global scale, violent communities lag behind in terms of development because they scare away potential and existing investors (Sen, 2000). Peaceful and politically stable countries have been able to attract new and retain existing investors and thus promote development. Historically, the link between peace

and development can be traced way back to the 1975 Dag Hammarskjold Foundation which defined development as "need oriented, endogenous, self-reliant, ecologically sound and based on structural transformation." (Barnett, 2008). This definition clearly incorporates the concept of human rights in the development agenda as it seeks to promote environmental rights and human needs. The interaction between peace and human rights is growing tremendously and on many institutional fronts (Nelson and Dorsey, 2003). Before the 1990's the link between development practitioners and human rights advocates was very limited. From the early 1990's onwards, development came to be seen as a right and the thrust on democracy and good governance became a requirement to access development assistance (Nelson *et al.,* 2003). That extremely brought the convergence between human rights and human development.

Development is a contested concept which has been defined differently by scholars. Some scholars such as (Solow, 1956, Mabogunje, 1980, Schumpeter, 1942) define development in terms of economic growth which is measured by a rise in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This has been widely contested as a country may have a high GDP whilst its citizens have very low standards of living and are in abject poverty. Other scholars such as (Kuznets, 1934, Castro and Prasad, 2018, Sen, 1999) define development in terms of a reduction in poverty levels in the society. Poverty has been defined as a deficiency in resources needed to constitute a normal life. This paper defines poverty as inaccessibility to resources perpetuated by policies of exclusion such that normal progressive life would be made impossible.

This paper defines development as a process that creates growth, promotes positive change and results in an improvement in access to available resources by citizens. It also encompasses elimination or reduction of poverty and limits the chances of violent abuse of citizens.

Human Rights are defined as "the rights people are entitled to simply because they are human beings, irrespective of their citizenship, nationality, race, ethnicity, language, sex, sexuality, or abilities; human rights become enforceable when they are codified as conventions,

covenants, or treaties, or as they become recognized as customary international law." (Afunaduula, 2005). This paper defines human rights as norms that aim to protect people from serious political, legal and social abuses. This shows that citizens have a right to have equal access to resources in order to develop economically and live a peaceful life.

On a general term, peace can simply be defined as the absence of war in society. On a scholarly argument like this one, such a definition of peace falls short as it only refers to negative peace. (Barbey, 2015) had this to say on peace, "Peace has traditionally been seen as an international matter with a definition of peace limited to the absence of war or conflict; that is negative peace. Because peace also includes the conditions needed for peace to last and to prevail –positive peace– it touches most realms of life." A rather more detailed definition of peace goes further to mention positive peace, which is peace without any form of violence such as structural violence, where swords have disappeared and have been turned into ploughshares. (Galtung, 1964). In addition, (Barnett 2008) noted that "Peace is the goal and process of expanding people's freedoms." This resonates well with the findings by (Barbey, 2015) who emphasizes the importance of conditions for long lasting peace rather than just mere absence of war. This clearly shows that a complete definition of peace has to include positive peace.

This paper defines peace as a condition in which there is absence of violence of all forms, structural or violent, full citizen participation and realization of social justice leading to durable peace.

This paper is divided into four sections, the first part deals with the nexus between peace and development, the second part deals with the nexus between human rights and development, the third section deals with the link between peace and human rights and the last section deals with the roles of governments in promoting the realization of improved human rights.

Background

There were wild celebrations in Zimbabwe after the dethronement of Robert Mugabe from power in November 2017. The 2018 elections held thereafter, were seriously contested though they were somewhat peaceful. This was a clear indication that the system of governance had not changed. To that end, the 2019 World Report noted that "Relatively peaceful national elections marred by disputed results and post-election violence signified that little had changed in Zimbabwe in 2018." It is quite crucial to observe that the high hopes that the citizens of Zimbabwe pinned on the Mnangagwa regime began to be dented. The 2018 August 1 shootings of citizens by soldiers which killed at least six people was a precursor to a series of human rights violations which followed and persist up to today in the form of detention of journalists, violent repression of peaceful demonstrations, abduction and torture of human rights activists and leaders of opposition political parties among many. (World Report, 2019). To that end, the (Newsday, 2020) newspaper reported that "Several human rights and political activists, journalists and opposition political supporters are languishing in remand prison, while others have been arrested, charged and released for alleged subversion." Resultantly, these human rights violations have impacted negatively on the economy which has greatly declined between 2017 and 2020. A closer analysis of the economy between 2017 and to date has revealed that the GDP growth was at 3.5% in 2017, declined by -8.3% in 2018 and -7.4% in 2020. (World Bank Report, 2020). The 2018 African Development bank report noted that "Inflation spiked from single digits in 2018 to more than 200% in November 2019… More than 60% of the population falls below the poverty line." In addition, the economic cost of violence was 5% of GDP in 2018. (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019). Despite a panoply of other factors such as corruption, over expenditure by the government, it is plausible to conjecture that the absence of inclusive peace and human rights violations have also had a serious negative impact on economic growth

and development. It is quite crucial to point out that all these human rights violations are in disregard of international law and best practice specifically the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which advocates for the right to free speech, right to freedom from torture and right to life. Furthermore, human rights violations are a violation of the constitutional provisions of Zimbabwe, particularly section 44 which states that "The state and every person, including juristic persons, and every institution and agency of the government at every level must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and freedoms set out in this chapter." It could be argued that these constitutional provisions are just aspirational for they only exist on paper and not in practice. There is therefore a wide gap between what exists on paper and what is on the ground. The government does not seem to open a free democratic space and demonstrations have been crushed with brutal force. 6 people died and 35 others were injured as a result of actions by state security forces (Motlanthe Commission of Inquiry, 2018). (Amnesty International, 2021) noted that "Security forces frequently used excessive force to prevent or crackdown on peaceful protests and to impose lockdown restrictions killing at least 10 people". Yet, human rights violations still persist unabated with seemingly no solution in sight (Institute for Security studies, 2009). (The World Report, 2021) posit that "Unidentified assailants, suspected to be state security agents, abducted and tortured more than 70 critics of the government during 2020." Citizens cannot express themselves freely through peaceful demonstrations, social and print media. The police violently dispersed protests in July, wherein 16 protestors were injured and a further 60 were arrested (World Report, 2021). In view of the foregoing, the Mnangagwa administration has faced international and regional condemnation for these human rights violations which have led to a crisis. The regime has devised and perfected subtle, but very sophisticated strategies to silence any voices of dissent. However, the government of Zimbabwe has denied the existence of a crisis.

The nexus between peace and development
Peace and investment

The interconnection between peace and development cannot be doubted and under emphasized. Scholars such as (Galtung 1989, Hettne, 1993, Sorensen, 1985) argued that there is a strong intersection between peace and development. It is crucial to point out that a peaceful environment is a conducive place to conduct business. A peaceful environment attracts both potential investors from within the country and internationally to come and do business. Conversely, a violent or unstable environment scares away investors and is therefore shunned by development opportunities and hence a country lags behind in development. To that effect, (Jonsson, 2010) asserts that "Violence constrains development." It is therefore by no coincidence that the most peaceful nations in the World rank amongst the most developed (The Global Peace Index, 2020). The Nordic countries such as Sweden, Norway and Finland quickly come into mind. Furthermore, it is quite significant to observe that technological innovations have occurred in the most peaceful countries under stable conditions leading to development. It could be argued that states, as duty bearers must create conditions that promote the realization of development. There is also evidence to show that nations that have pursued liberal policies and strong institutions that promote human rights have enjoyed tremendous successes in terms of development. To that end, (Barnett, 2008) posit that "There is evidence to suggest that the more states are of pluralist type, the more freedoms and opportunities are upheld. The relative successes of the liberal democratic welfare states of western Europe in balancing freedoms with opportunities and guarantees suggest that peace and development are indeed matters of institutional design." It is therefore quite evident that there is a strong dialectical nexus between peace, development and human rights.

In addition, a peaceful environment also retains existing investors which is a crucial aspect of development. Investment retention is an important pillar of development ethics in the sense that those

businesses on the ground have a better chance of creating a positive image about a country and hence attract related businesses. A country's major thrust should therefore not only be the attraction of new investors but also the retention of existing ones to promote stability in the economy. The continuous incoming and outgoing of investors promotes instability and slows development. Zimbabwe needs to adopt a liberal approach to its system of governance by implementing the New Public Management (NPM) system which advocates for marketization and economic liberalization to promote the right to development (Hood, 1991). This will greatly help in attracting new and retaining existing investors.

Peace and citizen participation
The interaction between peace and development ensures full participation by citizens in the development matrix of the state. It could be argued that full participation by citizens permits them to demand the fulfilment of their rights from the duty bearer. To that end, (Barbey, 2015) concedes that "Human rights empower people to live freely and happily." The freedom given to citizens to participate in the affairs of the state is an important human right which promotes peace as it limits chances of confrontation between the state and its citizens. One can also note that when citizens are accorded their right to participate, they also reduce chances of abuse and impunity by the state (Barbey, 2015). The same author further observed that "Human rights are peace prone; they favour peace. They limit the capacity of the state to abuse power, they are meant to be lived and defended if need be." (Barbey, 2015). In view of the foregoing, one does not therefore fail to see the link between peace and human rights. It is crucial to note that Zimbabwe has not done very well in implementing mechanisms to limit the abuse of power by the state which it wields through oppressive legislation. Human rights violations have limited creativity, increased deprivation and hence diminishing prosperity for future generations. There is need for Zimbabwe to increase and free

the political space to allow for effective participation by citizens. This can be effectively done by freeing the airwaves and allowing freedom of assembly, association and expression. Repealing oppressive pieces of legislation like Access to Information, Privacy and Protection Act (AIPPA) would go a long way in improving the quality of human rights in the country. Oppressive pieces of legislation and physical violence have greatly impaired innovation and hence contributed to lack of development.

Human rights and development
Human rights and political rights

Emerging trends have revealed that the link between human rights and civil and political rights has not been previously exploited. It is prudent to observe that the promotion of human rights is in a way development in itself as it helps to make citizens, the environment and the state benefit. To that end, (Nelson *et al.,* 2003) assert that "The nexus of human rights and development is complex and multidimensional." It is multidimensional in the sense that if the fulfilment of social, economic and cultural rights is not realized, violence may ultimately break out due to discontentment. The only option to prevent physical and psychological violence from occurring is to promote human rights. Human rights promotion creates an enabling environment for human capital formation, infrastructure development and limits deprivation thereby eliminating chances of physical violence from erupting (Sen, 2000). The findings of Nelson *et al.,* corroborate with those of (Barbey, 2015) who concedes that "The absence of fulfilment of economic and social rights is a major cause of non-peace; poverty causes violence, crime, migrations and conflicts over resources." The refusal by the Zimbabwe government to ratify international conventions and pieces of legislation makes the enjoyment of economic and social rights a pie in the sky for most of its citizens. Zimbabwe has not ratified the African charter on elections and good governance adopted by member states in 2007,

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which seeks to promote human rights respect as one of its major objectives (New Zimbabwe, 2017). Resultantly, most of these elections have been marred by violence and were seriously contested. This greatly affects the quality of people's human rights and hence low levels of development as investors shun violence. It can therefore be argued that human rights and development have a crucial intersection that needs to be exploited for the benefit of citizens to enjoy a better quality of their rights in society. The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development is a clear indication that there is need to explore the link between the two pillars for societal progress. One can therefore posit that there is a strong connection between human rights and development.

However, the success of this interaction is not uniform in all societies. In order for success to be realized, it has to take into consideration diversity and environmental and cultural aspects. To that end, (Nelson *et al.,* 2003) posit that "…the success of the interaction is uneven and likely to depend heavily on the political and organizational context, as well as on the strength of individual norms regarding rights to economic and social goods." Consequently, the contestations on the secrecy of proceeds from mineral resources as economic and social goods in Zimbabwe needs to be avoided so that transparency and accountability prevails. Individuals are enriching themselves looting proceeds from minerals at the expense of the majority of the people. To that end, (The Maverick report, 2021) observed that "Wealth is recycled in a tiny elite and kept out of range of the common man." Areas that are naturally endowed with mineral resources have well developed infrastructure and those that do not have minerals are lagging behind. One can therefore argue that there is need to promote proportional devolved sharing of proceeds from mineral resources in Zimbabwe. This also helps to benefit areas that were not naturally endowed with resources. There is therefore dire need to distribute equally proceeds from mineral resources in order to realize development in all provinces.

Human rights and development programming

The concept of human rights needs to be a crucial pillar of development and therefore programmed into development. It could be argued that human rights and development can never be treated in isolation as they are inseparable. The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action is a clear recent declaration which advocates for this linkage on the effectiveness of Aid in promoting human and social development. To explicitly show the linkages between peace and human rights, (Eliasson, 2011) argued that "My main message today is that lasting solutions require that the pursuit of peace, development and human rights must take place in parallel." It can be argued that for effective development to be realized in communities, the inter-linkages between peace, human rights and development need to be integrated and promoted. Such an approach promotes sustainability in development programmes leading to lasting solutions. Rights holders, in this case citizens can claim their rights and the state as the duty bearer should fulfil its responsibility. There is therefore a nexus between development and human rights. One can therefore point out that human rights standards act as the yardstick upon which desired outcomes are measured. In view of the foregoing, (Jonsson, 2010) examines that "A Human Rights-Based approach (HRBD) to development thus means that human rights standards define the development outcome and human rights principles define legitimacy for the process resulting in a sustainable realization of human rights." One can therefore posit that the integration of human rights and human development significantly helps to improve the quality of people's human rights. In Zimbabwe, there is need to craft clear policies and pieces of legislation which make the state accountable as the duty bearer so that redress is possible where necessary. In addition, there is need for mechanisms to be put in place by the state for remedying of human rights violations. This would greatly help to improve the quality of human rights. The next section discusses the overlap between human rights and development.

Human rights and development as overlap

Human rights and human development support each other. That means they heavily depend on each other and cannot be promoted separately. To that end, (Jonsson, 2010) noted that "development and human rights are mutually reinforcing." Such a method which accommodates many approaches to promote the two pillars is therefore broad based. In its annual report in 2000, the United Nations Development Programme strongly supported the overlap between human rights and development. Development can also be taken as a crucial pillar of human rights. In other words, development can be seen as contained in human rights or a sub set of it. In view of the foregoing, (Jonsson, 2010) posit that "…development exists within a human rights framework… Development should rightly be seen as an integral part of human rights." This is in tandem with the Vienna declaration and programme of Action which advocated for the implementation of development with a human rights lens. The convergence of human rights and development can therefore not be doubted.

The convergence of human rights and development is contrary to popular belief in the past where human rights issues were relegated to the states, which had the sole responsibility to promote them. Subsequently, it remained a free will of the state whether to make sure human rights were promoted or not. The argument by (Eliasson, 2010) is of paramount importance, who noted that "Issues related to human rights were seen as internal affairs. The nation state was primary and dominant actor, together with defence alliances." One can observe that such a scenario was subject to abuse by states as some reneged on their obligation. In such cases, human rights became a pie in the sky for the majority. There is therefore need to consider the overlap between human rights and human development for the improvement of the quality of human rights in society. Zimbabwe needs to do away with impunity when it comes to the issue of human rights. There is

dire need for the state to be accountable and meet its obligations to respect, fulfil, promote and protect human rights to improve the quality of people's human rights.

Furthermore, another approach is to view human rights as contained in development. In that case human rights are viewed as a crucial element of development. This is in accordance with the 1995 Copenhagen summit which declared that "Human rights are an integral element of the development agenda." (Jonsson, 2010). It is crucial to observe that whichever approach of those alluded to above in the paper is adopted, it is quite clear that there is a strong and undoubted nexus between peace and development. There is therefore need to integrate the two pillars for the improvement of the quality of human rights. Zimbabwe can provide a budget and develop programmes that greatly promote the integration of human rights and development.

The nexus between peace and human rights
Human rights and accountability
States need to meet their obligations as duty bearers in promoting human rights and human development. To that end, (Jonsson, 2010) observed that "Duty bearers are accountable for the observance of human rights for rights-holders." Duty bearers can use some of the following ways to promote human rights; provide a budget, create a conducive environment and enacting legislation for redress when the need arises. Rights holders must be capacitated to demand the fulfilment of their rights from duty bearers. It could be argued that the nexus between human rights and peace enables duty bearers to meet their obligations. The nexus between peace and human rights therefore acts as a monitoring mechanism. There is also need to hold civil society and donors from the international world accountable to set standards. One can therefore posit that peace in this case acts as a guide and monitoring tool for good governance. This is in tandem with the recommendations of the United Nations Common Understanding which advocates that development collaboration should

develop competences of both duty bearers and rights-holders. The realization and promotion of good governance is quite crucial for sustainable peace. Furthermore, there is need to promote universal primary education as a way to promote peace and development. To that end, (Kirbassov, 1994) noted that "Education is key for both peace and sustainable development. Governments should encourage and support private schools and be open to private-public partnerships in education." It is quite evident that there is a strong interconnection between peace and human rights.

Peace and normal lives
The general activities of life are easily carried out in a peaceful environment. These include the day-to-day normal life activities like eating, which is a basic human right that can be easily enjoyed in a harmonious environment. It has been argued that peace and justice do not exist in isolation as both aim to attain universal values. To that end, (Barbey, 2015) asserts that "…peace: it prepares preventive and humane ways to address conflict and difficulties of all sorts. Human rights, as they empower people to live their lives fully are also proactive. Here, peace and human rights merge." Respect for human rights promotes creativity, citizen participation and people lead their daily lives without any threats which allows prosperity leading to development. (Sen, 2000). In view of the foregoing, it is quite significant to observe that the intersection of peace and human rights is quite clear and uncontested. There is therefore dire need for the exploitation of these intersections between peace and human rights for the improvement of people's human rights. It could be argued that peace can be a subset of human rights or human rights can be a subset of peace (Nelson *et al.,* 2003). Whichever way is adopted does not matter but what is crucial is to consider the inter-connectedness of the two important pillars. The prevailing harsh economic conditions in Zimbabwe do not allow the free enjoyment of normal life activities like eating as food is unaffordable. There is need to craft favourable

economic policies that promote access to resources without any hindrances to improve the quality of human rights. This would thus lead to positive peace, participation and human rights.

Peace and democracy

The World over has seen a decline in dictatorships and a rise in democracy. There is also a general decline in conflicts. In most countries, peace has been laid in a firm foundation leading to the progress in human rights. It is therefore quite clear that the demand for and promotion of human rights is possible in a peaceful environment. Conversely, in a war or violent situation, it is a big challenge to respect human rights and hence the respect for human rights is limited. In addition, citizens have no space and time to demand their rights as they will be concentrating on survival first. In a peaceful environment, states can thus be able to adhere to international treaties and conventions than in a war or conflict situation. The universality of human rights, though it is contested is possible to be implemented in a peaceful or stable environment. The universal Periodic Review process is a good example of an international convention which enables states to review, redress and promote human rights. (Barbey 2015). The intersections between peace and human rights is therefore crucial for the improvement of the quality of human rights. The promotion and maintenance of peace should be the number one priority by the Zimbabwe government to attract investment. The previous violent situations that prevailed especially in the run up to and during elections have created a very bad image of the country and that has repelled potential and existing investors thereby stalling development. The government has to put spirited efforts to remedy the situation by making efforts to promote peace and respect human rights. This will resultantly promote investment and hence an improvement in the quality of human rights will be realized.

The role of Governments
Creation of a peaceful environment
Governments should create a peaceful environment that is conducive for investment to take place. At all, costs governments should avoid conflict situations which drive away potential and existing investors. Peace at all costs should be promoted to attract potential investors as well as retain existing ones. It could be argued that peaceful countries have enjoyed a larger share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) compared to violent states that have been shunned by investors. The most violet regions of Africa for example the horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions have lagged in development as investors are not attracted to them due to the high incidences of violence and intractable conflict. The citizens have also not benefited from the abundant resources that they are naturally endowed with due to violence. The governments can manage that through respect, fulfilment, protection and promotion of human rights which are a crucial pillar to development. In view of the foregoing, (Eliasson, 2011) in reference to peace, human rights and development asserts that "If one of these three pillars is weak in a nation or a region, the whole structure is weak." This resonates well with the argument by the (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2019) which noted that "As peacefulness increases, so does satisfaction with life, freedom, and feelings of respect." A close relationship exists between the level of peacefulness and type of governance. There is therefore need for respective governments to promote democratic governance as a way to promote the inter-linkage between peace, human rights and development for positive peace to be realized in society.

Craft policies
In order to promote peace, human rights and development, states have to craft policies that promote intersections of these three pillars. This is possible by enacting policies that are inclusive and have a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down approach. It is important to

observe that policies of exclusion and relative deprivation have been the major causes of conflict and violence which scare away potential and existing investors. This has led to the emergence of intra-state resource related wars as opposed to interstate wars. There is therefore need to integrate peace and human rights so that development is realized. To that end, (Barbey, 2015) posit that "Peace, democracy and human rights …have an ideal in common: they are human values required for the well-being of all." This corroborates well with the findings by (Eliasson, 2011) who acknowledged that "We know that the question of peace and the question of human rights are closely related. Without the recognition of human rights we shall never have peace and it is only within the framework of peace that human rights can be fully developed." It could be argued that the inter-linkage between peace and human rights needs to be fully exploited to promote development in states. There is therefore need for nations to fully take development as a human rights issue to minimise chances of conflict in states.

Incorporate human rights in development
Furthermore, there is need for states to incorporate human rights in the development discourse. The state as the duty bearer has to ensure that human rights are placed at the centre of development in order for peace to be realized. (Nelson *et al.,* 2003). Countries also have to adhere to international laws or conventions on the promotion of human rights as part of the right to development agenda. The 2005 World summit declaration agreed that "We acknowledge that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations systems and the foundation for collective security and well-being. We recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing." (Eliasson, 2011). This is clear evidence that the incorporation of human rights in the development agenda is crucial for the realization of peace and development and hence promote the quality of people's human rights.

The incorporation of human rights in the development agenda also ensures full participation by citizens in the political decisions of the state. The theory of positive peace, participation and human rights serves as the interface between peace, human rights and development. This greatly helps to minimize chances of the outbreak of violence thereby maintaining peace in the state. In view of the foregoing (Barbey, 2015) argued that "The advantages of making peace a human right are numerous; people, the human rights system and the government will all benefit from it. It will make states less prone to violence and thereafter render democracy more accessible and legitimate." Resultantly, investment will increase from both potential and existing investors leading to social development. Human rights abuses in Zimbabwe for example, have led to targeted sanctions and the crafting of ZIDERA by the United States of America leading to international isolation. This has greatly limited foreign direct investment, reduced trade and foreign currency inflows leading to low levels of investment and hence lack of development and high poverty levels. This has also made the situation volatile with a potential to explode into violent conflict. An analysis of the western conception of human rights is necessary and it is done in the next section.

Western Notions of Human Rights
The western construct of human rights is that human rights are universal to all human beings by benefit of their humanity and as such these rights cannot be taken away from them. The Western concept of human rights is based on Universalism in which they strongly believe that there are no cultural considerations when promoting human rights. To that end, (Nhina Lee 2016) argued that "Universalists believe that same legal enforcement mechanisms of human rights exist everywhere. Cultural relativists argue that there are diverse ways to interpret and to use or abuse human rights." The western concept of human rights believes that they can cut across different cultural settings. They further argued that those who advocate

for cultural differences in the promotion of human rights want to use that as an excuse to oppress citizens. In view of the foregoing, (Anon 2014) noted that "The second section will demonstrate how cultural diversity and how cultural relativist arguments are used by states to justify behaviour which abuses the rights of its citizens and to claim non-required adherence." It may be crucial to observe that while cultural diversity needs to be incorporated in the promotion of human rights, the use of culture as a justification to deny citizens their rights is not acceptable. In such cases, the western notion of human rights becomes most appealing.

Methodology (Methods/Procedures)
A qualitative analysis approach was used in which data were collected and analysed. Primary data were collected from respondents by the use of questionnaires and interviews. The study then analysed the data obtained from these sources. Information was also obtained from textbooks, journal articles, newspapers and published manuscripts related to the topic. These were selected using internet search engines such as Google and physical library reading. A total of 24 were because they covered the topic in detail and it also helped to eliminate bias. They were then reviewed, organized, sifted and interpreted into meaningful information. The major objective was to obtain accurate information on the situation on the ground on the integration of peace, human rights and development. However, qualitative data has been observed to universalize assumptions about the measurement of violence, war and other variables. It also promotes conclusions to be made without necessarily getting into the field (armchair empiricism). Qualitative research involves the study of small groups of people and analysing their responses to understand human behaviours. Qualitative research helped me to understand the inter-linkages between peace, human rights and development in Zimbabwe. The population consisted of human rights experts, civil society representatives, victims of human rights and citizens. They were people

aged between 18-65 years because they have experience and exposure to current trends on human rights discourse. The sample, 561 is a representative sample and has sufficient statistical power not to reach wrong conclusions. Quota sampling helped me to identify citizens between 18 and 65 years who had general knowledge on human rights issues. Snowball sampling helped me to identify participants with expert knowledge on human rights. Triangulation of the two data collection methods was done to ensure validity.

Data were analysed using descriptive narratives such as content and thematic analysis. Step 1 was making sense of narrative data by identifying key themes and concepts, step 2 was generation of initial codes by circling or highlighting words and phrases in the text, step 3 was reviewing themes and step 4 was defining and naming themes. This helps to generate meaning or theory development form the data obtained. On data analysis, (Denzim and Lincolin, 2018) noted that "The researcher does not just leave the field with mountains of empirical materials and easily write up his or her findings…The final take from the filed may assume several forms: confessional, realistic, impressionist, critical, formal literary, grounded theory and so on" Structured interview questions were transcribed and analysed question by question to derive meaning from the content obtained. Open ended questions were analysed by identifying themes, common phrases and keywords in which numerical and hierarchical data coding techniques were employed. This enabled the researcher to draw reasonable conclusions from the collected data.

Results and Discussion
Type of study
This is a survey on Zimbabwean citizens to collect data for research

Research sample
The data were collected from individuals who were willing to participate in the survey. They were people in Zimbabwe aged between 18-65 years of age due to ethical practice and some of knowledge of human

rights issues. My research used non-random sampling, specifically quota sampling and snowball sampling techniques. I used quota sampling specifically to identify participants who were between 18 and 65 years, who had general knowledge of human rights issues in Zimbabwe. As a result, 336 participants with general knowledge on human rights were identified and interviewed. To obtain information from experts in the field of human rights in Zimbabwe I then used the snowball sampling technique in which participants referred me to another expert (participant referral). Resultantly, 225 participants with expert knowledge of human rights were interviewed. This is because there were specific characteristics and special experiences or exposure my research participants had to have as core aspects of my study. These techniques helped me to interview the right participants and hence obtain reliable and valid information.

Data Collection Methods
To obtain the required information, two main methods of data collection were used. The first method was the use of in-depth interviews. In-depth interviews ensure that the researcher captures what is relevant from experts in the field. They are therefore useful when you want detailed information about a person's thoughts and behaviours or want to explore new issues in depth.

Questionnaires were also used as a second method to collect data from respondents in which the house hold drop-off survey method was employed. This enabled the participants to work on the instrument at their convenient time thereby ensuring privacy and confidentiality which is crucial given the politicization and sensitivity of the topic in Zimbabwe. This method also promoted personal contact between the researcher and the respondent, which enabled clarification where necessary. The method is reasonable and appropriate to capture the information sought by the researcher and it also ensured a high response rate. The researcher distributed questionnaires to respondents to research subjects who were willing to participate.

Results

Response rate

Out of the 615 questionnaires distributed to volunteered participants 598 were returned for data analysis. Nevertheless, 6.24% were incomplete and could not be analysed for this research. Thus 561 were analysed, presented, discussed and interpreted henceforth. This sample ensured representativeness.

Respondent Characteristics

The respondents were 22.22% females and 77.78% males.125 of the respondents were females and 436 were males. 225 of the respondents were experts in the field of human rights whilst 336 had basic knowledge of the subject.

Table1.1

Age Range (Years)	Knowledge of Human Rights		Experience(Years)		Total
	Expert	Basic	10-19	20+	
18-30	7	111	7	0	118
31-43	119	106	69	50	225
44-56	42	63	17	25	105
57-69	38	47	7	31	85
70+	19	9	9	10	28
Total	**225**	**336**	**109**	**116**	**561**

Characteristics of Respondents

Data Analysis, Results, Discussion and Interpretation

The names used in this part of the research are pseudo-names and not real names for ethical reasons. The following themes emerged from the research findings;

Theme 1: There are gross human rights violations in Zimbabwe from 2017 to date

The respondents were asked to choose whether human rights violations in Zimbabwe were moderate, slight, gross or other in the period specified, with an opportunity to explain. 88.89% of respondents said that there were gross human rights violations in the country, 5.56% said there were moderate human rights violations and 5.56% pointed out that human rights violations were mild in the country. The majority of the respondents (88.89%) agreed that human rights violations were gross in Zimbabwe in the period in question.

This means that there are serious human rights violations in Zimbabwe which is negatively impacting on development. Lack of development has been observed to typify countries where violence is prevalent and human rights violations are rampant. To that end the 1993 Addis Ababa conference observed that conflict poses a direct threat to development. This is in tandem with the findings by (Collier, 2007) who posit that "The relationship between low income and civil war may seem obvious-if you read newspapers, you will see that the countries where there is conflict are far more likely to be poor. After all, when a civil war looks to be in the cards, investors flea, and the economy declines… "This clearly shows that there are gross human rights violations in Zimbabwe.

When asked to explain, representative comments were as follows;

Taps: "Citizens have no right to demonstrate in the country, they fear the government as they are killed by soldiers and the police. The international community must intervene and stop these abuses as they are contributing to an upsurge in uprisings and strikes."

Dhadza: "People are not free to express their views in this country. There is no freedom of association, movement and expression. Human rights defenders, political activists and journalists are being arrested and tortured for expressing their views leading to an increase in discontentment, demonstrations and violence in general. This has led to the rise of rebel groups like Mthwakazi in the country."

All the participants agreed that there are gross human rights violations in the country. They also agreed that human rights violations lead to rebellion by certain sections of society hence leading to an increase in violence by using common expressions such as "…leading to an increase in discontentment, demonstrations and violence in general" and "…leading to an upsurge in uprisings and strikes." This clearly shows that respondents concur that there are gross human rights abuses in the country. This is a violation of international best practice which provides for the respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights by states as duty bearers. Notably, the United Nations Charter aims "To achieve international Cooperation… in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;" States therefore need to respect human rights in tandem with international law. Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) aims to create an open and democratic society based on openness, human dignity, freedom and equality." The Zimbabwean Bill of rights protects a number of socio-economic rights such as the right of access to housing; the right to have access to healthcare, food, water and social security and other rights. It is crucial to observe that most of these provisions in the Bill are aspirational, as they simply exist on paper but are rarely put into practice. The meaning derived from the responses have nuances of a western approach to human rights promotion which is universal to be applied in Zimbabwe.

These responses clearly means that human rights violations are a threat to peace as they may lead to the escalation of violence. To that end, (Skarstad and Strand, 2016) argued that "Human rights violations reduce government legitimacy, enabling the formation of violent rebel groups who easily gunner popular support from affected groups." This clearly shows the impact of human rights violations in society at large and on Zimbabwe in particular. There is therefore need for the government to be proactive and take the necessary steps to prevent the situation from degenerating into chaos.

Theme 2: There is a link between peace, human rights and development.

The basic question asked in the questionnaire was "Is there any connection between peace, human rights and development?" All the participants (100%) answered question 1 in the affirmative meaning they totally agreed that there is an intersection of peace, human rights and development. Participants had an opportunity to explain their responses and representative comments in the questionnaire were as follows;

Dhewa: "Peace brings policy that is stable and effective to have development. A state that is peaceful has citizens who trust the government and both parties can work together effectively for development."

Kandido: "The violations have negatively affected development. There has been massive brain-drain as people ran away from human rights abuse. The country has been isolated and slapped with sanctions due to human rights abuses. International investors have shunned investing in the country hence economic stagnation."

Bhachi: "Violations killed development in so many ways. It reduced investor confidence which killed FDI, killed ethics and integrity on the market, promoted parallel market and killed formal business. According to a new analysis from the Danish Institute of Human Rights, investment in freedom and participation rights might have positive impacts on economic growth. By investing in human rights the economic growth rate of a country is likely to increase rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association and electoral self-determination have a significant positive effect on economic growth."

Gido: "Human rights violations affects peace in the country and promotes civil unrest which hinders development. Human rights violations affects relationships with international community thereby straining trade and commerce which are pillars of development."

All the participants (654) agreed that human rights abuses negatively affect development in the country. They also agreed that

human rights abuses affect peace in the country which in-turn reduces development by using expressions such as "violations killed development in so many ways" and "human rights violations affects peace in the country." These were some of the common responses from participants.

These responses clearly mean that violence and human rights abuses greatly reduce development and hence leading to poverty in the country. The 1993 Addis Ababa Conference observed that conflict poses a direct threat to development. (Green and Singer, 1984). This is in tandem with Larsen's findings in 2017 who "Attributes lack of development, deceleration and reversal of it to the absence of peace." This is also evident in Zimbabwe where there has been a significant decline in economic development as the country has been shunned by potential and existing investors due to human rights issues. The interface therefore between peace, human rights and development needs to be promoted. This is possible through the promotion of Economic, Social and Political rights as enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In that regard, the observation by (Jorgensen, 2017) is quite striking, who noted that "Using a dynamic panel data estimation method on 167 countries between the years 1981 to 2011, we can see that the rights to freedom of speech, freedom and assembly and association and electoral self-determination have a significant positive effect on economic growth. "This clearly indicates that there is need for the promotion of human rights to achieve durable peace and development.

Theme 3: Effective strategies and mechanisms to link peace, human rights and development can help reduce conflict and violence
The basic question asked in the questionnaire was "To what extent can this linkage help to reduce conflict and violence?" The respondents were asked to choose whether the linkage was to a moderate extent, not at all, to a lesser extent and to a greater extent. 94.12% pointed out that the link was to a greater extent, 5.88% to a moderate extent and 0% to a lesser extent.

When asked to explain, representative comments from participants were as follows;

Nodza: "Rigorous teaching campaigns to the general public based on peace, human rights and development. Through implementation of the country's constitution. Respecting human rights so as to promote peace and development."

Dhidza: "The strategies include among others;

1. Being a signatory of the United Nations and following the recommendations.

2. Ensuring that there are platforms for citizens from all walks of life to express their grievances freely as far as human rights are concerned. If the raised concerns are addressed, that will go a long way to mitigate conflicts.

3. Ensuring that there is a conducive environment for all citizens to participate in economic growth as well for international investors to invest in the country."

Kaya: "Promote true democracy, respect rule of law, curb corruption and allow freedom of speech before, during and after speech, disengaging government institutions from politics to remain regulatory. Avoid policy inconsistences and have clear policies among other things."

Tari: "To promote peace and human rights there is need to dialogue and respect for human rights and respect differing views/opinions."

The majority of the participants (94.12%) agreed that the interconnection between peace, human rights and development is to a greater extent. They also agreed that the promotion of peace and human rights leads to the realization of development by using expressions such as "respecting human rights so as to promote peace and development" and "…all citizens participate in economic growth as well for international investors to invest bin the country." These were some of the common responses. This resonates well with the findings by Jorgensen who noted that "The effect of human rights investments differ globally from region to region: In Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and Central Asia our analysis finds a significant,

positive long-run effect on human rights investment on economic growth." This clearly shows that countries can greatly develop economically by heavily investing in human rights promotion.

These responses clearly mean that there is need to respect, protect and fulfil human rights as a strategy to promote development. This can be achieved through involving citizens in decision making processes to promote peace and development. Furthermore, there was evidence of blatant disrespect for the provisions of the constitution and state capture of crucial institutions from the responses. Expressions used were "through implementation of the country's constitution" and "…disengaging government institutions from politics to remain regulatory…" It could be argued that there is evidence of the state slightly morphing into a dictatorship which poses a serious threat to peace. The escalation of violent protests and the August 1 2018 shootings of protestors give credence to this assertion.

Theme 4: There can be an alternative framework for effective promotion of peace and human rights a country can implement.
There can be an alternative framework to promote the inter-linkages between peace, human rights and development. The basic question asked in the questionnaire was "Is there a framework for effective promotion of peace and human rights a country can implement?" 98.93% of respondents agreed that there is a framework a country can implement to effectively promote peace and human rights. The remainder (1.07%) did not describe the framework, meaning it is not there or they were not sure. The majority agreed that a framework can be implemented to promote peace and human rights.

When asked to describe the framework, the following responses emerged;

Dada: "Educational campaigns, a vibrant human rights commission in place and independent strong institutions. These institutions can start the ball rolling towards redress."

Aki: "Citizens can demand accountability through various platforms. Put in structures and solid systems in place."

Kaya: "Peace building, human rights education and conflict resolution. Sustainable development projects and awareness programmes."

Kiki: "Public awareness, people need to know that their rights need to be protected not exploited. Zimbabweans are too passive."

Chuchu: "Citizens need to organize campaign groups to help themselves meet like-minded people and take action. They also create awareness and help familiarise people with existing international laws and rules on the protection of human rights violations. Citizens also need to articulate steps the state must take to provide redress and protection for victims of human rights violations."

The majority of the participants (98.93%) agreed that there can be a framework for effective promotion of peace and human rights which can be implemented. They agreed that this is possible through involving citizens by using expressions such as "Public awareness, people need to know that their rights need to be protected not exploited…" and "Citizens need to organize campaign groups to help themselves meet like-minded people and take action…" and "Citizens need to demand accountability through various platforms…" These were some of the common responses. These responses corroborate well with the findings of (Gaventa, 2002) who posit that "the questions of how citizens, especially the poor, express voice with influence, and how institutional responsiveness and accountability can be ensured, have become paramount." Citizen participation and accountability of those in leadership positions has to be promoted to promote peace and promotion of human rights.

These responses clearly mean states have to meet their obligation of rendering citizens their right to exercise full enjoyment of their rights. When violations have occurred, it is the duty of the state to make sure citizens have access to judicial mechanisms to seek redress. To that end the United Nations observed that "Where the State is responsible for a human rights violation through its acts or omissions, it is under an obligation to provide adequate, effective and prompt

reparation to the victim(s). Indeed, where reparation is not provided, the obligation to provide an effective remedy ... is not discharged." It could be argued that in all these cases highlighted above, no mechanisms have been put in place to remedy human rights violations. Accessibility to judicial and other mechanisms for redress has been curtailed. Unsurprisingly, many reports on violations have emerged to the effect that "Several human rights and political activists, journalists and opposition political supporters are languishing in remand prison, while others have been arrested, charged and released for alleged subversion."

In view of the foregoing, it can be argued that there is dire need for the promotion of positive peace, citizen participation in the affairs of the state and effective promotion of human rights. A framework to ensure redress for human rights violations therefore becomes of paramount importance.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The preceding discussion highlighted the nexus between peace, human rights and human development. Focus was on the best ways to harness the inter-linkages of the three pillars of peace, human rights and human development in improving the quality of people's human rights. It was quite evident from the research that treating the three, peace, human rights and human development separately and in isolation does not in any way lead to an improvement in the quality of human rights. The study would like to argue that in the light of all the evidence presented above, there is need for countries to move in abreast with modern trends which demand the integration of peace, human rights and human development for the improvement of the quality of people's human rights. In addition, countries need to adopt a number of strategies highlighted in the essay in order to improve the quality of people's human rights. It is therefore quite evident that modern day human rights can be improved by exploiting the dialectical nexus between peace, human development and human rights. Areas for further research may include an investigation of mechanisms and

strategies for effective promotion of human rights and remedying human rights violations especially in contested political environments.

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Abbreviations

AIPPA - Access to Information, Privacy and Protection Act

FDI - Foreign Direct Investment

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

 HRBD - Human Rights-Based approach to Development

NPM - New Public Management

ZIDERA - Zimbabwe Democracy and Recovery Aact

Gulf States Scramble for the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

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Abstract

The Horn of Africa, so named for its hornlike shape when viewed on a map or from outer space, is a geostrategic region on the African continent owing to its proximity to the shipping lane sea-borne goods and oil, worth millions of dollars from the Persian Gulf, pass through on a daily basis from the Gulf of Aden, through the chokepoint Bab el-Mandeb, to the Red Sea, and then the Suez Canal which leads to the Mediterranean Sea. Made up of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, the Horn of Africa has become attractive to a number of foreign powers that are jockeying to have a foothold in it. Among these external powers with competing diplomatic, economic and security interests are the Gulf States in the Arabian Peninsula – Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) which are investing huge capital, and building seaports and military bases in the geostrategic region. This paper examines Gulf States scramble for the Horn of Africa with a focus on the protagonist, the UAE. For the study, data were garnered from secondary sources. Theoretically, the Game Theory was adopted for the study. The paper concludes that the UAE has done remarkably well over the years by investing billions of dollars in development projects in the region. However, its investment will be at stake, if a divided Somalia distabilises the region in the nearest future.

Keywords: *Horn of Africa, Gulf States, UAE, Military Base, Port.*

Introduction

History has it that Africa has experienced two 'Scrambles' by foreign powers with economic, political and security interests in the region. The first occurred in the 19th century, when the representatives of European imperial powers – Great Britain, France, Belgium and others, dashed to Africa mainly to secure raw materials supply (e.g. palm oil and rubber) for their industrialisng country, and acquire territories via treaties which not only led to the partitioning of Africa's land in the 1884/1885 Berlin Conference, but the commencement of colonial rule on the continent (except in Ethiopia and Liberia). The second was during the Cold War in the 20th century, where the two superpowers – capitalist United States and communist Soviet Union, vied for the allegiance of post-colonial African states' despotic leaders, thus carving out for themselves a sphere of influence on the continent (Al Jazeera, 2014; The Economist, 2019; as cited in Zambakari, 2020, p. 6).

Today, in the 21st century, Africa for the third time is a theatre of competition, this time around, between established and (re-)emerging powers from Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North/South America – Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (hereafter UAE), the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (hereafter U.S.) which over the years are jockeying to bolster diplomatic, trade and military ties with chiefly sovereign African states. These growing interests, scuttle and contest between the above-mentioned external powers on the continent, have been labelled by scholars the 'New Scramble for Africa'.

"The Horn of Africa (hereafter HoA) is one of the most geo-strategically important regions of the world." (Magara and Kinkoh, 2020, p. 58) The region, comprised of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, is located next to one of the world's busiest Sea Lanes of Communication (hereafter SLOCs), with access to both the Red Sea and Indian Ocean (Kleinfeld, 2018). Most exporters of petroleum

and natural gas from the Persian Gulf that transit either the Suez Canal or the SUMED Pipeline, go through the Strait of Hormuz, and then the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (also spelt as Bab al-Mandab or Bab al-Mandeb) (Offshore Energy. 2019). In 2018, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), around 6.2 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil, condensate, and refined petroleum products flowed through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a chokepoint bordered by Eritrea and Djibouti in the HoA, and Yemen in the adjacent Arabian Peninsula (Horton, 2019; Offshore Energy. 2019).

Against this backdrop, this paper with a focus on the UAE as one of the Gulf States with competing national interests in the HoA, has been compartmentalised into the following subheadings: theoretical framework, an overview of Gulf States scramble for the Horn of Africa, the UAE scramble for the Horn of Africa: A discourse, conclusion, and lastly recommendations.

Theoretical Framework

To explain 'Gulf States Scramble for the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)', this paper employs the Game Theory. The Game Theory is "a body of thought dealing with rational decision strategies in situations of conflict and competition, when each participant or player seeks to maximize gains and minimize losses" (Plano and Riggs, 1973, p. 33 as cited in Varma, 1975, p. 286). Simply put, it is a tool for analysing actors or players decision-making in competitive and cooperative situations (Smith, 2003).

The Game Theory was expounded by the Mathematician, John von Neumann and the Economist, Oskar Morgenstern, in their co-authored book: *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944). Other notable scholars to have contributed to the development of the theory include: T. C. Schelling (1960, 1967), J. C. Plano and R. E. Riggs (1973), and A. Rapoport (1974).

The Game Theory, drawing from the games played at leisure time e.g. Chess and Tic-Tac-Toe (popularly known as X and O), states that there are two or more players (states or group of states in the context

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of international relations) in a situation of competition or conflict. Each of the players or group of players, make rational decisions in order to win the game against the opponent. The decision taken by one of the players in the game is dependent on the other. In other words, the decisions of the players are interdependent (Varma, 1975, p. 287; see Akinboye and Ottoh, 2005, pp. 76-77).

According to Rapoport (1974, p. 1), games used to simulate real-life situations typically include five elements:

1. *players*, or decision makers;
2. *strategies* available to each player;
3. *rules* governing players' behaviour;
4. *outcomes*, each of which is a result of particular choices made by players at a given point in the game; and
5. *payoffs* accrued by each player as a result of each possible outcome (Smith, 2003).

In the Game Theory lies the *Prisoner's Dilemma*, a hypothetical scenario of two criminals interrogated separately by security officers. This dilemma succinctly shows how players in a game can cooperate. That said, there are three known types of games: i) *Two-Person Zero Sum Game* – in this game of two players, one of the players wins what the other loses. In other words, there must be a clear winner and loser. Mathematically, this is written as $(+1) + (-1) = 0$ (Akinboye and Ottoh, 2005, p. 78; Onah, 2010, p. 59), ii) *Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Game* – the 'winner-takes-all' is not the case in the two-person non-zero sum game. Simply put, a player's win in the game is not equal to the loss of the other player, iii) *Nth-Person Sum Game* – This type of game unlike the previous two, has more than two players that come together to form groups i.e. alliances.

Evidently, Gulf States scramble for the HoA is an *Nth-Person Sum Game* between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Among these countries competing to have a foothold in the region, the UAE over the years gained, only to lose tremendously, its enviable influence

over Djibouti and Somalia. In Somalia for example, Qatar and its ally, Turkey's sway over Mogadishu is growing stronger compared to that of the UAE. In mid-2017, the intra-Gulf rivalry led to a Saudi Arabia-UAE coalition against Qatar accused of backing Islamist groups. While Djibouti, Eritrea, and the self-declared Somaliland supported the Saudi Arabia-UAE alliance, Ethiopia and Somalia stayed neutral.

An Overview of Gulf States Scramble for the Horn of Africa
Decades ago, the HoA was a fragile region plagued by poverty, intermittent armed conflicts and droughts. But in recent years, the oil-rich Gulf States – Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which initially had little interest in the hornlike region, have been racing each other for influence in the strategic region. The UAE to start with, has built a military base in Eritrea, and a Dubai-based company has built, operates, manages, and invests in seaports in Djibouti and the self-declared Somaliland and Puntland (Berbera and Bosaso respectively), while Qatar plans to construct a new seaport in Hobyo, Somalia. Saudi Arabia on its part has in Ethiopia, focused its investments on agriculture for its food security following 2008 food prices hike (Kleinfeld, 2018; Horton, 2019; Reuters Staff, 2019). Still on Ethiopia, the UAE has promised the largest economy and most populous country in the HoA, billions of dollars in aid and investments (see International Crisis Group, 2018, p. 7).

Since 2010, Gulf States have carried out peace-keeping and counter-terrorism operations in the HoA. In the year 2010, Qatar deployed a small contingent of peacekeepers to the Eritrea-Djibouti border after clashes broke out between the HoA neighbours over disputed territory in the June of 2008 (Reuters Staff, 2017). From 2014 to 2018, the UAE trained hundreds of Somali troops as part of an effort to defeat Islamist insurgency and secure Somalia for the government backed by Western nations, Turkey, and the United Nations (Reuters Staff, 2018a).

Worth mentioning straightaway is that in Gulf States today (e.g. Saudi Arabia and the UAE) are some migrant workers from e.g. Eritrea and Ethiopia who offer their relatively cheap and unskilled labour through the controversial sponsorship system called the 'kafala system'. Though Africans are not the largest migrant communities in Gulf States, their remittance flows are a critical source of income for countries in the HoA, meaning they represent an important source of Gulf States economic influence in Africa. Also, Gulf States Islamic cum charitable organisations over the years have played a significant role in winning the hearts and minds of the people in the HoA through generous humanitarian donations (Todman, 2018).

Presently, Gulf States are not the only foreign powers competing to have a foothold in the HoA. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. by al-Qaeda, America, in pursuit of its security interest and that of its allies, carries out from time to time, counterterrorism operations in the Sahel region from military outposts across Africa. In the Lilliputian State, Djibouti, it has its own military base called Camp Lemonnier. Aside the U.S., France, Italy, Japan all have a military base in the diminutive state (The Economist, 2018; Neethling, 2020).

On the 1st of August, 2017, the People's Republic of China (PRC) officially opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in line with President Xi Jinping's ambitious military modernisation programme which includes developing China's forces capabilities to operate far from home (Al Jazeera, 2017). Over a month after the launch of the Chinese military base, the transcontinental country, Turkey, formally opened its biggest overseas military base in the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, on September 30, 2017. More than 10,000 Somali soldiers will be trained at the base that cost Ankara $50 million to build (Hussein and Coskun, 2017). Still in Somalia, Turkey plans to build a launchpad in the country for its first moonshot in the year 2023 (see Fabricius, 2021).

The UAE Scramble for the Horn of Africa: A Discourse

Of all the Gulf States with a footprint in the HoA, the UAE is arguably the most active in the ongoing competition in the region (Horton, 2019). In the last two decades, the UAE has increasingly made its presence felt in the HoA by building and managing ports in the region through DP World, a global port operator based in Dubai. In the year 2006, DP World won a 30-year concession contract to build and operate the Doraleh Container Terminal (hereafter DCT) in Djibouti which opened in 2009. The Doraleh port is Djibouti's biggest employer and source of revenue. Also, the port alone accounts for 95% of imports for its landlocked neighbour, Ethiopia (Al Jazeera, 2018a; Kleinfeld, 2018; AP 2020; Paduano, 2020). Subsequently, in the May of 2016, DP World signed a $442 million agreement with Somalia's self-proclaimed Somaliland, to invest and manage the deep-sea port of Berbera for 30 years. In the said port, Ethiopia has a 19% stake that will reduce its dependency on Djibouti's Doraleh port (Stevis and Fitch, 2016; Kleinfeld, 2018).

The UAE's involvement in the HoA entered a new phase when Abu Dhabi pledged on the 15th of June, 2018, a whooping sum of $3 billion in aid and investments to Ethiopia. $1 billion out of the promised $3 billion will be deposited in its central bank (the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE)) to ease the country's foreign currency shortage according to an Ethiopian official (Maasho, 2018). In August 2018, Ethiopia announced that Abu Dhabi plans to invest in an oil pipeline connecting Eritrea and Ethiopia. The pipeline will run from Eritrea's port city of Assab to Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, an Ethiopian official said (Obulutsa and Fick, 2018; Oneko, 2018).

Aside its economic interests in the HoA, the region is of great interest to the UAE for security reasons. In 2015, the UAE started the construction of its first naval base in Assab, Eritrea (The Economist, 2018). Thereafter, the parliament of breakaway Republic of Somaliland approved on February 12, 2017, a deal which permits the UAE to build a naval and air base in the port city of Berbera (Osman, 2017).

Obviously, Abu Dhabi needs these bases to defend key commercial ports and SLOCs in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as well as to conduct its military operations in Yemen. In 2014, the UAE and Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen to defeat the Iran-backed Houthi rebels that had taken control over Yemen's capital, Sanaa, and large parts of the country along the Red Sea and near Bab el-Mandeb (Bergenwell, 2019).

Figure 1: *A Magnified Map of the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula*

Source: Oneko, S. (2018). Arab Gulf States in the Horn of Africa: What Role do they Play? *DW*.

Regarding diplomacy, some observers feared that the intra-Gulf rivalry between the UAE/Saudi Arabia and Qatar, may spill over to the HoA. Their fear came true during the Gulf diplomatic crisis in 2017. The UAE and Saudi Arabia accused Qatar of supporting Iran and Islamist groups e.g. the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that are distabilising the Middle Eastern region. Thus, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Egypt severed diplomatic ties with Qatar on the 5th of June, 2017. Excluding Egypt, the three Gulf States gave Qataris two weeks to leave their country. All four Arab countries imposed air, sea, and land blockade of Qatar which exposed its vulnerability, as some of Qatar's food supply come from Saudi Arabia via land. Qatar Airways was not spared. The national carrier had to shoulder more cost going through a detour (Wintour, 2017; Kleinfeld, 2018; Todman, 2018; see Iyayi et al., 2020, pp. 19-20; Salihu et al., 2020, pp. 100-101).

In the HoA region, the governments of Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia's breakaway region of Somaliland sided with the UAE and Saudi Arabia while the government of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed a.k.a 'Farmaajo' in Mogadishu, which is closer to Qatar and Turkey, stayed neutral despite Emirati and Saudi pressure to cut ties with Qatar (Al Jazeera, 2018b; Kleinfeld, 2018, Maruf, 2018; Feierstein, 2020, p. 3). Purportedly as a consequence of Eritrea and Djibouti taking the side of the UAE-Saudi Arabia alliance, Qatar announced on June 14, 2017, that it had withdrawn its peacekeeping troops from the disputed Eritrea-Djibouti border (Reuters Staff, 2017).

Still on diplomacy, the Eritrea-Ethiopia rapprochement was a big win for the UAE. For years, the two foes have had a border dispute. As a statement of fact, both countries were at war from 1998 to 2000. But on July 09, 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (who was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize) and his Eritrean counterpart, President Isaias Afwerki, signed the landmark "joint declaration of peace and friendship" which normalised ties between both countries.

On the part of the UAE and its ally, Saudi Arabia, they brokered the second historic peace accord – the Jeddah Peace Agreement which the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea signed in the Saudi city, Jeddah, on the 16th of September, 2018. Present at the signing ceremony were Saudi Arabia's King Salman, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and the United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres (Mitchell, 2018; Oneko, 2018; Reuters Staff, 2018b; see Todman, 2018).

The UAE, no doubt, is leading in the geopolitical and geo-economics competition in the HoA. Nevertheless, it has suffered setbacks *vis-à-vis* its ambitions in the region (Fenton-Harvey, 2019). On the 22nd of February, 2018, the Government of Djibouti seized control of the DP World-run DCT. In response to Djibouti's nationalisation of DCT, DP World filed a case at the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) which ruled in its favour on January 14, 2020. Needless to say at this juncture is that the current ruling is the sixth legal victory of DP World over the government of Djibouti's president, Ismail Omar Guelleh (Al Jazeera, 2018a; Kleinfeld, 2018; AP 2020).

In Somalia, the UAE is fast losing its influence, as the country draws closer to the Gulf State, Qatar, and its ally, Turkey. The UAE-Somalia relations gradually turned sour owing to Mogadishu's failure to back the UAE-Saudi Arabia alliance against Qatar in the 2017 Gulf crisis, and the UAE's investments and operations in Somaliland that broke away from Somalia in 1991, and Puntland, that became semi-autonomous in the year 1998, after Somali dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, was toppled in 1991. Mogadishu sees Abu Dhabi's actions as undermining its efforts at reunifying Somalia with Somaliland and Puntland (Fenton-Harvey, 2019; Feierstein, 2020, p. 6). To have compounded their frosty relations was the $9.6 million, seized by Somali security officials on a Royal Jet plane that flew into Mogadishu airport from Abu Dhabi on the 8th of April, 2018. The UAE made it known that the money was to pay for the salaries of Somali soldiers as part of an agreement between the two countries. Displeased by the

action of Somalia, the UAE as reported by its news agency, WAM, disbanded its 4-year-old military training programme (2014-2018) in Somalia (Al Jazeera, 2018b; Maruf, 2018; Reuters Staff, 2018a; Horton, 2019; Paduano, 2020).

Conclusion

In the light of the findings of this paper, the Gulf States scramble for the HoA has been good and bad for the strategic region. In its national interests and that of HoA countries, the UAE has done remarkably well over the years by investing billions of dollars in development projects in the region. Many thanks to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the neighbours – Eritrea and Ethiopia inked a peace agreement in 2018. However, as was seen in 2017, the UAE scramble for the HoA left some countries in the region with no choice but to take sides with it and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf diplomatic crisis. Also, the UAE relations with the governments of breakaway Somaliland and semi-autonomous Puntland have made the reunification of the territories of Somalia an arduous task for Mogadishu. Should the UAE continue relating with them, its billion-dollar investment in the HoA will be at stake, if a divided Somalia distabilises the region in the nearest future.

Recommendations

The following are strongly recommended to the governments of HoA countries, and Gulf States, in particular the UAE:

    i)   The government of the four HoA countries are to ensure that their multifaceted relations with Gulf States are mutually beneficial and not exploitative;

    ii) At the moment, the HoA is still a fragile region. A seed of discord sown is the volatile region is enough to heighten existing tensions and cause instability. Thus, Gulf States should desist from pressurising the HoA countries to take sides in intra-Gulf rivalry;

    iii) Gulf States in the HoA should as much as possible, pursue a

healthy competition in their national interests and that of the countries in the geostrategic region;

iv) If an 'African solution' is not forthcoming *vis-à-vis* a dispute between HoA countries or a dispute involving one of them e.g. the protracted Egypt-Ethiopia Nile River dispute, Gulf States should once again play the role of a mediator, if requested by the disputants;

v) The UAE should bear in mind at all times that it is not the only foreign power in the game of infrastructural development in the HoA. China also has a presence in the region in pursuit of its 2013 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which simply put is about infrastructure connectivity between China and different parts of the world, including the HoA. Losing ground in the region as it did in Djibouti and Somalia only creates opportunity for China, Qatar, and Turkey;

vi) The UAE should assist the government in Mogadishu in reunifying Somalia with the self-declared Somaliland and semi-autonomous Puntland by persuading the government of the two regions to rejoin the federation. This way, it will regain its influence over the federal government in Mogadishu.

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The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement and Implications for Border Security Management of the Nigeria-Republic of Benin Borders

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Abstract

This paper interrogates the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement and the implications for border security management of the Nigeria-Republic of Benin borders. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons was enacted in 1979 to ensure the free flow of persons, goods and services deemed crucial to attaining economic integration. Despite the benefits of the Protocol including promotion of free trade and commerce as well as easy exchange of human resources across the border, severe challenges still persist such as the concomitant increase in Transnational Organized Crimes (TOCs) that are a signature of African borders. Human trafficking is a particularly notorious crime that this article pays attention to due to the emphasis by the ECOWAS Common Approach to Migration of 2008. Porosity of the borders and inefficient border facilities are also obstacles. The ECOWAS Protocol though well intentioned has further aggravated the problems faced by Nigeria and the Republic of Benin as regards borders in the sub-region. Unofficial routes have sprung up thereby compounding the issue of policing these borders. It is imperative that the governments of Nigeria, the Republic of Benin and the ECOWAS authorities begin to reconsider the effects of the protocol in the light of the current realities. This paper makes the case for a more proactive implementation of the ECOWAS protocol by installation and maintenance of sound border facilities, promotion of inter-agency cooperation across border agencies of both countries and appropriate funding for these border agencies.

Keywords: *ECOWAS Protocol, Transnational organized crimes, free movement, border security.*

Introduction

The state of borders has been a source of concern in recent times for policymakers in Nigeria. Borders have emerged to be sites of crime that indicate the dysfunction of the state (Lamptey 2013, Osimen et al, 2017, Asiwaju 2018). The porosity of the nation's borders especially to the west with the Republic of Benin makes it imperative that the security implications be critically examined. This study traces the ease with which borders are crossed to the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement as one of the major sources of the insecurities associated with the borders in Nigeria. This paper gives the backdrop to the conversation by highlighting West African migration from colonial times. It then moves on to consider the sub-regional body of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the instrument that facilitates ease of movement across the borders which is the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement. Next, the specific borders of Seme and Idiroko are identified and discussed. The paper thus determines the security implications for border security before making some important recommendations to enhance the implementation of the Protocol as regards good border management.

Pre-Colonial Migration in West Africa

Migration in West Africa has been the way of life of the peoples for centuries (Adepoju 2005a). ECOWAS estimates indicate that the region's countries now harbour approximately 7.5 million migrants from other West African countries – i.e. almost 3% of the regional population (ECOWAS Commission, 2008). This ease of movement predated colonial times that set in the mid- 19th century. The borders were fluid as people moved across the sub-region at will for various reasons. Much of these were as a result of trade, slavery, conquest and inter-marriages (Lar, 2007). Borders were easily redrawn especially with the rise and fall of various empires and kingdoms. Notable ones included Oyo and Kanem-Bornu empires and Benin Kingdom in present-day Nigeria as well as Songhai Empire in present-day Republic

of Benin. Commercial activities such as Trans-Saharan Trade also involved people moving across the West African region to North Africa (Bakewell & Haas, 2007). In fact, it can be argued that this free flow of movement only met its waterloo with the advent of colonialism in the region (Bakewell & Haas, 2007; Opanike *et al.,* 2015). This put paid to the freedom of movement as the European colonialists established territories and bred the spirit of nationalism in the peoples of these territories that made them see their neighbours over the borders as aliens. These artificial borders are a consequence of the Partition of Africa that was undertaken at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 (African Union Commission, 2013; Felix &Eniayekan 2017). At that table, European powers divided the entire African continent thereby creating animosities amongst the peoples. The result was the balkanisation of West Africa into areas of conquest by the French, English and Portuguese which makes up the states in the region today.

The wave of independence blew across Africa in the mid-twentieth century especially from 1960. Much of West Africa gained independence during this time and the question arose of what to do with the artificial colonial boundaries that had been inherited from the colonial masters. This conundrum was further compounded by separatist tendencies that abounded in several African states. At this critical juncture, the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) stepped into the discourse in 1963 with the principle of UtiPossidetis Juris (African Union Commission, 2013). This principle noted in essence that the borders inherited by each nascent independent state were to remain exactly the way they were without any change whatsoever. Whereas this principle provided stability to the states and served to discourage attempts to redraw African borders, it was also a drawback to the ease of movement that was obtainable hitherto in the continent (African Union Commission, 2013).

The West African sub-region sought to enhance integration and promote development among member-states. It was decided that to foster economic development, it was pertinent to relax the rigid border

structures that served as a hindrance to the ease of movement of people across these borders. Thus, notable scholars such as Adepoju (2005a, 2005b. 2015) have noted that the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement was simply a return back to the status quo of free movement of people, goods and services before the advent of the colonialism of Europeans

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is the international organisation for the West African sub-region created in 1975. This period represented the emergence of West African states that had just gained independence. The motive behind the creation of ECOWAS was to initiate the growth and development of all states in the West African sub-region (Ministry of External Affairs, 1991). Major integration drivers such as Nigerian Head of State General Yakubu Gowon and President of Togo, Gnassingbe Eyadema sought that the states worked in concert to spark rapid growth as well as present a united front as a powerful bloc in world politics (Gowon, 1984).

The organisation has an effective structure that depicts a top-down approach. At the top is the Authority of Heads of State and Government. It is followed closely by the Council of Ministers. ECOWAS has a secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria which serves as its administrative arm. The secretariat coordinates the activities of the organisation in all fifteen member states.

The focus of the organisation has shifted from solely economic issues due to changing socio-political situations in several of the states over the years. The sub-region has been riddled with internecine conflicts that have crippled the governance structures and created socio-political complications. Thus, ECOWAS has been transformed into an organisation that is pre-occupied with intervening in the security challenges of the member states. This happened so often that the sub-regional organisation was forced to create a security arm known

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as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). This security arm of the organisation has intervened in deadly conflicts in the region such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Mali in a bid to restore the peace and harmony (Lar, 2007).

ECOWAS is therefore renowned worldwide for its security interventions rather than its economic initiatives. This unfortunately draws the focus away from its primary aim of sparking the growth and development of the economies of its member states. One of the most prominent economic initiatives is the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services which is the subject of this study.

ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement
The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement is arguably one of the most important instruments of the organisation. In fact, the Protocol has been hailed as the most sophisticated free movement mechanism in all of Africa (MiWorc 2017). The community was able to attain this noble feat right from its inception. The Preamble of the Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) identified the need to facilitate free movement within the bloc (Adepoju, 2005a).
Article 59 of the ECOWAS revised Treaty of 1993 states that:
> *Citizens of the community shall have the right of entry, residence and establishment and Member States undertake to recognize these rights of Community citizens in their territories in accordance with the provisions of the Protocols relating thereto* (Elumelu, 2014a).

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment was promulgated in 1979. The Protocol involves three parts- the free movement of persons, right of residence and right of establishment. These three parts were to be enforced consecutively every five years. The Protocol was borne out of the realization that easy movement of

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human and material resources was indispensable to the stated goal of provoking joint economic development of the states in the area (Opanike *et al.,* 2015; Lar, 2007). It was only logical that to achieve this, the member states should be free to call on the very best human and material resources to facilitate the growth desired. (ECOWAS Commission, 2008). The Protocol thus emerged at the most appropriate time for the community.

This work is concerned with just the free movement aspect of the Protocol. A discussion of the rights of residence and establishment is outside the purview of this paper. Whereas, the Protocol is intended to facilitate the intra-regional movement, it is subject to very important constraints which are important to emphasise.

One of which is the time constraint. The community citizens according to Article 3 (2) are only permitted by the Protocol to reside in member states without the typical visa requirements up to 90 days. This implies that after the stipulated time, the citizen would be expected to follow the normal procedure that pertains in the state in which the individual resides as regards residence and other procedures required for foreigners. Therefore, if such a citizen exceeds the time frame without notifying the appropriate authorities, such a person would have extended beyond the mandate of the Protocol and be liable to prosecution if determined by the host state. The intention behind this is to provide the state with the upper hand in deciding who remains within its borders.

Another important aspect of the Protocol is captured in Article 3 (1) which states that the citizen must have appropriate travel documents and an international health certificate to be able to benefit from the instrument. This suggests that the Protocol is not laissez-faire for unbridled migration across the borders of West Africa (Ayamga 2014). Inasmuch as the authorities of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) seek to make the borders easily accessible to the community citizens, it simultaneously desires to ensure that they are safe for the benefit of the national security of

each member state. This adheres to the tenet of good border management which seeks to keep out threats to the state while ensuring easy navigation of the borders (Bertozzi 2008). Irregular migration in the case of the ECOWAS region would be checkmated by the implementation of this aspect of the Protocol. The rationale was that valid travel documents such as a passport and an international health certificate ideally prove that the person who possesses them has a genuine reason for crossing the borders that define a state's sovereignty. The ECOWAS passport was introduced in 2000 and has since become a valid travel document required for movement within the sub-region as a result of this instrument (Elumelu 2013; Adepoju 2005b).

Article 4 arguably gives the most power of enforcement to states as far as the Protocol on Free Movement is concerned. The enactment of an instrument that guarantees free passage across a state's border connotes a vital loss of a state's prestige. This is because one of the hallmarks of sovereignty of a state is determining who goes in and out of its territory (Osimen *et al.,* 2017). Sovereignty itself refers to the ability of a state to retain control of the people within its territory and their affairs. Thus, taking away this ability to screen people indiscriminately can be seen as a weakening of a state's power. The supranational body of the region which is ECOWAS has essentially usurped part of the state power by enacting the free movement protocol. Therefore, this article serves as an important counter measure that states could take to assert their national interest especially if it goes against the regional interest in favour of intra-regional migration. A state can consider a community citizen to be a danger to its internal security. This is despite the citizen observing other parts of the Protocol such as possession of valid travel documents as well as the international health certificate. In this light, a state can thus securitise such a citizen as a threat and deny him the free movement across its borders. This puts a check on the ability of cross-border criminals for instance to flee across borders and carry out their nefarious activities.

Benefits of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement undoubtedly has several benefits that have accrued to the community citizens as a result of its existence and implementation.

One of such is the easier movement of human and material resources within the sub-region. With the implementation of the Protocol, it is a lot easier for people and goods to move quickly within the community (Ministry of External Affairs, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1991). This is particularly important for commerce which thrives on having access to the right labour and capital to attain maximum profits. The bureaucratic controls hitherto experienced at the borders of West Africa have been lifted. The typical waiting period for issuance of visa has been bypassed as well as the uncertainty of the process. Resources can be quickly mobilised and deployed to the West African regions that need them. Nigerian businesses have benefitted immensely from this agreement with Africa's richest man Aliko Dangote setting up business franchises all over West Africa. Nigerian telecom giants such as Globacom are also commonplace in the region.

In addition, the Protocol has galvanised the economic integration in the sub-region. The easier movement of resources has brought the economies of member-states closer and more dependent on each other. This portends better prospects for the relatively weaker economies in the region. They are able to leverage on their comparative advantage and thrive in the common economy that this instrument aims to create. It is in line with the vision of the founding fathers of the organisation that free mobility of labour across the sub-region is indispensable to the economic integration in the community (Gowon, 1984).

ECOWAS Vision 2020

ECOWAS has been involved in several attempts to reform itself over the years. This is consistent with its desire to keep up-to-date with

modern challenges. The latest drive by the ECOWAS is the Vision 2020 which fits in right with the theme of the work.

The community basically desires to transform itself from an ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS of People by 2020 (ECOWAS Commission, 2011).

The vision reads thus:

> *"To create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region built on good governance and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation"* (ECOWAS Commission, 2011).

The drive is to break down the barriers that have held the organisation from uniting the peoples of the sub-region in the last 40 years. ECOWAS Vision 2020 seeks amongst others an adoption of the Schengen-type visa that removes internal borders within the area, abolition of residence permit, exchange of information by security operatives at borders and the removal of checkpoints on security highways (Elumelu, 2014a). Some of the challenges facing the ECOWAS member states include parochial national interests as well as persistent colonial orientation of member states. National interests have often stood in the way of the integration goal of the organisation. States like Nigeria have been accused of harbouring hegemonic tendencies towards its smaller neighbours. This has often been as a result of the large population of the state and its massive land mass when compared to its neighbours. This has led to suspicion on the part of its neighbours. Thus, integration initiatives that have been sponsored by Nigeria in the past have been treated with apprehension and seen as part of its larger expansionist agenda (Gowon, 1984). These ideas have been rebuffed vehemently by member states and slowed down the progress of the organization in the long run.

Another major clog in the wheel of progress of the organisation is the differing colonial orientations of member states. ECOWAS is made

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of 15 member states with 9 Francophone states, 5 Anglophone and 1 Lusophone state. The major rivalry is between the Francophone and Anglophone states. The Francophone states still have major ties to France which was the colonial state. The general currency of all the states is CFA Franc and there are strong cultural and military ties with Paris. It therefore appears that France is a major determinant of the actions and reactions of the Francophone states in the organisation (Felix &Enaiyekan, 2017). Thus, whatever resolutions made by member states that are deemed reprehensible to French interests are frustrated and subsequently dropped. This has been a setback to the organisation from its inception and has prevented its emergence as a truly integrated bloc (Ayamga, 2014).

The fulfilment of the ECOWAS 2020 Vision is heavily dependent on the reform in the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Goods and Services. This Protocol is particularly one of the utmost drivers of the quest for a borderless sub-region of peoples rather than states. This is what makes this work particularly apt seeing as it examines the protocol in the light of the implications for border security management.

Seme and Idiroko Borders
Seme Border is the biggest border between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin. In fact, Seme border has been referred to as the busiest border in West Africa due to its strategic location between the bustling cities of Lagos and Cotonou in Nigeria and the Republic of Benin respectively (Nigerian Customs Service, 2018). It came into existence with the independence of both Nigeria and the Republic of Benin in 1960. It is located in Badagry West Local Government Area. It is the major land border between the two states and accounts for much of the transactions that bring in a lot of revenue between both states (Adeleye, 2017). The Seme border however has been in a state of disrepair and dysfunction for a long time until recently in 2018 with the inauguration of an ultra-modern facility in October, 2018. It had

acquired a reputation for being one of Africa's most notorious borders. Transnational organised crimes such as human trafficking, contraband smuggling and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are prominent signatures of the Seme border. The facilities for manning the borders are antiquated. The European Union in collaboration with ECOWAS has recently built a joint border facility at Seme to facilitate good border management for both Nigeria and the Republic of Benin. However, it is yet to be put into use over two years after its completion. Instead, the old routes are still being made use of which result in severe traffic gridlock and resultant loss of revenue for both sides.

Idiroko is another major border between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin. It is situated at the outskirts of Ogun state and attracts significant business transactions too. It is a border that is frequently traversed by commuters and business people. Both Seme and Idiroko borders have similar characteristics that are important to examine.

One of which is porosity of the borders (Haas 2006). The two borders have official routes that are sanctioned to carry out business and enhance the easy movement of people, goods and services between these two states. Nevertheless, there is also a presence of several unofficial routes that litter the landscape of Seme and Idiroko borders. These unofficial routes are taken advantage of to perpetrate nefarious activities most notably smuggling and other crimes (Onuoha, 2013). While a glance at the official routes portray adherence to the rules and regulations of border management, the unofficial routes actually show the reality on ground and witness twice as much activities as the official ones (Aduloju, 2017). The porosity of the borders is a major issue that prevents good border management. No valid documents are required to pass through these routes and virtually anything goes. Interestingly, the border agents are aware of the existence of these routes and simply do nothing to police them either as a result of apathy or active connivance with the criminals and people smugglers. The presence of the porous borders posits grave danger and aggravates border insecurity. A state that cannot effectively

police all the routes into its territory opens itself up to inherent security risks that undocumented migration brings (Leonard 2010). This has been the case in recent times in Nigeria where reports have been made of security threats such as Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen taking advantage of the porosity of the borders to swell their ranks and obtain reinforcements (Onuoha 2013;Osimen *et al.,* 2017).

Similarly, both Seme and Idiroko borders are grossly understaffed. This is a consequence of the porosity of the borders. The major border agencies in Nigeria are the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) and the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS). The NIS handles the entry and exit of people across the borders while the NCS is primarily concerned with the movement of goods across the borders. These agencies are understaffed and lack the adequate capacity to man these borders (Okunade, 2015). There are only a handful of border officials to police the land borders in particular. This situation is very obvious when the officials are confronted by smugglers and other criminals. They are simply outnumbered and outmanoeuvred by these adept people who are more familiar with the terrain and more skilled (Lamptey, 2013). Most times, the agencies lack the manpower to effectively police the official routes talks more of the numerous unofficial ones (Onuoha, 2013). The effect is that they simply succumb to the whims and caprices of the smugglers and look the other way. A similar issue is the capacity required to secure these borders. The officials are often poorly trained in basic security skills such as intelligence gathering and reconnaissance (Eselebor & Linehan, 2014). They are also lightly armed and come against criminals with sophisticated weapons at their disposal. This already puts the border agencies at a disadvantage in combating crime the right way.

Moreover, the borders at Seme and Idiroko have very poor working conditions for the border agencies (Aduloju, 2017; Adeleye, 2017). This is symptomatic of the general nature of border communities. These communities lack basic infrastructure especially good road networks, electricity, pipe borne water and housing. They are often

out of touch with the central government and are considered outposts of the society (Asiwaju 2018). Hence, there is a glaring lack of government presence or interventions in these areas except during election times when politicians come to woo the constituents for their votes (Asiwaju 2018). The working conditions for border agencies are deplorable to say the least. The officers lack good communication facilities such as mobile network coverage. This makes it difficult to share real time intelligence between the border outposts and their central command when the need arises. The office environment lacks basic amenities such as work stations, computers and even chairs and tables. The living conditions for the officials are also sub-standard with some officials sleeping in the open. As a result, there is little motivation for the officials to engage with security threats when they are not adequately taken care of.

Border Security Management
Border security management is an integral part of the security of any state. The borders define the sovereignty of a state and mark off the point at which a state has influence over its affairs. This implies that the border is at the heart of a state's security (Osimen *et al.,* 2017). Any attempt to violate the borders of a state is often rebuffed. In fact, throughout history, borders have been the leading cause of conflicts between states (Laine, 2015).

Therefore, borders have often been very rigid and securitized. Movement across borders have been heavily regulated with very irksome procedures that intend to both thoroughly screen out threats on the one hand and also deter unnecessary migration to other states on the other hand (Laine, 2015). This reality has gradually changed due to the contemporary times in which we live in. In today's globalised world, people, goods and services criss-cross borders every time due to the inter-connectedness of the age (Osimen *et al.,* 2017). This has led to the need for a revised understanding of border security management. Good border security management now refers to the

ease of moving across borders while simultaneously keeping out national security threats (Lamptey, 2013; Bertozzi, 2008). Today's emphasis is on making the process as seamless as possible. This does not discountenance the need for security consciousness as the border agencies simply deploy more technology to effectively screen out the threats. Bertozzi (2008) is of the opinion that border agencies should take care not to stifle economic activities in the bid to enhance border security.

Effective border security management relies heavily on the collaboration with the border agencies of other states to be successful. This is because in order to remove the existing roadblocks to the smooth transactions at the borders, the officials would have to rely on the use of technologies particularly on intelligence gathering to able to filter out the threats that may exist to a state's security. This would only easily come from cooperation with the neighbouring state in terms of joint patrol, capacity building, communication and intelligence sharing (Bertozzi, 2008). Therefore, no state can attain effective border security management in isolation. It would need all the help it can get from its neighbours.

Implications of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement for Border Security
This paper is particularly concerned with the implications that the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement has for border security management.

Poor Detection of Threats to National Security
The ECOWAS Protocol has contributed to the poor capacity of border agencies to determine threats to the national security. The advantage of pre-screening of travellers for visa issuance is the ability of the border agencies to determine who is coming into the country and what the purpose is (Leonard, 2010; Zampagni, 2017). It helps to provide the host state with advance information which is useful in

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determining if a person or group of persons constitute a threat to the national interests. A visa can then be issued after determining that the migrant has legitimate reasons to move across the borders into the state. The ECOWAS Protocol currently negates against this by allowing the influx of all and sundry without the scrutiny of relevant checks such as these. This allows for mixed migration where different criminal elements could hide among legitimate migrants to cross en masse into Nigeria or the Republic of Benin (UNODC 2018). This arguably is the case at the moment in Nigeria in the discourse on the recent security threat of the Herdsmen/Farmers clash. The head of Miyetti Allah, the group representing the herdsmen, recently argued that the herdsmen that perpetrate the conflict are non-Nigerians. According to him, they are Fulani from neighbouring states such as Niger that cross the borders at will. He attributes the ease of navigating the borders at northern Nigeria to the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement which makes border crossing very easy (The Nation Nigeria, 2018).

The essence of the instrument was to enhance the integration of the region but it has inadvertently taken away a vital element of the policing of border agencies. This ability to pre-empt threats is particularly important as it is easier to take preventive measures rather than curative ones. If the border agencies could be notified earlier that a particular citizen is a threat to the national security of Nigeria or the Republic of Benin, he would ordinarily be refused entry into the state. This unfortunately has not been the case since the Protocol came into force in 1979.

Promotion of trans-national organised crimes especially human trafficking
Transnational organised crimes are criminal acts that are carried out by structured gangs for profit across the borders of several states. Recently, such crimes have become a signature of West African borders (Onuoha 2013; Opanike *et al.,* 2015; Asiwaju 2018) The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons has inadvertently promoted

human trafficking in the West African sub-region. The United Nations Organization for Drug and Crime defines human trafficking as the act of recruiting, transporting or receiving a person through coercion or deception for the purpose of exploitation in the forms of sex, forced labour or organ harvesting (UNODC 2016). This type of transnational organised crime has become so notorious that it is the only one singled out by ECOWAS in its Common Approach on Migration to be combatted as a moral and humanitarian imperative (ECOWAS Commission, 2008). Human trafficking gangs have taken advantage of this to ensure the perpetuation of the so-called "modern-day slavery" in the 21st century (Adeleye 2017). Human trafficking gangs are able to exploit the free movement of people, goods and services by bribing border officials and ensuring their collusion in the nefarious activities. Young girls for instance, are recruited in hotspots in Southern Nigeria such as Benin City and stealthily moved across the land borders on their way to Southern Europe. A large majority of those affected are Nigerians making them one of the most-trafficked victims to Europe in all of sub-Saharan Africa (De Haas 2006). The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement has contributed to the laxity of border officials on both sides of the divide to the issue of human trafficking and other Transnational Organised Crimes (TOCs). The lack of observance by the border officials such as the Nigerian Immigration Service is further compounded by the infiltration of the top ranks of these agencies by the elite heads of the trafficking gangs. The heads of these gangs are wealthy traffickers with sophisticated networks across Europe, Asia and America. They exert pressure on the weak institutional structures of the border agencies and are able to sway them to their side as a result of their clout (Adeleye, 2017).

Improper awareness and implementation of the Protocol
A major consequence for border security of this free movement instrument is improper awareness and implementation of the Protocol. There is reason to believe that the meaning and import of the Protocol have been misunderstood especially by the community citizens

(Elumelu,2014). The instrument has been interpreted to mean movement across West African borders without any form of identification whatsoever. Thus, citizens troop en masse over the borders and appear puzzled when quizzed by border officials for relevant travel documents(Haas, 2006). The blame for this can be placed squarely on ECOWAS and the member states for not properly undertaking sensitization of the community citizens. Such misconception is dangerous as it could lead to the outbreak of violence and hostility in the process of enforcing the law. Citizens also prefer to use porous routes at the borders rather than the official ones(UNODC, 2018). This inconceivably occurs even when they have the relevant travel documents such as the ECOWAS passport and health certificate. This action springs from the belief that official border procedures are burdensome and tenuous such that citizens would rather contravene the law than follow it. Community citizens should be adequately sensitised on the full provisions of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement and their rights therein (Adepoju, 2015). Implementation is also subject to political dynamics of member states. In early 1983 and in mid-1985, the Nigerian Government revoked Articles 4 and 27 of the Protocol to expel over 1 million illegal aliens mostly Ghanaians (Adepoju, 2005a).

Ignorance and blatant violation of the Protocol by border officials
The implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol is also hampered by shocking ignorance and blatant violation of the law by border officials. It is commonplace within West African borders that border officials still request for gratification from travellers in spite of the valid travel documents possessed by the citizens. Movement at the Seme border for instance often resorts to gridlock as border agencies request for "tips" or bribe to permit travellers especially traders to bring in their goods. This flagrant disregard for the Protocol posits a danger to the state as it permits the highest bidder to come into the state irrespective of their intentions. Under this disguise, criminal elements could be

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granted entry that constitutes security threats as a result of this lack of thorough implementation of the Protocol.

Remarkably, some border officials are even ignorant of the basic tenets of the Protocol. This is seen in the fact that people are allowed to move across these borders without relevant checks on their person and documents. This leaves a lot to be desired as the wrong calibre of people get admitted into the state with grave security implications. In Nigeria recently, the issue of security threats such as nomadic herdsmen migrating across the borders into Northern Nigeria has been traced to the irregular migration that is due to negligence on the part of border agencies manning the nation's frontiers (The Nation Nigeria 2018).

Increase in corruption among border officials
The Protocol has also led to corruption among the hierarchy of border officials (Haas, 2006) . The intention of the protocol was to ensure easy movement of people across the borders while keeping out threats to national security. ECOWAS thus set out to create a fairly simple system in which the ECOWAS Travel Certificate or passport as well as the Health Certificate could replace the need for visas in verifying the identity of migrants. However, the system has been hijacked by corruption in these agencies. It starts from the very process of issuance of the ECOWAS passports. The procedure is often shabbily done without recourse to detail and thorough inspection of documents presented by the citizen of the community. In Nigeria, for instance, the ECOWAS Passport can be gotten in about two hours after submission. While this could be hailed as an efficient process, it is important to point out that the citizen often has to tip off the immigration officer in order to hasten up the process. This could be done irrespective of whether the documents presented are legitimate or in consonance with the laws of the land.

Corruption is also evident in the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement. This is seen in the way and manner the provisions of the protocol are handled by the border officials (Adepoju,

2005b). The ECOWAS Protocol has been taken to mean a *laissez-passé* for just about any form of illegality where everything goes. Whereas some of the provisions of the Protocol clearly state that the individual could only pass with appropriate travel documents, it has become a form of migration *en masse* across the borders. Scant attention is paid to scrutinising the travel documents at border posts of prominent borders of both Nigeria and the Republic of Benin such as Seme and Idiroko. Businessmen easily collaborate with border officials to ensure clear passage even when lacking basic travel documents. Trans-border Commuters in Nigeria such as ABC Transport and Cross Country frequently transport commuters across West Africa who do not have ECOWAS passports. They simply charge these citizens higher transport costs and "sort" or bribe border officials to be allowed movement across the borders. The porosity of the borders of Nigeria and the Republic of Benin also create a perfect opportunity to sabotage the ECOWAS Protocol. The Protocol is presumed on the basis that the West African states have what it takes to ensure the security of their borders. These include sound facilities, latest technologies and adequately remunerated personnel. The opposite is usually the case with African borders having the unenviable reputation of being among the most porous in the world (Onuoha 2013). This reality has provided the leeway for criminals to hijack the good intentions behind the enactment of the protocol and utilise it as the perfect cover for their illegitimate activities.

The presence of multiple illegal checkpoints at Seme border is also a contravention of the intent of the Protocol. In a research trip undertaken by the author in December 2017 across the land borders of West African states of Nigeria, Republic of Benin, Togo and Ghana, it was discovered that there were over 17 illegal checkpoints that were counted between the border at Seme and the border town at Badagry. These checkpoints are simply avenues to extort travellers of their resources even after lawfully crossing the state's borders and appear to be commonplace across the community (Haas, 2006). The

Protocol was set up to enhance movement across the borders and not complicate it. The implementation of this noble desire at the border in Seme leaves a lot to be desired. The checkpoints are a flagrant disregard of the tenets of the Protocol (Elumelu, 2014b). They made crossing the land borders of Nigeria a dreaded affair and introduce crime and corruption in a new dimension as it is carried out openly by border officials.

Inadequate Cooperation among National Border Agencies
The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement can also be fingered as contributing to the inadequate cooperation among border agencies of both the Nigerian and Republic of Benin States. The national interest is held supreme in every state and is promoted beyond every other desire. The Protocol represents a regional convention that could at times be interpreted as inimical to the national security of a country. Barely 5 years after the Protocol was enacted by ECOWAS in 1979, Nigeria, arguably the dominant power in the West African sub-region contravened its provisions under the Buhari regime by indiscriminately deporting over 1 million immigrants to states in the region such as Ghana and Republic of Benin that were deemed illegal (Haas,2006; Lar 2007). The argument put forward at the time was that they contributed to the insecurity of the state. Nigeria has also at other times shut its borders with the Republic of Benin totally under the pretext of combating Trans-national organised crimes (TOCs) (Osimen *et al.,* 2017). Instances like this have watered down the importance of the Protocol as states within the region could arbitrarily take counter-measures against it without warning.

Language barriers
The language barrier poses an existential challenge to the implementation of the Free Movement Protocol of ECOWAS. Language is crucial to the co-ordination of operations across the borders. This is even more so as Nigeria and the Republic of Benin

speak different languages – the former speaks English while the latter's lingua franca is French. This development arose due to the difference in colonialism. The idea of the sub-regional integration seeks to transcend the linguistic differences to unite the people of different cultures that make up the community. Overcoming the language barrier is simply the first step as the languages also harbour distinct cultures that would also need to be brought together. It is therefore appalling that the border officials at the Nigeria and Republic of Benin borders are often not multilingual (Ayamga, 2014). This implies that the border officials have inadequate knowledge of French and English required to carry out basic conversations that would ensure smooth entry and exit across the borders. This is a major problem because the inability to communicate effectively between the border officials and community citizens easily breeds room for hostility. Border officials typically come across as hostile and aggressive whereas travellers are impatient when the language differences come into play. The governments of Nigeria and the Republic of Benin have to invest heavily in multilingual trainings for the border agencies to build their capacity in both languages. The ability to do that would go a long way in ensuring the smooth implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement.

The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement is a very important instrument to foster economic integration in the sub-region. While it has been crucial to the development of the member states for over four decades, it is in dire need of reform to enable it become more effective. To do this, the author draws lessons from the free movement instruments across the world that ECOWAS could domesticate to get better results.

First, there is the need for an external border for the sub-region. ECOWAS has succeeded in abolishing the internal borders within the community. This implies that one can easily move across these borders with ease thanks to the Protocol that does not require one to have a visa. The benefits of these have involved easy movement of people,

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goods and services across the sub-region. ECOWAS however lacks a common external border. It has been unable to create a joint border of all 16 states that screens people from outside the sub-region who want to come into the community (Elumelu 2014a). The consequence is that a member state cannot easily vouch for the security of the other as each state is responsible for its own security. This does not augur well for the community in the age of globalization where states face similar threats. These threats include terrorism, viral diseases, arms proliferation and drug smuggling. The West African sub-region was thrown into chaos a few years back when Ebola broke out and spread rather easily from state to state.

ECOWAS can take some lessons from the European Union (EU) in this regard. The external border of the Schengen Area screens travellers from whatever point of entry into the EU. This is a buffer to the security of each member state as security threats are rebuffed and prevented from entering into any part of the region. There is also a joint organisation that manages the external borders of the European Union that is lacking in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). FRONTEX effectively co-ordinates the external borders of the region by facilitating co-operation amongst border agencies of member states and data-sharing (Leonard 2010).

In addition, there is the need for modern border facilities for ECOWAS member states. This is highly important for effective border policing. The Seme Joint Border Post that was commissioned in October 2018 is a step in the right direction. That feat has to be replicated in other border points between Nigeria and its ECOWAS neighbours. The facilities for the border agencies are not conducive for cross-border policing. The member-states and ECOWAS need to invest funds in building modern border facilities that are full-equipped with required technologies for good border management.

It is important that ECOWAS develops an effective data sharing system such as the EU Visa Information System. The West African organisation should create a sound information sharing system in the

sub-region. This is imperative to complement the ease of movement that the ECOWAS Protocol aims at attaining. The drawback of making migration seamless across borders within a particular region is the very present likelihood that it could be taken advantage of by criminal elements (Bertozzi, 2008). This is where the need for sound intelligence information and sharing systems come into play. It is crucial that ECOWAS designs an operational system for sharing intelligence on security threats across the sub-region in real time. Unfortunately, a lot remains to be done in this regard. The border agencies of West Africa have been rather slow to adopt prominent technologies at their land, sea and air borders. In the 21st century, manual searches are still the order of the day at the sub-region's entry and exit points. This lack of reliance on technology hinders the development of a sophisticated intelligence sharing mechanism among member states. The European Union has the Visa Information System that ensures that all member states are kept abreast of potential security threats (Bertozzi, 2008). This requires that information about travellers into the Schengen Area is within reach of all member states in real time. ECOWAS lacks such a system and has undermined the essence of the Protocol in its absence. The lack of coordination in data sharing has giving the West African borders the unenviable reputation of having some of Africa's most notorious borders. Criminals can move from one state to another unhindered and avoid detection by security agents. Improper documentation of migrants is also another consequence of this as the details of these people are not properly archived by ECOWAS for future purposes.

Conclusion

This paper argues that the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement has inadvertently heightened the border insecurity for Nigeria and the Republic of Benin. This is in spite of the measured benefits including promotion of intra-regional trade, easier movement of human and material resources and economic integration. The negative implications of the ECOWAS Protocol to border security include rise in

transnational organised crimes such as human trafficking, poor detection of threats to national security, improper awareness of the Protocol, increased corruption by border officials, inadequate cooperation of border agencies and language barriers. ECOWAS needs to mitigate these challenges as it prepares to transform into an ECOWAS of Peoples in 2020. Therefore, it should create and manage an external border for the region, formulate an efficient information sharing system, ensure national policies are not opposed to the Protocol and maintain smart borders with the latest technologies.

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Politics and Dynamics of Personality Cult in Africa

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Abstract
A personality cult is a circumstance where an open figure is purposely introduced to the individuals of a nation as an extraordinary individual who ought to be appreciated and adored. It is relevant to comprehend that distinctive African nations had early fathers from the religious to secular world who contributed colossally to the disclosure and systematization of country states. These personalities are expected to be adored as trailblazers of nationhood but have been subverted with present-day characters whose belief systems and perspectives are very unusual to the nations. The thrust of this paper is on a personality cult, religion and politics in Africa. Data were collected using the documentary method and analyzed via the content analysis method. The study was anchored on the theory of charismatic leadership propounded by Robert Tucker (1968). The study discovered that cults were part of a larger universe of symbolic politics that played a vital role in disseminating party goals and social hierarchies and that they served to centre emotions and loyalties in a particular symbol. However, a pure instrumentalist view fails to account for the cults' numerous popular manifestations, particularly in local contexts. The examination in this way prescribes, among others, that authority and non-formally attributed implications ought to be paid attention to in state-society connections to encourage and continue pioneer cliques.

Keywords: *Personality Cult, Religion, Politics, Ethnicity and Africa*

Introduction
A cult of personality or cult of the leader emerges when a country's regime or, more rarely, an individual uses mass media, propaganda, the big lie, spectacle, the arts, patriotism, and government-organised demonstrations and rallies to create an idealized, heroic, and worshipful

image of a leader, often through unquestioning flattery and praise. In one-party and dominant-party nations, a cult of personality is comparable to apotheosis, except that it is developed by modern social engineering tactics, usually by the state or the party. It is common in totalitarian or authoritarian states (Sivan, 2015).

The term was popularized in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech on the cult of personality and its consequences, delivered on the penultimate day of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's 20th Congress. In his address, Khrushchev, who was the Communist Party's First Secretary and, by extension, the country's leader, condemned the lionization and idealization of Joseph Stalin and, by extension, his communist contemporary Mao Zedong, as being contradictory to Marxist teaching. The speech was later made public and was part of the Soviet Union's "de-Stalinization" campaign.

In ancient Rome's Imperial religion, emperors and some members of their families were associated with the divinely sanctioned power of the Roman State. Monarchs and other state rulers have long been held in high regard and endowed with superhuman characteristics throughout history. In medieval Europe, for example, monarchs were considered to hold office by God's will, based on the notion of the divine right of kings. The Inca, Aztecs, Tibetans, Siam (now Thailand), and the Roman Empire are all known for redefining monarchs as "god-kings." (Mikaberidze, 2011). In the 18th and 19th centuries, the growth of democratic and secular ideas in Europe and North America made it increasingly difficult for kings to maintain this image. However, the following advent of mass media, such as radio, allowed politicians to portray a favourable picture of themselves to the populace as never before. The most well-known personality cults evolved from these circumstances in the twentieth century. These cults are frequently political religions.

The term Cult of Personality, like its French and German counterparts, first appeared in English circa 1800–1850. Initially, it had no political connotations, but it was strongly associated with the

Romantic "cult of genius." The phrase was first used in a political context in a letter from Karl Marx to German political worker Wilhelm Blos on November 10, 1877.

Frequently, a single leader became identified with this revolutionary shift and came to be regarded as a beneficent "guide" for the nation, without whom the nation's transformation to a better future would be impossible. Personality cults evolved in totalitarian societies, such as Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong, which has been used to justify them. Mao Zedong's respect has remained universal throughout China. According to a poll conducted by the Global Times in December 2013, over 85 per cent of Chinese people viewed Mao favourably. According to Jan Plamper, while Napoleon III made several originations, Benito Mussolini in Italy in the 1920s, who pioneered the dictator-as-cult-figure concept, was later followed by Hitler, Stalin, and others utilizing the propaganda powers of a totalitarian state (Arshin, 2014).

The Stalin cult, according to *Pierre du Bois,* was meticulously developed to legitimize Stalin's leadership. There were numerous purposeful distortions and falsehoods employed. Key documents were destroyed when the Kremlin refused access to archive records that might reveal the truth. Photographs were tampered with, and documents were conceived. People who knew Stalin were compelled to produce official accounts to satisfy the cult's ideological demands, mainly since Stalin himself delivered it in Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1938, which became the official history. According to David (2010), the Stalin cult was a significant component of Stalinism and hence one of the most prominent elements of Soviet authority... Many Stalinist researchers regard the cult as essential to Stalin's leadership or as proof of Stalin's megalomania. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser link the "cult of the leader" in Latin America to the concept of the caudillo, an influential leader who is unconstrained by any office or limitation. These populist strongmen are portrayed as "masculine and

perhaps violent," They employed the cult of personality to bolster their power. The connection can be traced back to Argentina's Juan Peron, according to Mudde and Kaltwasser (Amir, 2010).

Conceptual Clarification
Personality Cult
The term 'Cult' became associated with the term' personality in modern European languages in the first part of the nineteenth century, but it does not seem to have appeared in Russia until considerably later. It is widely assumed that the term "cult of the individual" was first used in Russia in Nikita Krushchev's 1956 Secret Speech to the VKP's twentieth Party Congress. He denounced the "cult of the individual" surrounding the then-deceased Stalin; however, Georgi Malenkov, who briefly succeeded Stalin as premier and first secretary of the Communist Party, used the term concerning the then-deceased Stalin in April 1953, in a speech to the Central Committee. Personality cults were considered intrinsically anti-Marxist, with Marx and Friedrich Engels speaking out against the self-glorification around them as their celebrity rose in 1877. Although, the variances in usage among academic subjects are minor, the specific definition given to the word personality cult varies slightly depending on the historical era and the writer's discipline and inclination. Stalin, Mao Zedong, Adolf Hitler, Napoleon Bonaparte, Maximilian I, Caesar Augustus, and Alexander are the most well-known leaders with personality cults.

According to political scientist Pao-min Chang (2012), a personality cult is the intentional elevation of one man's status and authority by the deliberate production, projection, and transmission of a godlike image. Historian Rpad von Klimó posits that personality cults should be understood as secularized forms of religious rites. He described a cult of personality as a collection of symbolic behaviours and texts that convey and ritualize the specific meanings attributed to a single individual to form a fictitious society. Similarly, Plamper

defines a *personality cult* as the godlike exaltation of a modern political leader through mass media techniques and excessive glorification of this leader.

Adrian (2016) describes the cult of personality as a quantitatively excessive and qualitatively extravagant public display of praise for the leader in the ABC of Sycophancy: Structural Conditions for the Emergence of Dictators' Cults of Personality. He wrote about the necessary, but not sufficient, structural conditions that lead to the formation of personality cults, as well as a path-dependent chain of events that lead to the cult formation: "a particular combination of patrimonialism and clientelism, lack of dissidence, and systematic falsification pervading the society's culture" (Ejike, 2018).

Religion
The concept of political religion is dominant to any study of charismatic leadership, and particularly personality cults. As previously noted, the term 'cult' has a religious meaning, and personality cults centered on politicians share many similarities with religious worship. According to historian Marina Cattaruzza, the term "political religion" is nearly invariably connected with authoritarian governments of the 1930s, such as Stalin's Russia, Hitler's Germany, and Mussolini's Italy (Barry, 2015). *Political religions* are a recent phenomenon that emerged only after establishing a political sphere separate from religion and after the religion had been reduced to a private concern with a private dimension. According to Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, religious belief is crucial to human existence, who claims that if formal religion is suppressed, individuals will try to construct their religion.

Politics
Politics refers to the range of actions involved in governing a country, state, or region. It entails making judgments that affect entire groups of people. It refers to obtaining and exercising governance-organized authority over human society, notably a state. In modern nation-states,

people often form political parties to reflect their ideals. Members of a political party frequently agree to have the same stance on numerous topics and support the same legislative reforms and leaders (Hawley, 2016). An election is usually a contest between opposing political parties. The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the Democratic Party (DP) in the United States, the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in Germany, and the Indian National Congress in India (2546 political parties), which has the most political parties in the world, are just a few examples of political parties around the world.

Politics is a broad term with many meanings. It has several descriptive and non-judgmental definitions (such as "the art or science of governing" and "political ideas"), but it is frequently used in a negative context. A range of approaches is used in politics, including publicizing one's political beliefs, negotiating with other political subjects, passing legislation, and using force, including warfare against rivals. Politics is practiced on a wide range of social levels, from traditional societies' clans and tribes through modern municipal governments, businesses, and organizations, all the way up to sovereign nations and the international level. As a result, a political system is a framework that establishes appropriate political procedures in a specific community.

Africa

Africa is the second-largest and most populous continent on the planet. It spans 6% of the Earth's total surface area and 20% of its land area, with a total area of 30.3 million km2 (11.7 million square miles), including adjacent islands. It is home to about 16 per cent of the world's population, with 1.3 billion people as of 2018. The Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to the northeast, the Indian Ocean to the southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean to the west encircle the continent. Madagascar and several archipelagos make up the continent. There are 54 sovereign nations

with full recognition, nine territories, and two de facto independent states with little or no recognition. The Northern Hemisphere contains most of the continent and its countries, whereas the Southern Hemisphere has a significant percentage and number of countries (Goldberg, 2015).

Africa's average population is the youngest of all the continents, with a median age of 19.7 in 2012, compared to a global median age of 30.4. Algeria is Africa's largest country in terms of land area, and Nigeria is the most populous country. As indicated by the finding of the earliest hominids, Africa, particularly central Eastern Africa, is primarily considered the genesis of humans and the Hominidae clade (great apes). Africa is home to a wide range of ethnic groups, customs, and languages. European powers conquered practically all of Africa in the late nineteenth century, and most current African republics arose from a decolonization process in the twentieth century. African nations collaborate through the establishment of the African Union, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopts the charismatic legitimation theory propounded by Robert Tucker (1968) in the 1960s as a paradigm for studying personal leadership growth in developing countries. The theory's hypothesis matched the predicted roles of post-independence leaders who had amassed significant followership during the battle for independence in nation-building and economic development. The theory's inability to explain certain expectations, particularly the transformation of charismatic legitimation into personality cults and unaccountable authoritarian control, has prompted criticism. Like the trait approach, this theory began with an emphasis on identifying the qualities of great persons then shifted to include the impact of situations on leadership. However, it failed to reemphasize the critical role of traits of ineffective leadership.

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Nevertheless, this article reviews the theory in light of African and Nigerian experience, arguing that, given the character of the country's elite, effective and accountable leadership cannot be left to the preferences and choices of leaders, no matter how exemplary, messianic, heroic, or revolutionary they may be. The paper offers a case for putting in place the necessary institutional correlates that are compatible with democracy, the rule of law, and accountability and capable of curbing trends toward political power personalization.

Brief Historical Analysis of Personality Cult
Personality cults around political leaders predate the twentieth century's totalitarian governments, and they are not limited to a single philosophy or political system. They have been discovered in a wide range of locations and eras throughout human history. Conducting a cursory overview of some of the main elements of personality cults from antiquity to the time immediately preceding Stalin's dictatorship can provide helpful information. It will be shown that, while many aspects of Stalin's cult, as well as the accolades and exceptional attributes lavished on him, appear to be unique and tailored specifically to the expression of Stalin's outstanding leadership, they are generic and formulaic when viewed in the context of previous personality cults. The first documented occurrence of a divine cult of a live human is widely assigned to the Spartan general Lysander, who was venerated on Samos at the end of the 5th century BC. Personality cults existed in Pharaonic Egypt, around Alexander the Great, Roman emperors, Japanese emperors, Napoleon, Napoleon III, Russian tsars, and a variety of other imperial systems, fascist administrations, and socialist regimes (Morison, 2018).

The use of art to publicize and promote the leader's identity has a long history as well. The Ancient Romans, for example, excelled at sculpting, particularly portrait busts, which were only used by patricians. The emperor's busts were manufactured in large quantities and sent around the empire to be displayed in public places and private

houses. , every Roman citizen was compelled to burn incense in front of the emperor's bust to express loyalty and allegiance. Caesar Augustus was portrayed as a military commander (imperator), the first citizen of Rome, and the leading priest, among other things. These roles were archetypal and tied to his official titles and duties, expressing the ruler's nature in his numerous established connections with his subjects.

The political poster, which is of great significance to this study, is possibly the most closely paralleled in numismatics. Darius, the Great of Persepolis, used coinage to transmit his image to the people across his vast realm. Antony and Octavian both struck coins with their pictures in the position previously reserved for the gods as part of their propaganda campaign to succeed Julius Caesar in Ancient Rome. Brutus, too, struck coins depicting his forefathers occupying the temple of the gods. Dionysus' symbols and pictures of Antony with an ivy crown on his head can be found on Asian coins. Antony, like Octavian, linked himself publicly with Dionysus and attempted to build a heavenly lineage for himself. Apart from their merely pragmatic utility as cash within the economic system, coins were small, portable, extensively distributed, and frequently in public view, making them an effective method of propaganda. They may have also taken on apotropaic properties at times (Tobiah, 2019). Maximilian's images were rich in symbolism, establishing a complex visual language that spoke to his attributes, archetypal leadership qualities, ancestry, and position's validity. Maximilian did not abandon other types of art and propaganda that had a long and illustrious history. He appeared in statues, and his deeds were announced on triumphal arches and through the issuance of coinage, following in the footsteps of previous Roman emperors. Maximilian planned a large number of public works to demonstrate not only his historical ties to the Roman Empire but also his spiritual and ideological ties to Emperor Constantine, displaying his Christian piety and faith, his leadership qualities, and his warrior identity, much like the emperors striving for divinity before

him. Concerned that his claims to historic legitimacy would not be enough to secure a stable and peaceful rule, he 'beefed up' these claims with some inventive genealogy and using his created image to appeal to his subjects on charismatic grounds.

Napoleon's cult grew in popularity in Russia, England, France, and Germany and, to a lesser extent, the rest of Europe in the nineteenth century. Napoleon portraits could be found in practically every home in Germany and France. Despite Russia's victory in compelling Napoleon to depart from Russian soil in the Patriotic War of 1812, they witnessed Napoleonic worship. Napoleon's status as a conquering enemy, as well as his later humiliating escape and abandonment of his remaining troops, appear to have done little to tarnish his reputation as a great general and emperor. Napoleon Bonaparte's cult was later used by his nephew Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III) as a means of power. One of the most complex and arguably most analogous cults of a revolutionary hero before Lenin was George Washington, which helped legitimize the American Revolution. An exemplary (and perhaps invented) biography, a multitude of historical paintings, enormous statuary, and the presence of pictures in practically every family home were all part of Washington's cult (Carter, 2010).

The Role of Mass Media
The media has played a vital influence in the formation of personality cults. According to Thomas (2013), the charismatic leader, particularly in politics, is increasingly becoming a product of the media and self-exposure. When it comes to the media in the United States, Robert (2018) says it is difficult to tell how much the media reflects and how much they produce the cult of personality in American politics. They certainly did not develop it all by themselves, but they undoubtedly contributed significantly to it. In Africa, politics is dominated to the extent that it is unusual in the modern world by the personalities of political leaders. In recent years personalised politics, the leader's

"charisma" has been almost wholly a product of media exposure (Cullinane, 2018), which is made easier because a significant number of these media parastatals are subservient to the political leaders.

Personality Cults in Selected African Countries
Equatorial Guinea
The first president of Equatorial Guinea, Francisco Macias Nguema, was the centre of an extreme personality cult, presumably spurred by his heavy use of bhang and iboga, and he gave himself titles like "Unique Miracle" and "Grand Master of Education, Science, and Culture." The island of Fernando Pó had its name Africanized after him to Masie Nguema Biyogo Island; upon his overthrow in 1979, its name was again changed to Bioko. The capital, Santa Isabel, had its name changed to Malabo. He modified the national motto of Equatorial Guinea's coat of arms from "There is no other God but Macias Nguema" to "There is no other God than Macias Nguema" in 1978. (Isemberg, 2019).

Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, accused of creating a personality cult, has perpetuated this pattern. As proof of this, in July 2003, state-run radio declared Obiang to be the country's deity, with complete control over men and things. It went on to say that the president was in constant contact with God and that he could choose to kill without fear of being held accountable or going to hell. In 1993, he made similar remarks. Marcas had declared himself a god as well. Obiang has cultivated his cult of personality by ensuring that his public speeches end with well-wishes for himself rather than the republic (Soucek. 2018). Numerous prominent buildings have presidential lodges, many towns and cities have streets dedicated to Obiang's coup against Macau, and many people wear clothing with his visage. Like his predecessor and other African tyrants like Idi Amin and Mobutu Sese Seko, Obiang has several inventive titles. Among them are the gentlemen of Bioko's vast island, Annobón, and Ro Muni. El Jefe (the boss) is another moniker he uses (Michael, 2017).

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Libya
During Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's leadership in Libya, there was a personality cult devoted to him. His image appeared on postage stamps, watches, and school satchels, among other things. Quotations from The Green Book appeared in several places, including street walls, airports, and even pens, and they were also turned into pop music for public consumption (Navaro-Yashin, 2016). Gaddafi stated that he despised the personality cult surrounding him but that he was willing to put up with it because the Libyan people adored him. According to his biographers, Blundy and Lycett, he was a populist at heart. Throughout Libya, thousands of fans would gather at public events when he spoke; the government claimed these as "spontaneous demonstrations," however, there have been documented cases of groups being coerced or paid to participate (Dubois, 2016). He was notorious for arriving late to public gatherings, and he would occasionally fail to show up at all. Although he possessed a gift for oratory, biographers Blundy and Lycett thought he was a lousy orator. Gaddafi was known for his long, rambling lectures, which usually entailed attacking Israel and the United States, according to biographer Daniel Kawczynski (Philip, 2015).

Togo
President of the Togolese Republic, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, had a massive personality cult that included but was not limited to, a thousand dancing women who sang and danced in praise of him; school children beginning their days by singing his praises; portraits that adorned most stores; a bronze statue in Lomé; and $20 wristwatches with his portrait that dissipated. In addition, the anniversary of a failed assassination attempt on Eyadéma's life was remembered annually as the Feast of Victory against Evil Forces (Reese, 2015). To commemorate the anniversary of the 1974 plane disaster he believed to be the sole survivor, Eyadéma changed his first name from Étienne to Gnassingbé.

Personality Cult in Nigeria: The Case of Nnamdi Kanu

As previously stated, the term 'cult' comes from the religious realm, but it is crucial to highlight that the clear distinction between religious and secular sectors that characterizes many Western democracies today did not exist in the ancient world (Chetan, 2017). The leader cult and its ritual manifestation can have a unifying societal impact, emphasizing social, political, and moral cohesiveness. This may be seen in the followers of Biafra/Nnamdi Kanu (the self-declared leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra, who is pushing for the separation of southeast Nigeria from the rest of the country).

It is pointless to try to reason with Kanu's fans about the man or their Biafran fantasy. They appear to feel that they are immune to the need to reason, and they have all been engulfed by Kanu's cult of personality since his detention by Nigerian security forces in October 2015. Following his release on bail, images of adult men and women worshipping at his feet, crowds following him everywhere he goes, and simple terms like "head of a separatist movement" are no longer acceptable to define Kanu for his supporters. He has been compared to Christ and is now their "supreme leader," "saviour," and possibly Moses, and Christ rolled into one: "I recall when Christ came, not everyone viewed him as saviour." This was in reaction to "non-believers" (Bilias, 2017).

Kanu is reportedly a devout believer of Judaism, and he and his adherents are not afraid to wax biblical about the Biafran cause being a divine mandate. Kanu is alleged to be a guy sent by God to battle for his people's freedom. As a result, opposing Kanu or Biafra is equivalent to opposing God (Felix, 2017). The irony is lost on Kanu fundamentalists. One of the most severe challenges facing pro-Biafrans in Nigeria is the hold of Islamic extremism, particularly in the country's north, and the reality that many Igbos have perished due to extremist violence. Kanu and his supporters, on the other hand, are perfectly content with their Biafran fanaticism and exceptionalism. According to Kanu, in response to a recent interview when asked

how the public would react to his demand for a boycott of the governorship election in Anambra State in November, People will not vote because "we controlled them 100 per cent," The idea that he can control a large number of people is highly hazardous for both the controller and the controlled. It is at odds with democratic norms and the Igbos' republican spirit, which Kanu claims to lead. This may well go over Kanu's and his supporters' heads, as seen by their intense assumption that a Donald Trump presidency will bring Biafra to fruition (Curtis, 2).

Nigeria's failed state conditions, Kanu's detention and subsequent Nollywood-style antics after his release, false claims about Biafra's divinity, and the suppression of dissent have all contributed to the current phenomenon of fanatical followership and a personality cult, which the Nigerian authorities have no idea how to deal with it.

Conclusion

Observing the cult of personality from a historical perspective, starting with the ancient world and progressing through Europe to modern times, it becomes clear that the essential characteristics of charismatic leadership, as well as the cults of personality built around charismatic leaders, have more similarities than differences, regardless of geography or epoch. This is not unexpected, given that charismatic leaders and the conditions that breed them have existed throughout history, and the issues that these leaders and their countries face are very consistent. Although, political propaganda portrays each of these leaders as uniquely gifted and blessed, or at the very least as a member of a rare breed, their public personas are nearly identical in many ways, with their personality cults sharing several key genres, symbols, and fictional features.

The study recommends that dignitaries representing the nation's personality cult be evaluated based on their dignity and patriotic aspects. Spiritual leaders should respect their God to be able to proclaim the truth and give better answers, which may or may not be

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used against the state. Men of dignity and integrity should be chosen to occupy such areas so that they are not exploited as a tool by opposition parties, as this will prevent extortion and looting of the people and the government as a result of covetous behaviour. The country should also work to instil moral values in its citizens so that they can lead the country to greater heights.

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Climate Change: Genesis, Consequences, Remedies and Global Politics

Author:	Tola Badejo, PhD
Publishers:	Concrete Communications Limited, Lagos & College Press, Ibadan
Year of Publication:	2021
Pages:	98
Reviewers:	Jide Owoeye & Tunde Oseni

This 98-page book by Tola Badejo is a treatise in Environmental Management Science as it is in International Political Economy- Such a book is rare. Succinctly titled; **Climate Change: Genesis, Consequences, Remedies and Global Politics**, Badejo's book presents to us a meticulous, data-rich and graphically illustrated environmental science text. Although, the author is a Zoologist by training, his research interests, particularly in his post-doctoral endeavours, have covered Applied Ecology in its broader sense. As the author reflects, this work is a 'comprehensive account' of multiple researches he has embarked upon over the last thirty years.

As a matter of fact, the thematic focus of this book is both multi-disciplinary and intellectually stimulating. A chapter by chapter understanding of the intertwined issues of climate change, including political, economic, social and technological dimensions, make the book an enriching addition to knowledge production not only in environmental but also natural, applied and social sciences. The reader begins to have a sense of intellectual curiosity with both the opening preface by the author and lucid foreword by Professor Francis Adesina of Geography department of Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife.

This is aside a two-page 'preamble' by the author in which critical and technical background is provided for the study.

Our Intervention

From the programme of event earlier sent to me, I could deduce that the reviewers have been selected to discuss the various themes of the book as related to their own disciplines. Accordingly, mine lies in the politics of the subject matter.

For this reason, I will speak less on the Causes of Greenhouse Gases (Chapter 1) or Consequences of Global Warming (Chapter 2). Other areas including Remedies for Global Warming such as reforestation, energy conservation and renewable energy sources (Chapter 3) would also be treated by other experts on this panel.

Rather, I would be more interested in Chapter Four, "Politics of Global Warming" and Chapter six. "Deviation from sustainable Development Goals by Newly Industrialized countries" My thoughts on these two sections of the book would then be aligned with the author's conclusion in Chapter 7.

First, global power politics is uneven. In International Relations, we often talk about the asymmetrical relationship between the Global North and Global South. In Badejo's book, this reality is well analysed. In relating this to solving ecological crisis particularly climate change, Badejo advocates that "it is logical to expect that industrialised nations should spend more money than less industrialised nations in cleaning the environment because they contribute more to emission of Greenhouse Gases". The economic inequality among nations has equally enabled the ecological injustice. Enforcement of "Carbon Tax", the author argues, is the core policy at curbing climate change.

Second, international politics of climate change is not likely to end soon. The reason for this is well captured in Badejo's book. States are run based on national interest which of course, may be fuelled by elite interest or different ideological learnings. For Badejo, subtle (and at times total) rejection of the Paris Agreement (by Trump's America,

for instance) is not based on sound 'ecological reasoning'. (p.69) Ecology, the author affirms, is not economics. If the United States could undermine the various treaties on reducing greenhouse gas emissions and limiting the rise in average global temperatures, which other powerful country would not? In short, America's political stance against both the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Climate Change treaty showcase dynamics of power politics on Climate Change. On this, the author writes:

> *Unfortunately, those supporting the Paris Agreement are more than those who do not support it in the present administration of President Donald Trump in USA. President George W. Bush tore the Kyoto Protocol apart in 2001. President Trump tore the Paris Agreement apart in 2017. This reveals one naked fact. The world cannot trust the Republicans with environmental issues (pg. 76).*

While it is true that partisan cum ideological differences in American politics affects the country's inconsistent support for climate change treaties, it is almost a given fact that a Republican government would tow the lines of Big Businesses and industries than a typical Democratic regime.

In fairness to the West, a strong economy is a product of industrialisation. This is why in Chapter six, the author explicated the growing contribution of carbon by countries such as China, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, India, among others. The question is not whether or not industrialization leads to Co_2 emission; it is about what the countries need to do, or are doing, to reduce or eliminate Greenhouse gases. Badejo notes:

> *In their pursuit of economic stability, the so-called Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) have been steadily contributing more emissions to the atmosphere since 1980. This is to the detriment of the concept of sustainable climatic environment (pg.84)*

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The author does not just complain about the negative consequences of action and inactions that have affected the health of the global ecology, he offers some practical solutions which includes that countries of the world should:

(i)   tap into sustainable, renewable sources of energy;
(ii)   reduce politics that may hamper sustainability policy at all levels.
(iii)   disaggregate economic indices that may make some countries embark on a rat-race path of development that may further hurt the planet earth.

Perhaps a lacuna in the volume is the pass over of the significance of Climate Change for our country's contemporary security outlook. For instance, is it true that banditry and Herdsmen killings etc. could be excusable due to Climate Change? If so, are we the only country bordering the Sahel where drought had driven Fulani Cattle Herders south wards causing mayhem on farm lands? Nonetheless, Badejo's analysis points out that politics, when negatively infused, corrupts policy. When such a policy is a global effort to save the world system, the problem persists. Although, I have read the book in its manuscript format only, I anticipate that it will come out in good colour, with the layouts well aligned. There is no doubt that readers would benefit from the ideas and tips in this book. One can only hope that the book will reach the appropriate quarters, especially the decision-makers whose responsibility largely determines the implementation of these well-articulated ideas about such a topical issue as Climate Change.

African Journal of
International Affairs and Development

Volume 21 (1&2) 2017

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